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ABSTRACT
Era[c]ing Diversity is guided by a broad question of inquiry regarding the formation and
reformation of subjectivity through the filling out of “blank” forms such as the application for
naturalization. This dissertation examines how the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
uses and distributes race, and how subjects participate in the social reproduction of the
dominant ideology to create a society where individuals think: I am White; He/she is Black, or
Asian, or Native American etc. Era[c]ing Diversity examines how the N‐400 constructs the new
citizen and the ways that permanent legal residents of Mexican origin disrupt or reify this
construct. Specifically, Era[c]ing Diversity argues that the application for naturalization provides
for a restrictive view of race in the United States, and that the design of the Form N‐400 and
the ethno‐racial questions within it persuade applicants (immigrants from Mexico) to identify as
White even if they have never done so previously.
This investigation strives to understand the link between discourse and society and
employs a critical rhetorical approach that integrates the three levels of social organization:
macro, meso, and micro. This three‐part research project consists of an analysis of the
historically situated racial projects (Omi and Winant) that have transformed the racial
categories on the application for naturalization in the past century (chapter four), a “textual”
analysis of the current application for naturalization using theories of visual rhetoric (chapter
five) and ethnographic‐oriented methods (non‐participant observation, questionnaires, and
video interviews) to understand how permanent legal residents of Mexican ancestry negotiate
the application with a focus on the racial construction of the “new” U.S. citizen in this process
(chapter six). Finally, Era[c]ing Diversity considers the implications of race as presented by the
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U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the effects of the participation and negotiation
of the social reproduction of this racial discourse by this community in U.S. society.
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Chapter 1
A CRITICAL RHETORICAL APPROACH TO RACE AND THE NEW CITIZEN
We welcome the new citizen, not as a stranger but as one entering his father’s house.
President Woodrow Wilson (1917)
The only title in our democracy superior to that of President is the title of citizen.
Justice Louis Brandeis (1937)1
Generally, our western ideas of citizenship originate with Ancient Greece where
citizenship was seen as a relationship between the individual and the city‐state. Today, with the
rise of the nation‐state, citizenship is sign of membership into a certain nation. Many political
theorists assert that citizenship is a social contract that carries with it certain responsibilities
and virtues. According to William Galston, a citizen should be courageous, law‐abiding, and
loyal; socially, the citizen should be independent and open‐minded; he/she should have a
strong work ethic (economic), and politically, the citizen should respect the rights of others,
have the ability to judge the performance of elected officials, and engage in political discourse
(qtd. in Kymlicka and Norman 7‐8). The ideal citizen, as outlined by Galston, however, is far
from what the individual understands when referring to citizenship. It usually entails legal
status, identity as a member of a political community or communities, and civic activity such as
the four activities listed by Galston (Kymlicka and Norman 30‐1).
In the U.S., immigrants seeking naturalization i.e., citizenship, after a relatively short
period of residency (on average five years), are subject to learning the language (English) and
knowing something about the country’s history and political system. In addition, naturalized
citizens must demonstrate good moral character and profess loyalty to their new home.

1

(See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service 2)
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Becoming a citizen, at the individual level, carries with it certain rights (cannot be deported),
duties (voting, military participation, obeying laws, paying taxes) and benefits (access to
resources, federal assistance), but at the social level, citizenship is supposed to carry with it the
“ideal of social cohesion”(Kymlicka and Norman 31). The idea, however, of social cohesion is
nearly impossible today when most countries are culturally diverse since “in very few countries
can citizens be said to share the same language, or belong to the same ethnonational group”
(Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship 1). Yet Kymlicka argues that “most political theorists”
operate under the assumption of a homogenous nation‐state where citizens share a “common
descent, language, and culture” (Multicultural Citizenship 2). This, I would argue, is also an
underlying assumption of the naturalization process. Immigrants must demonstrate ability in
the language and culture of the U.S. Although a common descent is not asserted openly, it is,
nonetheless, an ideological assumption that is reproduced in the application for naturalization,
Form N‐400.
Will Kymlicka maintains that ethnocultural differences after WWII are handled much the
same as religious tolerance,“ethnic identity, like religion, is something which people should be
free to express in their private life, but which is not the concern of the state”(Multicultural
Citizenship 3). If this is the case, why is race still a question of relevance on the application for
naturalization? The answer lies primarily in the historic treatment of race in the U.S. and the
use of racial categories to exclude certain segments of society to the full rights and benefits of
citizenship. The 1790 Naturalization Act allowed citizenship to “white persons.” Although
naturalization requirements have changed over time, this racial requirement remained in effect
until 1952. From 1790 until 1952, it was the job of the lower courts to decide who was White.
2

This difficult task was accomplished through the consideration of various factors: observation
(skin color, physical attributes), scientific evidence, and ancestry to name a few.2
Regardless of the taxonomies developed to determine whiteness, for most of our
country’s history, being white was required for citizenship. Ian Haney López and Cheryl Harris
argue that the courts determinations on race worked to solidify the boundaries of race in U.S.
society. Harris argues that the law “affirmed critical aspects of identity (who is white); of
privilege (what benefits accrue to that status); and of what property (what legal entitlements
arise from that status)”(1725). The legal scholarship dedicated to race and scholars of critical
race theory underscore the issue that race did not precede the law, but that race, as socially
constructed, was an outcome of the laws. Haney López argues that “law is a prime suspect in
the formation of races” and that further studies should be conducted to understand the role
that law has in maintaining and sustaining race in society (White by Law 13). Specifically,
Haney‐López asks whether “legal rules construct races through the direct control of human
behavior, or do they work more subtly as an ideology shaping our notions of what is and what
can be?”(White by Law 13). This dissertation will explore the second question addressed by
Haney López by examining the establishment of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
and historic changes to naturalization law and policy. The current application for naturalization,
Form N‐400, has traces of the social, economic, ideological, and political processes that have
informed naturalization (citizenship). Permanent legal residents applying for naturalization are

2

See Haney‐López’ White by Law for more information on the legal construction of White and the historic cases
tried.
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unaware of the embedded ideologies and the consequences of acts of writing in the formation
of subjectivity at an individual and social level.
I first became aware of the implications of the application for naturalization as a
volunteer at a local non‐profit organization3 that provides assistance to immigrants. I
participated in two “citizenship drives.” The first was
part of a national campaign sponsored by the
Spanish‐language television station, Univision. The
¡Ya es hora, ciudadanía!4 (Now’s the time,
citizenship!) campaign was launched in 20085 by an
Video 1.1. “Ya es hora” 2012 PSA

alliance of private and public organizations that

promote citizenship as a means for legal residents to become more civically involved in their
communities. The local organizations provide help by way of volunteers and free legal advice to
applicants in order to facilitate the application process. It was at this event that I encountered
Juan.6 In preparation for the “citizenship” campaign event, Juan was given a checklist of
documents, information, and fees that he needed to bring with him on the day of the event.
Juan met all of the basic requirements: he was over the age of eighteen, had at least five years
as a legal resident, knew basic English, was of “good moral character,” and was knowledgeable
in U.S. history and government. He brought with him three forms of identification, two 2 x 2
photographs, and a money order made out to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service. He
also filled out a planning sheet that was part of the preparation for the application process
3

The Diocesan for Migrants and Refugees (DMRS)
Translations throughout by author
5
As we near another presidential election year, the “Ya es hora” campaign 2012 is underway.
6
Names have been changed for confidentiality.
4

4

where he annotated important dates such as travel outside of the U.S., marriage, divorce, and
birthdays of children, etc. In his rush to ensure he had all of the necessary documentation, he
gave little thought to a small but important section on the application: “Part 5. Information for
Criminal Records Search.” (See Figure 1.1 below)

Figure 1.1 Part 5. Information for Criminal Records Check
This “part” of the document asked Juan to answer questions about his gender, height, weight,
and whether he was Hispanic or Latino. He assumed that he was since he was from Mexico and
checked the box marked “yes.” Question 5.E. asked him to select one or more races and this
question baffled him. He stopped and asked the volunteer if he had to answer this question.
She told him, “yes;” According to the instructions he had to choose at least one box. The
problem, thought Juan, was that he did not understand why Hispanic and Latino were not
considered racial categories. Also, since he did not identify as Asian, American Indian or Alaskan
Native, or Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander that left only two blocks, White and Black7

7

Although it is the norm in scholarly literature to use lower case letters when referring to the racial categories of
white and black, I choose to use uppercase letters to highlight the fact that they are racial categories and to
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or African American. As a Mexican immigrant of dark complexion, he had never thought of
himself as either White or Black. He was tempted to
check Black, but he did not identify with the African
American culture and therefore opted for White. Now, a
third option seemed plausible; he could mark both
White and Black, but that also did not seem adequate. In
Video 1.2 Antonio and Race

the end, Juan opted for White. (This was also the case with

Antonio, who participated in this study; Antonio discusses his option to self identify in Video
1.2.8)
It was precisely this situation that intrigued this researcher. After volunteering in two
citizenship events and helping over fifty immigrants from Mexico fill out the Form N‐400, I
began to question how this important form for naturalization had much broader implications in
the construction of race in the U.S. In the United States, the idea of race and specifically the
Black/White paradigm has become the defining feature of social structure (Kymlicka Liberalism)
and therefore remains an important facet of U.S. society. Although this system of racial
oppression has been dismantled since the end of slavery and racial segregation, the idea of
racial categories has become part of American culture (Goldberg), and the binary divide of Black
and White continues to reign despite immigration policy that supports diversity9. Yet when

differentiate them from other uses of the words black/white. When quoting another source, I do not change the
original formatting as intended by the cited author. The reason for capital letters is articulated by Kimberlé
Crenshaw who states that “Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities’ constitute a specific cultural group
and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun” (1332 n.2).
8
I incorporate video here and in chapter six. Translations are provided, as necessary. Please refer to the key ( ) in
the text.
9
According to a recent Congressional Budget Office Paper titled “Immigration Policy in the United States,”
immigration policy serves four main goals: to “reunite families,” “admit workers with specific skills,” “provide

6

faced with questions of identity, applicants for naturalization are asked to not declare their
diversity, but conform to the U.S. conception of race. This is evident by the severely limiting
options the applicant has to choose from. Because of this and other issues, my dissertation
investigates the discursive nature of race and ethnicity and the implications of citizenship in the
racialization of Mexican immigrants in the U.S.
1.1 Major Questions
The overarching question of inquiry for this investigation is:
How does the application for naturalization (N‐400) construct the new citizen and how
does this community disrupt or reify this construct?
And specifically:
1. What are the historically situated racial projects that inform the current racial
discourse of the N‐400? (Chapter 4)
2. How does the visual rhetoric of the form (N‐400) construct and persuade its users?
(Chapter 5)
3. How do applicants negotiate race as presented in the application for naturalization?
(Chapter 6)
These are essential questions because the racial categories on the application for
naturalization do not encourage diversity but rather support the melting pot metaphor of
assimilation. Given my location as a researcher on the U.S./Mexico border and my experience
working with a local non‐profit organization, my study will focus on legal residents from Mexico
applying for naturalization. This is an important group to study since “Mexico accounts for 31.3
percent of all immigration, with 11.7 million immigrants living in the United States, more than
refuge” for persons facing persecution, and “ensure diversity by providing admission to people from countries with
historically low rates of immigration” (U.S. Congress vii).

7

the number of immigrants from any other region of the world” (Center for Immigration
Studies). The largest number of legal immigrants in the U.S. comes from Mexico; therefore, the
racialization of this group of immigrants will have the most impact on the conception of race in
the U.S. Furthermore, the outcome of this study will be relevant to the racialization of
immigrants from Latin America, as “54.6 percent of the foreign‐born” are from these areas
(Center for Immigration Studies).
In “Becoming American: The Hidden Core of the Immigration Debate,” Stanley Renshon
states that there are three essential steps that immigrants must take in order to become part of
the American national community: they must adapt to American culture, acquire the language
(English), and be civically engaged. Does cultural adaptation also include adaptation to the
racial categories of defining self in the U.S.? Although I do not believe that it is an explicit part
of cultural adaptation, the fact remains that the application for naturalization ignores the ways
different groups of people from diverse countries define themselves and race. The current
question of racial identity on the N‐400 influences the majority of Hispanic or Latino10
applicants to choose between Black and White, thereby reinforcing the culture of Black/White
as the dominating categories. This study will examine, through the lens of rhetorical theory,
how these individuals experience race. Since race and identity are complex issues, this will
require a few “border crossings” of my own into other disciplines such as sociology and
discourse studies in order to provide an account of the construction of race at the societal,
institutional, and individual levels.

10

I choose to use Hispanic/Latino interchangeably in this document. Although I disagree with the use of the labels
Hispanic/Latino since they “typically collapse diverse peoples into a single overarching group” (Cobas, Duany, and
Feagin 9), these are the terms used on the N‐400 as well as the U.S. Census forms.
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1.2 Rationale
Although there is an abundance of studies that examine race at the macro level, few
have focused on the daily experiences of individuals, and none have looked at race‐making in
the context of citizenship at the individual level. This study will examine this understudied
dimension of race and ask: How is race experienced in everyday situations? How do legal
residents applying for citizenship understand race? Do they accept or reject the racial
framework provided for them? Does this framework influence their ways of self‐identification?
What are the broader ramifications of the choices for self‐identification in U.S. society? This
study will be ethnographic in scope and implement questionnaires and video interviews with
legal residents in the process of applying for citizenship. Their accounts will problematize
further the racial paradigm in the U.S. and expand upon much needed research in this area
from the perspective of Rhetoric and Composition.
In addition, this research adds to an already growing body of work related to the
construction of race in society. While other research has focused on producing a theory of
racialization (Hall; Omi; Winant; Fenton) this research applies these theories to understand the
role of writing in the process of becoming a naturalized citizen. Other research has examined
the legal construction of race and the U.S. Census as part of this process (Rumbaut; C.
Rodríguez; Haney López to name a few), but I critically examine the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the application for naturalization.

9

1.3 Investigation of the Research Questions
It is the aim of this research to investigate racial identity as rhetorically constructed.
Language is a means to construct social realities and be constructed by them. Language is also
the node in a dense network that connects us to other elements of social life and necessitates a
“critical” lens. According to Raymie McKerrow, “a critical rhetoric serves a demystifying
function…by demonstrating the silent and often non‐deliberate ways in which rhetoric conceals
as much as it reveals through its relationship with power/knowledge” (92). This critical
rhetorical approach will be informed by discourse analysis.11
Although there are many versions of discourse analysis, in general these approaches
can be divided by those that include detailed analyses of texts and those that do not (see van
Dijk 1997). According to Norman Fairclough, “discourse analysis in social sciences is often
strongly influenced by Foucault” and “generally pay little attention to the linguistic features of
texts” (Analysing Discourse 2). Fairclough’s own approach to discourse analysis tries to
transcend this divide by analyzing texts for the “socially constructive effects of discourse” while
also investigating the effects of this discourse when people talk or write (Analysing Discourse 3).
This study also works to incorporate the macro (societal), meso (intermediate or institutional)
and micro (individual) effects of discourse in society by analyzing specific texts (the act of
writing your identity at the individual level) as well as analyzing the social structuring of
language by investigating the historic changes to the racial identity question in the past century.
The racial identity questions in the current application for naturalization are the outcome of
these historic changes and constitute the meso‐level of analysis. Although the overarching
11

In chapter three, methodology, I explain in detail my strategy termed a critical rhetoric approach informed by
discourse analysis.
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methodological framework for this study is critical rhetorical analysis, this research will also
require the integration of other forms of analysis, such as ethnography and visual rhetoric. To
understand race at the micro‐level of lived experience necessitates ethnographic research
methods such as questionnaires and interviews. The meso‐level of racialization will require
discourse analysis of the Form N‐400 with attention to the fine‐grained details of the “text”
(linguistic features) while incorporating the lens of visual rhetoric to analyze the overall design
of the Form. Finally, critical rhetoric will serve to link the three levels (macro, meso, and micro)
to understand their effect on the racialization of new citizens in the United States.
1.4 Outline of the Chapters
I now turn to an outline of the dissertation. In chapter two, literature review, I provide
an overview of the major theories that inform this study. This discussion begins with the
integration of three sociological theories of racial formation (Hall; Omi and Winant; and
Fenton). Since these theories place discourse at the center of the production, and consumption
of racial ideology, I argue for rhetoric’s place in racial formation theory through the role of
discourse and ideology. Next, I turn to the relation of rhetoric and ideology and the treatment
of this by Rhetoric’s most cited scholar on the subject, James Berlin. Recent critiques of Berlin’s
theorization of rhetoric and ideology by Raúl Sánchez lead to a reinterpretation of the
Althusserian concept of ideology. Sánchez argues that Althusser theorizes “ideology” and
“ideologies” (two separate concepts) and that “ideologies” can be located (and resisted) in text.
This understanding of ideologies conceives of writing as “acts of subject formation (and
reformation)” (Sánchez 743). Sánchez’ interpretation of rhetoric and ideology (a là Althusser) is
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congruent with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony12 and Foucault’s order of discourse13 and is
discussed at length in this chapter. Chapter three describes the methodology. I mentioned
previously that the analytic approach used for this study is critical rhetoric informed by
discourse analysis. I begin the chapter with an overview of discourse analyses in Rhetoric and
Composition and outline a critical rhetorical approach that incorporates Norman Fairclough’s
Critical Discourse Analysis14 (2003, 2001, 1997, 1995, 1992, 1989). Fairclough’s model is
context‐driven and strives to explain how language functions in society and its effects at the
macro, meso, and micro15 levels. Investigating race at the different levels requires a mixed‐
methodology that incorporates “text” analysis, questionnaires, interviews, and secondary data
from the U.S. Census and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Chapters four, five,
and six are dedicated to the different levels of analysis. In chapter four, I conducted primary
research at the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service Historical Library in Washington D.C. to
investigate the historic changes to the racial identity questions on the application for
naturalization. I present the historically situated racial projects16 that relate to the racialization
of U.S. society with a focus on naturalization law, treatises, court decisions, and immigration
policies that affected Mexican immigrants in particular. This historiography serves to
understand the major changes in the application regarding race and ethnicity and link these
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By hegemony, Gramsci meant “the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes,
beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations” (B. Burke).
13
According to Foucault, the order of discourse refers to the ways discourse is produced, controlled, selected,
organized and redistributed by “procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers…” (“The Order of
Discourse” 52).
14
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in capitals refers specifically to Fairclough’s model.
15
Fairclough does not use these terms (macro, meso, micro) but does refer to three levels of society.
16
Racial formations, according to Omi and Winant, are “created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” by
“historically situated projects” where human bodies and social structures are represented, organized and ruled (
“Racial Formation”124).
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changes to any major changes in immigration and naturalization. I discuss these findings and
compare it to the U.S. Census Bureau’s treatment of race and ethnicity. This is important
because both the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Census Bureau
follow the Office of Management and Budget’s revised Directive 15 adopted in 1997 which
changed the racial categories to five: “American Indian or Alaska Native,” Native Hawaiian or
Other Pacific Islander,” “Asian,” “Black or African American,” and “White.” This directive also
allowed for the option to choose more than one racial category; an option that did not exist
prior to the 2000 census. According to Rumbaut, it also changed the two ethnic identifiers to
“Hispanic or Latino” and “not Hispanic or Latino” (25). The changes to the census forms and the
applications for naturalization are the outcome of the articulation (Hall) of political, ideological,
historical, social, and economical processes but manifest differently.
In chapter five, I analyze the current application for naturalization, Form N‐400 (revised
18 Jan. 2011) using visual rhetorical theory. Carlos Salinas argues that technical rhetoricians
should incorporate graphic design theory in the “reading” and “writing” of images. In accord
with this, I employ the graphic design principles of Robin Williams to “read” the blank form and
present my findings and their implications. This analysis incorporates a fine detailed text
analysis of the Form N‐400 with attention to the ways the Form constructs and constrains its
users. In chapter six, I attend to the micro level of racial formation, the individual. I examine
how the permanent legal resident negotiates the racial questions on the Form N‐400. This
required the use of ethnographic methods such as questionnaire, non‐participant observation
and video interviews. The group‐administered questionnaires were given to students attending
free, local citizenship classes in the El Paso area. I queried fifty‐five participants about how they
13

preferred to self‐identify and asked them to answer the racial identity questions from the 2010
census and the Form N‐400. In addition, participants were asked about the overall design of the
document and whether or not this was a factor in their responses. I present the findings from
the questionnaire and integrate participant comments, class observations, and video interviews
to elaborate further on the participants’ responses on the questionnaire. Finally, I incorporate
the macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis to understand how the naturalization process
constructs the new citizen.
1.5 A Note about Terminology: Text, Discourse, Language, and Rhetoric
I use the term text in a very broad sense; a text17 in general will refer to anything
“written.” This could also include a transcript of the spoken word, or even a webpage, or in the
case of this study, the official form for applying for naturalization. By including a webpage as an
example of a text, I am deliberately alluding to electronic discourse, which includes the
blending of technologies and media to include images. In fact, the webpage, as well as the N‐
400 is an image (see Ding). Writing is an act of creating and can take on various forms.
Language will be used to refer to “whole” language, such as the English language. Discourse will
refer to the structural aspect of texts as an element of social life. However, both the terms
language and discourse can be used in specific as well as abstract ways. Rhetoric is a slippery
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Brian McNely examines our field’s troubling reliance on terms such as text and intertextuality in his dissertation:
Uncommonplaces: Redirecting Research and Curricula in Rhetoric and Writing (2009). I agree with McNely’s
assertion that approaching all rhetorical artifacts and acts as textual is reductive in nature (8), and I cringe at times
with the differentiation between terms such as discourse/image/text even as it is used within this dissertation.
However, there does not exist, in my opinion, a vocabulary (in our discipline) that is adequate to replace these
terms.
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term that can be defined as “situated strategic discourse.”18 In a general sense, rhetoric and
discourse can be synonymous, but I want to emphasize the notion of rhetoric as situational and
strategic; therefore rhetoric is context and purpose driven—it has social effects and can
influence change in our beliefs, attitudes, and our identity. It is also always ideological. Rhetoric
is then a modality of power, and these ideological constructions can be identified in texts as
well as enacted in society. For this reason, social research that is limited only to textual analysis
will not be able to fully address the social and ideological effects of discourse. How meaning is
made or how race is constructed requires the examination of the text itself (N‐400), and the
interpretation of the text in particular areas of social life—on new citizens integrating into U.S.
society.

18

Situated strategic discourse is a common definition and has been used by many rhetoricians. It is attributed to
Traci Zimmerman in “The Introduction to Rhetorical Practices.”
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Although identity may be socially constructed through discourse as our invocations of
postmodern and cultural theories assume… We don’t live identity as discourse; we live identity
within bodies. (LeCourt 21)
Why is it that so many compositionists insist on the rhetorically complex composition of “selves”
until it involves critical and emotional issues like racism? (West “The Racist Other”)

The persistent view of race in society as biological, and the continued dominance of the
Black/White paradigm in the U.S. (despite increased immigration from diverse countries in the
last 70 years) is a source of frustration for Critical Legal and Critical Race scholars. In surveying
the current theories of racial formation, it is apparent that these theories share a common
thread: racialization is about rhetoric and ideology, and “who” controls the circulation of the
two. Thus, I argue that Rhetoric and Composition is the most apt to forward Critical Race
Theory’s agenda.
I begin the discussion with one of the most influential scholars in our field regarding the
relation of rhetoric and ideology, James Berlin, and the critiques of his treatment of the two, by
Raul Sánchez. Sánchez argues that Berlin’s rhetoric is subsumed by ideology and that this
understanding of rhetoric/ideology has not been “useful” for composition. Sánchez offers an
alternative interpretation of Althusser’s ideology that promotes the role of writers and writing
in the formation of society and subjectivity. This interpretation underscores my argument that
writing (broadly conceived) is vital to maintaining the status quo in U.S. society. It also
advocates textual analyses since ideologies can be located (and resisted) in concrete (textual or
16

linguistic) objects. The “location” of ideologies and the analysis of text has been a source of
controversy in Rhetoric and Composition (Faigley; Crowley), but Sánchez’ interpretation of
rhetoric and ideology (à la Althusser) is congruent with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and
Foucault’s orders of discourse.
2.1 Racial Formation
Historically, the concept of race can be traced from slavery and the massive colonization
efforts of the English, Dutch, Spanish, French and Portuguese.19 This laid the groundwork for
the categorization of the races through scientific methods during the 1600s. The pseudo‐
sciences like that of phrenology and craniotomy provided the “evidence” to categorize race
hierarchically with White at the top and Black at the bottom in the Western world. Racial
categories emerged as a way to link skin color, mental, and intellectual traits to a group of
people and treat these traits as predestined. Subsequent generations accepted racial divisions
as natural (and scientifically backed) and reified them through a system of privileges that
excluded non‐Whites from important rights and freedoms. Race as a natural phenomenon was
so readily consumed and distributed in society, that by the time of the first national census in
the U.S. (1790), the nation “not only counted its population,” but also “racially classified it”
(Prewitt 5). This habit20 of racial classification continues from one decennial census count to
another. Although racial classification has remained a constant staple of the census, the racial
categories have shifted continually in response to changes in politics, science, and
demographics (Prewitt 6).

19

For a detailed account of the history of race in the U.S. see Winthrop Jordan, Edmund Morgan, Theodore Allen,
Kathleen Brown, and Matthew Jacobson
20
See Terrance MacMullan for discussion of the habits of Whiteness.
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One major shift in scientific thinking occurred with the advent of sociological theories of
knowledge and became influential in the U.S. with the publication of The Social Construction of
Reality by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966). Berger and Luckmann assert that the
worlds we live in are not some objective natural phenomena, but are socially constructed
through a myriad of social practices. Our commonsense knowledge of the world is constituted
by the ways we talk about, write it, and enact it. This new theory of representing reality altered
significantly how we understand race. Today scholars agree that race is a social and
psychological construction, and that there is “no biological basis for distinguishing among
groups along the lines of race” (Omi and Winant 123). Under this shift, race is no longer linked
to physical, biological, or mental traits, but is defined as “a concept that signifies and symbolizes
sociopolitical conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies” (Winant
“Race and Race Theory” 172) 21. This is not to say that the biological vestiges of race do not still
permeate society and complicate our notions of race, but scholars reject any link between race
and biology.
Since racial categories are artificial human creations, various scholars from diverse
disciplines such as African Studies, American Studies, African American Studies, Critical Race
Theory, Critical Legal Studies, Sociology, Psychology, Biology, Communication, and Rhetoric
have spent the last few decades studying racialization and how it is sustained and distributed in
society. Some of the most noted contemporary theories of race have been argued by British
sociologists Stuart Hall and Steve Fenton as well as American sociologists Howard Winant and
Michael Omi. The theories presented by these scholars (and discussed in the following sections)
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Also Omi and Winant “Racial Formation” 123.
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underscore that race is the outcome of historical, political, economic, and cultural processes
that are enacted (and the result of interaction) at all levels of society.
In “Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance” (1980), Stuart Hall offers
the metaphor of articulation to indicate that race is a complex structure that involves “relations
of linkage and effectivity between different levels of all sorts of things” (Foster‐Carter qtd. in
Hall 44). Hall adds that “these things require to be linked because, though connected, they are
not the same” (44). Drawing upon the works of Althusser and Balibar, Hall explains that an
articulation is composed of different instances; these “instances” are economic, political,
ideological, and historical and involve hierarchical and lateral relations. The outcome is a
production, distribution, and exchange of “race” that positions different social groups in
relation to one another. These “instances” or levels also represent the “structured relations
between its parts, i.e., relations of dominance and subordination,” and include the material and
individual levels of society (44). Hall’s theory of articulation is also a criticism of the current
tendencies in theory to explain race from either an economic or sociological stance, thereby
discarding the notion that class in a capitalistic society determines race. Instead, Hall outlines a
theory by which different levels or instances influence each other through an articulation of
dominance in a specific historical context that allows for the social persistence of certain social
practices within a society. One such example would be, despite the rejection by scholars that
people can be grouped into racial categories, the articulation of dominance allows for the social
persistence of this practice and provides the categories that are considered appropriate: White,
Black, Native American, Native Hawaiian, etc. while designating which categories are not
considered racial: Hispanic and Latino.
19

Working within Hall’s framework, Omi and Winant (2002, 1998, 1994, 1986)22, Winant
(1994; 2000) develop a theory of racialization based upon the pre‐existing discursive practices
that describe race termed “racial formations.” Racial formations, according to Omi and Winant,
are “created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” by “historically situated projects” where
human bodies and social structures are represented, organized and ruled (“Racial Formation”
124). The historically situated projects do the ideological work of linking structure and
representation; it “connect[s] what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways
in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon
that meaning” (Omi and Winant “Racial Formation” 125). Racial projects occur at the macro
level (i.e. state) and micro levels (everyday experience), in the political spectrum and across
historical time; this suggests that our “society is suffused with racial projects, large and small, to
which all are subjected” (Omi and Winant “Racial Formation” 127). Racial projects are diverse
and include “large‐scale public action, state activities, and interpretations of racial conditions in
artistic, journalistic, or academic fora, as well as the seemingly infinite number of racial
judgments and practices that we carry out at the level of individual experience” (Omi and
Winant “Racial Formation” 128). Examples of these racial projects include laws that legally
excluded non‐Whites from certain rights and privileges in society, such as citizenship or the
policies of Affirmative Action endorsed by institutions and government agencies. Both of these
projects have contributed to our present understandings of race in the U.S. For example, the
1790 Naturalization Act defined U.S. citizens in terms of race by designating that only White
persons could become citizens. This law conferred privileges to White persons; thus ordering
22

In this dissertation, I cite specifically the two essays by Omi and Winant published in 1998 and 2002. Please note
that the difference in the two versions is that the 1998 version is in the plural “Racial Formations.”
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hierarchically U.S. society through racial designations. Likewise, policies like Affirmative Action,
which have been implemented to ensure equality in U.S. society are also based on racial
categories, and therefore depend upon the continued practice of racially categorizing people.
Steve Fenton engages further the discourse of race and ethnicity and the process of
racialization in his book Ethnicity, Racism, Class and Culture (1999). In his theory of ethnic23
formation, Fenton identifies three social levels where we can observe ethnicity: the macro,
meso, and micro.24 The macro level is comprised of the major economic and political structures
of the social order, the meso—the intermediate institutions (or structures) between the
individual and the state, and the micro—the everyday interactions of social life (Fenton 13‐14).
Fenton places greatest importance on the intermediate—the meso‐structures of social
institutions. These institutions, such as schools and universities, act as a link between the
individual and the state.25 These are “of central importance” because it is through them that
“cultural capital for advancement is acquired” and “cultural identities are preserved” (14). It is
here, Fenton argues, where the most decisive cultural battles are enacted because schools are
most often the instrument used to maintain dominance in society, whether through language
or culture. He explains the importance of the meso‐level through an example of the school
system. Schools, argue Fenton, reinforce the dominant ideology by privileging specific forms of
knowledge, skills, and abilities that are valued by the dominant groups in society. Students who
come to school with technological skills and the related vocabulary are valued in the school
23

Fenton prefers the use of the term ethnicity since it does not “suffer from the historical association of error that
race does” (6). In this case, Fenton, along with a growing group of social scientists, have replaced the word race
with the word ethnicity to refer to self‐identifying groups based on shared traits such as religion, nationality,
culture or language.
24
Fenton calls these levels of social formation: macro‐social formations, meso‐structures of social institutions, and
micro‐social life (13).
25
These meso‐structures can be independent or regulated by the state (Fenton 14).
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setting whereas students who do not have access to computers at home and who do not
possess these skills are labeled “deficient.” Although Fenton highlights educational institutions
as a prime example of the meso‐structures, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is
another meso‐level structure that mediates between the individual and the state. It is through
the legal residency and naturalization process that the three levels (macro, micro and meso) are
articulated simultaneously. At the macro‐level, the U.S. Government provides the policies for
immigration and defines who can apply for citizenship, who is a good candidate for citizenship,
and through the presence of racial categories on the application, designates that race is an
important part of U.S. society to new citizens. At the micro‐level, individuals reconcile their
experiences with the pre‐defined racial and ethnic categories provided on the official forms for
immigration.
Fenton also recognizes the importance of language in the construction of ethno‐racial
identities. “Ethnicity‐making situations” occur at all levels of society (macro, meso, micro) and
in all types of contexts from nation‐states, proto‐nations, indigenous, and urban contexts.26
Ethnic classifications frequently come to form, “as a matter of law or a matter of fact, a
constituent element of politics” (23) and different groups of people have differential access to
political power—which shapes ethnic ideology:
The boundaries of ethnic groups are symbolically represented—as the bearers a
specific language, religion, or more generally, ‘culture’; but they are also
materially constituted within the structures of power and wealth. Thus, ethnicity
should be regarded as materially and symbolically constituted, as a systemic
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See chapter one of Fenton for detailed discussion of “ethnicity‐making situations.”
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feature beyond the reach of individual actors, as well as a dimension of
individual action itself. (Fenton 25)
The three theories of ethno‐racial formation presented here have one uniting theme:
racialization is connected to practices of representation. Hall states that race articulation is
composed of “instances” that are constituted and reconstituted through ideological
representation and discourse (“Race, Articulation” 62‐64); Omi and Winant state that
racialization occurs when “human bodies and social structures are represented, (my emphasis)
organized, and ruled (“Racial Formation” 124), and Fenton asserts that “boundaries of ethnic
groups are symbolically represented (my emphasis)….” (25). Hall stresses that these practices of
representation “connect meaning and language to culture” and that “meaning is constructed in
and through language” (“The Work of Representation” 15). Hall explains further that a socially
shared system of meaning allows us to transmit and express meaning, but that practices of
representation are not reduced to language in a narrow sense; it includes words, sounds,
images, things—any sign or signifying practice that produces meaning.
In the discussion of racial theory and representation, Hall, Omi and Winant, and Fenton
agree that racialization is not just about representation, but a struggle over controlling
signifying practices. Hall calls this a structure of dominance; Omi and Winant mention the
organization and ruling of human bodies and social structures, and Fenton explains that the
language of constructionism (his emphasis) elaborates on a much older theme in sociology, that
of “the importance of social definitions, and the social power mobilised by those who are in a
position to create and sustain both the labels and the meanings the labels confer” (11‐12). This
struggle to/for representation has material, political and social consequences and are
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historically contingent; representation is multiple and changes over time. It is also ideological;
Hall as well as Omi and Winant stress that racial formation is an ideological process while
Fenton indirectly states that racialization refers to “a set of powerful ideas and beliefs about
‘race’” and the consequences of these ideas in society (4). Where exactly do these ideological
processes occur? Hall emphasizes discourse as the carrier of ideology (“Who”); Fenton locates
ideology in culture, but adds that “language is a fact of life but it is also a dimension of the
politics of culture” (6). In an earlier essay (1998) titled “Racial Formations,” Omi and Winant
declare that racial subjection is ideological. This subjection renders racial ideology as common
sense and these beliefs act as an “amateur biology” (“Racial Formations” 17). This “amateur
biology” orders people and our perceptions of them and is “too essential, too integral to the
maintenance of the US social order” (17). Omi and Winant refer to this as a “system of racial
meanings and stereotypes of racial ideology” that has become a “permanent feature of US
culture” (17). Racial representations in U.S. society, according to Omi and Winant, tend to
present a view of race that is fixed and immutable rather than historically contingent. Omi and
Winant emphasize the role of discourse in racial ideology and define racialization as:
an ideological process, an historically specific one. Racial ideology is constructed
from pre‐existing conceptual (or, if one prefers, “discursive”) elements and
emerges from the struggles of competing political projects and ideas seeking to
articulate similar elements differently. (“Racial Formations” 18)
It is through these “discursive elements” that distinctions among groups are created,
reinforced, and challenged. Omi and Winant do not elaborate on the concept of discursive
elements, but that these elements do the ideological work of creating reality and sustaining a
24

version of reality. At the same time, there is no unity among discursive elements, so that
competing and conflicting versions of reality are constantly challenging the dominant ideology.
2.2 Rhetoric, Composition, and the “Absent Presence” of Race
Given the important role of discourse in sociological theories of racial formation, we
could assume that race would be a central object of study in Rhetoric and Composition. Yet
more than a decade ago, Catherine Prendergast and Keith Gilyard27 observed that race was
“undertheorized, unproblematized, and under investigated in composition research—“
(Prendergast 36). In an aptly titled essay, Prendergast laments race as an “absent presence” in
composition studies and racism as an “absent absence” (her emphasis) (36). Prendergast
explains this absence in part on the “color‐ and power‐evasive paradigms” (Frankenberg) of
race that dominate composition studies. This concern is echoed by Victor Villanueva who also
calls for a move away from these paradigms in favor of what he terms a colonial sensibility28.
The problem, notes Prendergast, is that race is often used in identifying research subjects but
not theorized or addressed in the research:
For while it [race] is often called upon as a category to delineate cultural groups
that will be the focal subjects of research studies, the relationship of race to the
composing process is seldom fully explored. Instead race becomes subsumed
into the powerful tropes of “basic writer,” “stranger” to the academy, or the
trope of the generalized, marginalized “other.” (36)
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As mentioned in Prendergast from a conference presentation delivered at the Watson Conference on Rhetoric
and Composition, 1996.
28
Villanueva argues: “The demand for linguistic and rhetorical compliance still smacks of colonialism practices
which reproduce, in effect, the colonial histories of America's people of color. What we need, I'd say, is a greater
consciousness of the pervasiveness of the ethnocentricity from which we wish to break away. ” He proposes what
he terms a colonial sensibility.
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Timothy Barnett also criticizes the unwillingness of English Studies to interrogate discourses of
whiteness despite English Studies’ great interest in critical pedagogies since the 1960s. In his
discussion of including discourses of whiteness in the composition classroom, he also advocates
for the study of the ways race “has proven to be a critical site of power relations in the United
States” and “the power racial discourses maintain in our lives and the power we have to revise
them” (14). This type of investigation is clearly, states Barnett, the domain of scholars in English
Studies. Prendergast also advocates a turn to investigate the textual practices that a priori
socialize students into discourses of race and power relations without reducing it to a
pedagogical model or application (49). Prendergast understands that the challenge, then, is to
theorize race (to include whiteness) in a way that does not “reinscribe people of color as either
foreign or invisible” (51). Once composition scholars engage race and racism at this level, then
composition can begin to counteract the discourses of race that permeate the classroom and
beyond (Prendergast 51). What Prendergast is forwarding, in my opinion, is a return to
investigate the implications of race and the writing subject outside of the composition
classroom. Even though the classroom is undoubtedly a “social affair” (Bruffee 775), our
scholarship and research on race have remained circumscribed by our pedagogy.
This study attempts to address the “absent presence” of race in Rhetoric and Composition
Studies by specifically focusing on writing and writing subjects in the social construction of race
in the U.S. This is an important endeavor because after the publication of Prendergast’s essay,
race has still been largely ignored from a composition perspective. Race is a prominent theme
in communications departments, and a survey of the current literature demonstrates the
breadth of the research in areas such as media (Zagacki; Cisneros; Owen and Ehrenhaus), global
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politics (Barber); terrorism (Cloud), public discourse (Roberts‐Miller; Asen; Gunn; Goldzwig),
cultural identity (Carstaphen and Sánchez), health (Happe), writing (Canagarajah), racism
(Crenshaw), race relations (Hatch), whiteness (Moon and Flores; Nakayama and Krisek; Shome)
and critical rhetoric (Roberts‐Miller; Flores and Moon)29.
The absence of race in composition studies is lamentable since composition and
especially critical rhetoric is perhaps the most apt to further Critical Race Theory’s (CRT)30
agenda to uncover and contest racial subordination. Critical Race Theory accomplishes this by
rejecting three mainstream beliefs: 1. Colorblindness will erase racism; 2. Racism is a matter of
individuals, not systems; and 3. Racism can be countered without paying attention to other
forms of oppression (gender, class, etc.) (Valdes, Culp, and Harris 1‐2). The mission and goals of
CRT has had far reaching affects outside of legal academia and has flourished as critical race
feminists, queers, and Latino/as have added to the body of work of racial injustice to include
sexual oppression, culture, language, and immigration etc. (Valdes, Culp and Harris 4). Despite
the expansion of critical race scholars in the past two decades, it is apparent that CRT alone
cannot address and dismantle racial oppression from a juridical perspective alone. This is where
critical rhetoric can further Critical Race Theory’s goals. According to Flores and Moon, critical
rhetoricians emphasize “the workings of power, dominance, subordination, and
marginalization” and “call for new definitions and understandings of power that complicate
juridical notions of power, coercion and punishment” (183). Furthermore, Flores and Moon
note that “critical rhetoricians explain how and why traditionally marginalized and
29

This list is not exhaustive. In a search under the keywords “race” and “rhetoric” in the databases JSTOR and
Academic Search Premier, the overwhelming majority of the items encountered were from communication
journals rather than composition.
30
Critical Race Theory (CRT) began as an offshoot to Critical legal studies in the late 1980s and was founded on the
basic premise that the American legal system is structured to maintain White privilege (Valdes, Culp and Harris, 1).
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disenfranchised peoples participate in their own disciplining processes and continue to have
faith in dominant discourses” (183). This speaks to one of CRT’s main frustrations: if race is a
social construct, then why does the public, legislators and the judiciary not recognize this?
Critical rhetoric can attend to this by addressing how to translate social construction theory for
these audiences and also by focusing on “the micropolitics of local power relations” (Flores and
Moon 183). By the “micropolitics of local power relations,” Flores and Moon mean the strategic
workings of race and power at the level of the everyday through the examination of various
cultural texts that speak to the marginalized. Although rhetoric and composition has been quick
to include alternative discourses and silenced voices in the rhetorical tradition and issues of
cultural and linguistic diversity in the classroom, the discipline has not turned its attention to
the intersections of critical race theory and critical rhetorical theory to understand how
discourses of race function in society. In this dissertation, I seek to contribute to this
intersection by questioning the grand narrative that “American” is the equivalent of “White”
and scrutinize the Black/White binary of race by including the experiences of permanent legal
residents of Mexican descent seeking citizenship.
This undertaking also furthers an area of CRT that is undertheorized and under
investigated: immigration. In “Race, and the Immigration Laws: The Need for Critical Inquiry,”
Kevin Johnson argues that CRT (nor Lat/Crit or Asian American Legal Scholars) has not
sufficiently analyzed immigration law (187) and that we need to look at immigration law
outside the lens of Black and White. Although this dissertation does not turn its attention to
immigration law, it focuses on the impact of racial naming, which is informed by immigration
law, and how these “neutral” questions about racial identity obscures the grand narratives
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embedded in them and the role of writing in this process. But despite the importance of the
micropolitics of power, rhetoric and composition has been slow to theorize how writers
become racial subjects and the role of ideology in this theoretical question.31
2.3 Writing Subjects
To understand the role of discourse in the process of racial formation, it is important to
begin with one of the most influential scholars in our field regarding writing theory and writing
subjects: James Berlin. The foundation for Berlin’s rhetorical theory was presented first in
“Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories” (1982). In this essay, Berlin
presents the major pedagogical theories used in composition and argues for the importance of
understanding that pedagogical theories are grounded in rhetorical theories. Furthermore, he
argues that the different approaches that instructors use in teaching the composing process are
“located in diverging definitions of the composing process itself,” and the ways that writer,
reality, audience, and language are understood both separately and as they relate to each other
(765‐766). Berlin identifies four “dominant groups” or rhetorical theories that are used by
rhetoricians: the “Neo‐Aristotelians or Classicists,” “Positivists or Current‐Traditionalists,” “Neo‐
Platonists or Expressionists” and the “New Rhetoricians” (766).
How these dominant groups define writer, reality, audience, language, and truth are
summarized in the chart that follows. In Berlin’s discussion of these four theoretical
approaches, it is ironic that he does not enter into a discussion of ideology or subjectivity; these
terms are absent from the discussion. It is in his later essay “Rhetoric and Ideology in the
Writing Class”(1988) that Berlin states that the “question of ideology is never far from
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discussions of writing instruction”(477). In this essay, Berlin, again, is concerned with the
pedagogical implications of rhetorical theory, but he enters the discussion by focusing on
rhetoric and ideology in three rhetorics: cognitive psychology, expressionism, and social
epistemic. Berlin’s treatment of ideology in this essay has implications for writing theory
beyond the pedagogical and political, and, states Sánchez, “has explicitly and beneficially
complicated rhetoric and composition’s orientation toward its objects of study: writing and
writing subjects” (“Composition’s Ideology” 741). In contending with the issue of ideology,
Berlin expands upon how each of the three rhetorics deals with and defines the writing subject.
Cognitivists believe “the structures of the mind correspond in perfect harmony with the
structures of the material world, the minds of the audience, and the units of language” (480).
Writing is viewed as problem solving, and the composing process is given scientific examination
(Flowers and Hayes). “The real is rational,” (482) and the words ‘self’ and ‘subject’ are absent
because the “existent” is inscribed in the things as “indisputable scientific facts” (484).
Expressionists believe in “the inherent goodness of the individual” subject (484). Reality serves
only the needs of the individual, and the material, the social, and the linguistic serve the
interests of locating the individual’s authentic self (484). The discovery of the true self is as
important as the product. Power is vested in the individual who uses the world (material,
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Table 2.1 Berlin’s Paradigms of Rhetorical Theoryb
Neo‐Aristotelians or
Classicists

Positivists or Current
Traditionalists
(Cognitive
Psychology*)
Individual sense
impressions leads to
knowledge; “must
reproduce the objects
and the experience of
them in the minds of
the hearers” (770)
The material world
exists independently

Neo‐Platonists or
Expressionists

New Rhetoric (Social
Epistemic*)

Writer at center of
communication;
Comes to Truth or
Knowledge through
dialectic process with
audience/hearer

Creator of meaning,
shaper of reality (776),
but language is socially
constructed and “truth
is impossible without
language” (774).

The material world
exists independently
and is always “in flux”
(771).
Enters in dialogue with
writer as a way to
discover ultimate
knowledge/truth

Multiple

Writer

Rhetoric provides the
means necessary to
persuade audience of
c
Truth.

Reality

The material world
exists independently
(767).

Audience

Objective receiver of
Truth (775)

Objective receiver of
Truth

Language

Communicates about
the material world and
is unproblematic
medium of discourse
(767).

Corresponds with
thought and can
communicate about
the material world

Deals with the realm
of error; but can
communicate essential
realities (771)

Truth

Discovered through
syllogistic reasoning—
deductive (769)

Discovered through
induction (769)

Discovered through
internal apprehension,
but beyond expression
in language (771);
Truth located in the
individual (773).
“Openly admits its
ideological
predilections”—
opposes ideology of
current traditionalist
(478)

Ideology*

“Refuses ideological
question,” encourages
discursive practices in
line with dominant
ideology (478)

“Message arises out of
the interaction of
writer audience,
language and reality;
meanings are
relationships” (775).
“Is at the center of a
dialectical interplay
that involves the
writer and the world;”
“language embodies
and generates truth”
(774).
Rhetoric is the means
to arrive at truth; truth
is multiple and
dependent on a given
discourse community
(774).
“Self‐consciously
aware of its ideological
stand”—ideology is at
center of classroom
activities (478).

social, linguistic) “to express the experience of the self,” to reveal the authentic self. Through
the authentic self, the individual will “discover the truth of the situation” (485). For scholars
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This chart is includes Berlin’s paradigms from both “Rhetoric and Ideology” and “Contemporary Composition.” I
see that these paradigms overlap and items from “Rhetoric and Ideology” are noted with an asterisk.
c
Truth beginning with a capital “T” denotes one universal truth.
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like Gibson, Coles, Murray, Elbow and Macrorie32, the self, subject, and voice are
interchangeable. The authentic self exists separate from the economic, political, and social
influences that exert pressure on the individual to conform (486).
The social epistemic rhetoric of Burke, Ohmann, Young, Pike, Bruffee, Faigley, Bizzell, to
name a few, views “rhetoric as a political act” (488). The individual engages the material, and
the social through dialectal interaction. This interaction is grounded in language, and
knowledge is formed from the interaction of subject, social group, and material conditions
(488). The subject is “a social construct that emerges through the linguistically‐circumscribed
interaction of the individual, community, and the material world” (489). There is no universal
authentic self because the self never operates in “complete freedom” (489). The self as well as
knowledge is historically bound. The self constructs reality and is also constructed by it. It is a
product of a dialectical relationship between the individual and the social.
Berlin’s essays came at a time that the field was in the midst of the post‐modern turn. In
postmodernity, knowledge is created through a dialectical relationship between the writer,
reality, audience, and discourse. This rejection of the unified, autonomous subject of modernity
has fundamental implications for the notion of subjectivity, which is why Berlin places
subjectivity at the center of our teaching practices. Berlin’s treatment of the subject, albeit the
student subject, is important because Berlin is not only summarizing and clarifying the
implications of the different paradigms and perspectives to the composing process, but he does
this so that he can argue for the supremacy of New Rhetorics/Social‐Epistemic Rhetoric’s view
of the world. Rather than approach subjectivity from a modern/post‐modern dichotomy, Berlin
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chooses to examine it from the lens of three different perspectives. I argue that, although
Berlin does not specifically refer to the New Rhetorics as a postmodern conception of the
subject, his classification of the writer and his/her relationship to the other dimensions
(audience, language, reality, truth, ideology) is clearly postmodern. Thus, I approach this
investigation from the lens of postmodernism. The new citizen is not a unified subject but is
composed of multiple and often conflicting subject positions. Like the scholarly work on student
writers, new citizens struggle with inherited social narratives, i.e. racial categories, and must
negotiate their identities in response to them. It is only under the postmodern paradigm, that
writers (new citizens) are active participants in the creation of these social realities and are
allowed the agency to be able to resist and change these powerful discourses. Understanding
how this happens first entails understanding how subject positions are created in the context of
a specific act of writing at the institutional level where U.S. government agencies provide the
discursive positions available for racial identity (what is possible) and the process by which a
new citizen invests in a subject position (See Hall “Who” 6). The naturalization of the subject
positions regarding race constrains our knowledge and beliefs about race in a given society and
the struggle to control what can be—the range of subject positions available to immigrants, is
ideological.
2.4 Writing Subjects and Ideology
If knowledge, then, is an arena of ideological conflict, it is at this point that I turn the
discussion back to Berlin’s understanding of ideology and rhetoric and the implications of this
for theories of subjectivity. In “Rhetoric and Ideology,” he “foregrounds” and “problematizes”
ideology by situating “rhetoric within ideology” (477). By doing so, Berlin declares rhetoric as
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“always already ideological” (477). Ideology is “never innocent,” and never free of bias; this
means “to examine rhetoric is to consider the ways its very discursive structure can be read so
as to favor one version of economic, social, and political arrangements over other versions”
(478). Berlin applies Therborn’s usage of ideology presented in The Ideology of Power and the
Power of Ideology and concludes from a rhetorical perspective that “ideology provides the
language to define the subject (the self), other subjects, the material world, and the relation of
all of these to each other” (479). In “Composition’s Ideology Apparatus,” Sánchez argues that
the problem with Berlin’s treatment of ideology is that he “clearly situates rhetoric within
ideology” (741), and Berlin’s “large claims for ideology” actually diminishes his articulation of
rhetorical theory (743). Berlin’s subordination of rhetoric to ideology also continues in his last
published book Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures (Sánchez 744). Sánchez explains that Berlin
outlines a theory of the subject where the subject becomes “a mere function of one discursive
regime” and not a participant in the making of society (746). This becomes even clearer when
Berlin situates discourse and experience as two separate phenomena: “The effort is to make
students aware of cultural codes, the competing discourses that influence their positioning as
subjects of experience” (Rhetorics 116). Sánchez argues that this space between discourse and
experience allows for writing to be theorized as the “notation system of experience”
(“Composition’s Ideology” 746). The problem with this view of rhetoric, states Sánchez, is that it
renders impossible a rhetorical theory that “might explain the formation of textually embedded
writing subjects and acts of writing” (“Composition’s Ideology” 743). This theory could explain
writing subjects and acts of writing outside of the academy, outside of the writing classroom,
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and for more than just student writers. Such a theory would attend to the diverse scenes of
writing and how writing functions in the world.
Sánchez’ critical engagement with Berlin’s ideology theory leads to a new articulation of
this theory—one that is also important to racial construction since Hall, and Omi and Winant
invoke ideology through the use of Althusser and Gramsci (as does Berlin) without fully
theorizing its functions and forms. Sánchez also argues that a theory of the Althusserian subject
has not been questioned from a “composition‐specific perspective,” and given its widespread
application in the theoretical work of our field, we “should interrogate it closely before applying
it” (“Composition’s Ideology” 748). In the following sections, I highlight Sánchez’ important
points in his “interrogation” of ideology from a “composition‐specific perspective” as it pertains
to writing subjects and the act of writing.
In his theory of the state, Althusser defines the “subject” and outlines how an individual
becomes a subject. Althusser states that “subject in fact means: (1) a free subjectivity (2) a
subjected being who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom
except that of freely accepting his submission.” Individuals freely accept submission through
the “reproduction of relations of production,” and this is secured through the State
Apparatuses. Althusser distinguishes between two types: the repressive and the ideological.
The Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA) consist of the enforcers: police, courts, army, prisons,
government etc., and the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) are the religious, educational,
familial, legal, political, and cultural institutions (to name a few). The RSA functions in the public
arena and the ISA in the private. The RSA operates by repression and the ISA through ideology.
The ideology by which the ISA functions is, according to Althusser, the ideology of the ruling
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class. This ideology “interpellates” individuals as subjects. Althusser explains that before a child
is born, it is “always already a subject.” In other words, there are ideological positions and
expectations assigned a priori. This is also the case for immigrants who are seeking
naturalization—racial positions and expectations are assigned a priori. Although it is true that
these potential citizens have already been interpellated by the racial positions and expectations
from their home countries, the process of naturalization is influential, and necessary to
cementing the new citizens’ ideas and beliefs of race in U.S. society.
In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Althusser theorizes ideology as
something that represents “the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in
which they live.” This distinction between “the imaginary” and “real” formulates ideology as
“pervasive and quasi‐ontological and the question of its origin and perpetrators becomes
difficult to address” (Sánchez “Composition’s Ideology” 748). Rhetoric, then, does not create
knowledge and reality; ideology is given this role with rhetoric at its service. This view of
ideology, which is the most widely cited by composition scholars, incapacitates the subject and
is not “the kind of subject needed” for composition theory (Sánchez “Composition’s Ideology”
748). Sánchez’ criticism is also addressed by Judith Butler who questions Berlin’s description of
the relation between ideology and subjectivity and traces these concerns back to Althusser and
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” Butler’s critique centers on the process of
interpellation. According to Butler, interpellation requires that there is some form of pre‐
ideological status of existence and that there is an anticipatory desire on the part of the
addressed to accept the subject position(s) (111). This pre‐existing ideology constitutes already
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what is possible and therefore struggle and negotiation will not be easy; it is “almost impossible
to refuse” (Butler 110).
Sánchez resolves the inadequate subject for composition theory by returning to an
earlier work by Althusser, For Marx that proposes a writing subject that is “useful” for
composition (“Composition’s Ideology” 748) and for this dissertation. In For Marx, Althusser
places ideology in relation to action or practice:
So ideology is not an aberration or a contingent excrescence of History: it is a
structure essential to the historical life of societies. Further, only the existence
and the recognition of its necessity enable us to act on ideology and transform
ideology into an instrument of deliberate action on history. (232, emphasis
added by Sánchez “Composition’s Ideology” 749)
It is this emphasis on action and practice that Sánchez interprets ideology as a “phenomenon
about which something can be done” (his emphasis), and allows for subjects to resist or enact
ideology (“Composition’s Ideology” 749). This is also the area of Althusser’s theory that can be
the most fruitful for composition scholars because ideology as practice can be applied to
writing theory since how “subjects” resist and/or enact ideology is accomplished through
language and more specifically from a rhetorical perspective through “(at least in part) as the
writing of texts” (Sánchez “Composition’s Ideology” 749).
The tension between the two views of ideology (action and practice) that Althusser
proposes was one that Stuart Hall and others at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
also tried to work through in the 1970s. In a now out‐of print volume titled On Ideology (1978),
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they analyze the question of ideology33 and note that Althusser identifies ideology as a level in
the social formation. The ideological level accounts for the complexity of relations between the
base and superstructure; the former is comprised of the economic level and the latter, the
political (qtd. in Sánchez 750)34 They also note that the economic level is always the
determinant and dominant level in a social formation, but later Althusser adds that there is
equivalence between levels and each level has the power to influence the other (qtd. in
Sánchez 750). Because of this tension of determinant‐equivalence, Sánchez argues that
Althusser is presenting two different things, not two versions of the same thing. Sánchez
understands that ideology as an overdetermining force is quite different from ideologies, which
can be “embodied in institutions” and “can be located and resisted” (Composition’s Ideology”
751). Ideologies can be located in concrete objects:
Simply put, “ideology” cannot address specific applications arising from specific
sets of relations, but there are plenty of “ideologies,” and we need only look at
both large‐scale and everyday struggles between people and institutions to find
them. (Sánchez “Composition’s Ideology” 751)
This understanding of ideology conceives of writing as “acts of subject formation (and
reformation)” (Sánchez 743). Thus, writing subjects are active participants in the making of
society and the making of their own subject positions. This study extends Sánchez’ (and
Miller’s) theory of textual rhetoric to the context of the application for naturalization, Form N‐
400 and the writing subjects involved—permanent legal residents. Legal residents applying for
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citizenship engage in the organization of their own racial subjectivity as well as the racialization
of U.S. society through writing in (or checking a box) their identity.
2.5 Ideology, Hegemony, and Social Formation
It is here, in the terrain of ideologies, that the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies
turns to the theory of hegemony by Gramsci to explicate how ideologies function as part of
social formation; For Gramsci, this meant explaining how the ruling classes ruled. From a
Marxist point of view, the dominant class ruled through force and coercion. Gramsci identified
two forms of political control: domination and hegemony. Hegemony referred to ideological
control and consent. By hegemony, Gramsci meant “the permeation throughout society of an
entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the
status quo in power relations” (B. Burke). These values, attitudes, beliefs and morality are
mediated through signifying practices and the struggle to make certain meanings prevail. This
struggle for representation is a departure from structuralism’s view of language where meaning
is derived from difference; rather, meaning is a struggle for power. This struggle of power
“takes place on a broad front which includes the institutions of civil society (education, trade
unions, family), with the possible unevenness between different levels and domains”
(Fairclough Critical Discourse Analysis 76). So hegemony is domination across different levels or
domains of society but it is never complete domination; “it is never achieved more than
partially and temporarily” (Fairclough Critical Discourse Analysis 76). Gramsci terms this an
“unstable equilibrium.” This unstable equilibrium takes place around “points of constant
instability… to construct or sustain or fracture alliances [between classes or blocs] and relations
of domination subordination, which takes economic, political, and ideological forms”
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(Fairclough Critical Discourse Analysis 76). Under the framework of hegemony, ideologies are
located in “all manifestations of individual and collective life” (Gramsci Selections 328). Like
Sánchez, Fairclough understands that a Gramscian concept of ideologies begets that ideologies
can be located in structures, events, language—in text. Gramsci supports this in Further
Selections from the Prison Notebooks by asserting that “the printed word is the most dynamic
part of this ideological structure,35 but not the only one” (155).
Although the interpellation of the subject is strictly Althusserian, according to Norman
Fairclough, “there is in Gramsci a conception of subjects as structured by diverse ideologies”
(Critical Discourse Analysis 76). The diverse ideologies construct the subject as a “strangely
composite” character (Gramsci Selections 324) where “common sense” is achieved by the
conflicting, and overlapping intersection of past and ongoing ideological struggles. Gramsci
termed this an “ideological complex” (Selections 195). This perspective of the ideological
complex has been developed by various theorists such as Berlin, Laclau and Mouffe, Hall, and
Omi and Winant; however, these theorists reject Gramsci’s (and Althusser’s) reliance on class as
the battleground for hegemony. To resolve this, many theorists turn to Foucault who also
argues that the relations of power cannot be reduced to Marxist modes of production or class
struggle. In Discipline and Punish Foucault argues that power precedes relations of production,
power precedes discourse; power is not repressive but productive. He explores the concept of
power/knowledge in this essay through the lens of the modern prison and explains how
subjectivity is constituted in the orders of discourse. Even though Foucault places discourse at
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the heart of social practices, he also suggests that discourse is secondary to power. Fairclough
explains that “power is implicit within everyday social practices which are pervasively
distributed at every level in all domains of social life, and are constantly engaged in” (Discourse
and Social Change 50). Yet the pervasiveness of power is only tolerable because it “masks a
substantial part of itself” (Foucault History of Sexuality 86). Discourse is where power most
readily masks itself. Therefore, the structuring of signifying practices is a form of hegemony.
The ideologies of hegemonic struggle can also be understood in terms of Foucault’s
order of discourse.36 This is important because writers draw upon the socially available
resources when producing and interpreting a text and these are constituted in orders of
discourse. According to Foucault:
in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected,
organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to
ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to
evade its ponderous, formidable materiality. (“The Order of Discourse” 52)
Foucault explains further this thesis by explaining how discourse is controlled through
“procedures” from the exterior and interior. Exterior “procedures” include societal value
systems that define what is true and not true; i.e. that races exist and can be classified. Interior
“procedures” control discourse through classification and ordering; For example, Hispanic and
Latino are not races; and the number of ways to self identify are constrained by what the
governmental agencies have deemed legitimate. Finally, a third group of procedures controls
the discourse by determining the condition of its application and by imposing a certain number
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of rules on individuals who hold them and limiting access to others.37 The discourse of racial
classification in U.S. society is controlled at an institutional level by the government. The
government determines its application and retains the knowledge of how the racial
classification system is applied. The discourse is so ritualized that it is commonplace to answer
questions of race on all sorts of forms, and the orders of discourse regarding race is socially
appropriated by individuals.
One other important understanding of orders of discourse that Foucault presents is that
for a specific discourse to maintain its hegemonic hold, it is not forwarded as totalizing and
unified. For the discourse to be socially appropriated it is masked and the discourse is
continually altered, differentiated, and gradated in a plethora of documents at a given historical
moment. This can yield diverse discourses that are often conflicting and contradictory, but it is
exactly this instability that helps to maintain a discourse’s primacy. Fairclough argues that
Foucault’s orders of discourse are akin to Gramsci’s ideological complex (Critical Discourse
Analysis): Both concepts are based on an unstable equilibrium that is masked through diverse
ideologies (Gramsci) or discourse (Foucault) that change over time, and can be located in
concrete linguistic objects.
The U.S. racial categories are a point of constant instability—categories are added,
deleted, or altered over time, and the different levels (economic, political, and ideological)
exert influence over the final outcome in a given historical moment. The final outcome of
racialization also becomes a process of definition through the lens of the dominant ideology.
Cobas, Duany, and Feagin assert that for Latinos this entails “their incorporation into a white‐
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created and white‐imposed racial hierarchy and continuum, now centuries old, with white
Americans at the very top and black Americans at the very bottom” (1). At the core of
racialization is a struggle over language and identity; this struggle is apparent at the moment of
applying for naturalization as the applicant comes into contact with the dominant culture’s
definitions of race. The questions regarding racial self‐identification on the Form N‐400 impose
certain assumptions about race on the applicant without his/her awareness. The invisibility of
the ideologies presents race as “common sense.” In “common sense, “ideologies… become
naturalized” (Fairclough Language and Power 76) much like a new citizen becomes naturalized
into full participation in U.S. society.
The theories engaged in this dissertation provide the foundation for understanding how
racial ideology becomes naturalized in U.S. society. The reinterpretation of the Althusserian
ideology/ideologies allows for a theorization of the “subject” that is useful for composition—
one that locates ideologies in texts and subjects as active participants in their “subject
formation (and reformation)” (Sánchez 743). Subjection becomes part of the “literal” writing of
texts. This understanding of Althusser resonates with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and the
Foucauldian subject. These theories explain that power is maintained through an unstable
equilibrium and it is masked through diverse (and conflicting) ideologies or orders of discourse.
Under this framework, racial formation no longer becomes a paralyzing endeavor, but one that
allows for the investigation of the discourse of race as negotiated by individuals at different
levels of society with a focus on acts of writing (broadly conceived). This idea is forwarded by
Utz McKnight who states that if we take the idea of articulation seriously, where race, class,
gender etc. are all interdependent of one another, then it is not important to investigate racial
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practices as structured in dominance, but to “look at the ways institutions, collective
formations, and individuals use race as an open, contested, and variable concept of dominance
everyday” (21). The major sources of racial practices today are comprised of discursive
elements (Foucault) and according to McKnight, racial subjection in the U.S. is acquired through
“social encounters when very young, and the idea of racial difference as phenotype is initially
explained or justified as a social value of importance” (46). Although new immigrants applying
for citizenship in the U.S. do not come to this country void of social encounters that assign
value to skin color, it is my contention that the process of legal residency and naturalization is a
significant source for the racial subjection of the new citizen.
This dissertation examines how the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service uses
and distributes race, and how subjects participate in the social reproduction of the dominant
ideology to create a society where individuals think: I am White; He/she is Black, or Asian, or
Native American etc. The subjection begins with everyday acts of writing your race on a form
with predetermined racial categories. The analyses in the following chapters examine race as
presented by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the participation and
negotiation of the social reproduction of this racial discourse by permanent legal residents of
Mexican origin in the process of becoming U.S. citizens.

44

Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY: A CRITICAL RHETORICAL APPROACH
The purpose of this research is to understand how legal residents of Mexican origin,
who are applying for citizenship, negotiate race and to frame this analysis within the broader
context of racialization in U.S society. I am concerned with issues of race since it is a primary
category of access in U.S. society, and legal residents are initiated, in part, into this category of
access via the application for naturalization, N‐400. The N‐400 presents its readers a version of
reality regarding race that is laden with preconceived ideological positions and expectations.
This became apparent to me during my volunteer work helping legal residents through the
application process as the racial identification questions were difficult for applicants to answer.
For example, question 5.D. asks the applicant if he or she is Hispanic or Latino, and question
5.E. asks the applicant to choose a racial category. These two questions together signal that the
Hispanic and Latino are not considered racial categories and are labels that De Genova and
Ramos‐Zayas, among others, say were devised in the 1960s to “erase the particular histories of
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans” (17).38 Consequently, Latinos are encouraged to identify racially in
the U.S., and on the N‐400 they must identify racially.39 This led me to question the version of
reality this Form presents and the implications of this in shaping race in U.S. society. This initial
curiosity seemed to be an insurmountable task, but my ultimate goal was to look at how race
works (discursively that is) in the world for this specific population.
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Although many rhetoricians have explored the connection between language and
society and have used diverse analytical methodologies, very few integrate the everyday
experiences of the people that are subjected to the discourse that constructs their material
realities; so I knew from the beginning of designing this dissertation that I had to integrate the
individual—the legal resident, in this project while also keeping an eye on the text—the
application for naturalization in the process. The outcome of this is an analytical method that I
term a critical rhetorical approach informed by discourse analysis. I explain in the following
sections why I use discourse analysis as a lens to look at the object and subjects of this
dissertation. The discussion begins with discourse analysis and its relationship to scholars of
rhetoric and composition. I explain that any approach that links language and society should be
critical in nature and follow the framework of Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA). I turn next to understanding where the rhetorical fits into this framework. I describe this
three‐part research project that consists of an analysis of the historically situated projects that
have transformed the racial categories on the application for naturalization in the past century,
a “textual” analysis of the current naturalization application using theories of visual rhetoric,
and an ethnographically‐oriented approach (non‐participant observation, questionnaires,
interviews) to understand how applicants negotiate the Form40 and the implications of this
negotiation in U.S. society.
3.1. Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric and Composition
There are many versions of discourse analysis, but in general these approaches can be
distinguished by studies that include detailed analyses of texts and those that do not (van Dijk)
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and those that are critical and those that are not (Gee). The different approaches tend to be
one of disciplinary background: scholars from linguistics use a systematic methodology that
integrates utterance‐level detail, while “discourse analysis in the social sciences is often
strongly influenced by Foucault” and “generally pay[s] little attention to the linguistic features
of texts” (Fairclough Analysing Discourse 2). The critical label is not related to whether the
analysis includes linguistic features of text, but with whether or not the text‐level analysis is
connected to its function/implication in society (Gee 68). Fairclough’s own approach to
discourse analysis tries to transcend this divide by analyzing the fine‐grained details of a text for
the “socially constructive effects of discourse” while also investigating the effects of this
discourse when people talk or write (Analysing Discourse 3).
So, where does the field of Rhetoric and Composition stand on the analysis of
discourse? This question was one that Ellen Barton and Gail Stygall attempted to answer since
there was, as of 2002, little written from a composition perspective on the “systematic analysis
of discourse” (1). This is due in part to what Barton and Stygall categorize as a cyclical
relationship between composition and discourse studies that has alternated between periods
of “interdisciplinary productivity and suspicious withdrawal” (2). According to Barton and
Stygall, as discourse studies emerged as a field in the 1980s, it was noticeably absent from
composition’s disciplinary discussions. Even though it was not a disciplinary focus, scholars from
rhetoric and composition conducted and published research using discourse analysis, and
Barton and Stygall affirm that this area of research has grown every decade since. This is not
surprising since the analysis of discourse, state Barton and Stygall, is “basic to the enterprise of
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composition studies: Every study in the field is based implicitly or explicitly on the analysis of
texts and/or talk in their various contexts” (1).
Yet amongst the interdisciplinary productivity, scholars in Rhetoric and Composition
critiqued the use of a methodology with the baggage of linguistic epistemology. Lester Faigley
questioned linguistics’ view of subjectivity in Fragments of Rationality and the “reading off” of
ideology from text. Sharon Crowley also questioned the association between linguistics and
composition (and thus discourse analysis). Despite these critiques, in Barton and Stygall’s view,
composition benefits from discourse studies in its ability to “elaborate and specify discourse
features of writing itself and to elaborate and specify the discourse contexts in which writing
takes place” (2). The increased focus on discourse analysis led Barton and Stygall to compile a
collection of essays on the various approaches used by composition scholars with the goal of
“situating the systematic study of discourse more explicitly in the field of composition” (1).
These studies are broad and diverse in topic and methodology but all strive to understand how
written language and discourse function in a variety of contexts. Although critiques of these
approaches stem around the issue of whether discourse analysis is reductive in nature, the
volume presented by Barton and Stygall demonstrates that since the 1980s discourse analysis
has increasingly focused on context rather than text and has resisted systematization; thus it is
not about a particular methodology or limited to certain sites of investigation. Barton and
Stygall argue that because of this, “discourse studies brings to composition…a theory of
language in use and a methodology with which to formulate and test insights about social
interaction and structural analysis” (9).
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In my opinion, the critique that rhetoricians, such as Faigley41 and Crowley, have of
discourse analysis is that when conducted at the text dimension, it does not account for
situated meaning. This narrow understanding of discourse analysis as a study of the correlation
between language and form is reductive, but discourse analysis is a broad area that
incorporates varied and diverse methodologies as well as varied and diverse sites of
investigation.
The volume edited by Barton and Stygall presents a collection of sixteen studies that go
beyond detailed sentence/utterance analysis to incorporate situated meaning. These studies
include investigations into metadiscourse (Vande Kopple), academic discourse (Peck
MacDonald), genre analysis (Swales and Luebs; Berkenkotter and Ravotas), narrative (Stygall),
professional discourse (Charney), revision (Nystrand), gender bias and authority (Fuller and
Lutz) and critical discourse (Huckin). As exemplified in this volume, the methodology that
discourse studies brings to composition is varied and highly adaptable to our areas of research.
It is not only about text and sentence‐level analyses; it can be used for written, oral, and visual
forms of communication. This ideal discourse analysis (form‐function) is one that is in line with
Fahenstock and Secor’s characterization of rhetorical analysis (same volume) as “inevitably
situational and functional” (178).
Since the aim of this study is to understand the rhetoric of race in the context of
citizenship and its implications in society, a rhetorical analysis that is situational and functional
is not sufficient. This necessitates a methodology that investigates how this situated meaning is
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Faigley states that “linguistic theory that attempts to relate language to social practice can offer ways to begin
discussing the unstated cultural assumptions of texts, but linguistic analyses….are incomplete unless they take into
account the specific historical circumstances in which these texts were produced and read” (97‐98).

49

enacted in society through a critical lens. In Barton and Stygall’s volume, Thomas Huckin
advocates a critical discourse analysis approach for use by composition researchers and
composition teachers because it puts emphasis on the “fine‐grained details of a text” but also
on the “political aspects of discursive manipulation” (157). The need for a context‐driven
approach to discourse analysis is in line with the goals of composition research as well as other
academic areas that strive to understand the link between language and society. So it is of no
surprise that critical discourse analysis has become what Norman Fairclough terms a new
“cross‐discipline” where many disciplines such as linguistics, anthropology, sociology,
education, and psychology have contributed to CDA (Language and Power 2nd ed. 9). To this list,
I also add English and Rhetoric and Writing Studies.
3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis
Critical discourse analysis is a theory and methodology that has its roots in critical
applied linguistics. There are many different approaches42 to critical discourse analysis, but in
general critical discourse analysis is categorized by its attention to the relationship between
language and society. Critical discourse analysts strive to describe, interpret, and explain the
relationship between the two. Although the approaches to CDA are broad, researchers must
attend to all three parts of CDA: critical, discourse, and analysis. What distinguishes CDA from
discourse analysis is that it addresses a social problem and attempts to explain this problem by
analyzing the function of discourse in constructing the problem, but this analysis must consider
issues of power and the social, political, historical, and ideological contexts where this discourse
42

In this dissertation I use the term approach when referring to CDA. Since there is no systematic unified set of
standards to conduct CDA, there is therefore not one CDA method. CDA is both a methodology and a theory.
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emerges (Rogers 3‐4). In contrast to discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis strives to not
only describe current sociolinguistic conventions but to also explain how these conventions are
the product of a struggle over power. According to Fairclough and Wodak, critical discourse
analysis:
Sees discourse—language use in speech and in writing—as a form of ‘social
practice.’ Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship
between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and
social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it
also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially
conditioned—it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social
identities of and relationships between people and groups of people...Since
discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power.
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects—that is, they can help
produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social
classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through
the ways in which they represent things and position people. (258)
Given CDA’s foundational principles, this study seeks to understand the application for
citizenship as a site of struggle over racial identity for legal residents of Mexican heritage. The
current conventions for racial identification on the application for naturalization are the
outcome of power relations. These issues of power are articulated in the social, historical, and
political discourses where U.S. racialization emerges. The naturalization of racial categories has
sustained race as common sense and these “common sense assumptions are ideologies”
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(Fairclough Language and Power 2nd ed. 2). This dissertation examines how the discourse of
race constitutes society and promotes a racial ideology of a White America. To explain how this
happens and the role of the new citizen in this, I rely on Fairclough’s “systematic methodology”
for discourse analysis.
3.3 A Critical Discourse Analysis Approach
Critical discourse analysis methodology has been furthered by Fairclough 2003, 2001,
1995, 1992, 1989; Fairclough and Wodak 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; van Leeuwen,
2008, 1993; van Dijk 1997, 1993; Rogers 2004; Gee 2011 as well as by rhetoricians such as
Wodak, 1995; Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Huckin 2002; Huckin and Berkenkotter 1995;
Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000 and Blommaert 2005. Although there are many ways to conduct
critical discourse analysis, the definitive text for critical discourse analysis (CDA)43 is Fairclough’s
1992 book titled Discourse and Social Change. This 260‐page book was dedicated solely to
delineating a social theory of language. In his social theory of language, Fairclough draws upon
works from linguistics, pragmatics, and discourse studies and the theories of Antonio Gramsci,
Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, and Anthony Giddens. Although Fairclough
is not the first to attempt a synthesis of theories from language studies and other social
sciences, previous theories have paid little attention to the role of power and ideology and the
role of language to these processes.44 In the following section, I discuss the major proponents
of Fairclough’s methodology as presented in Discourse and Social Change (1992) and salient
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Scholars like Gee distinguish between CDA and cda. CDA in capitals refers to critical discourse analysis as
described by Norman Fairclough. There are many ways to conduct critical discourse analysis. I intentionally use
CDA in capitals since I am using a Farcloughian model. This model, however, will be adapted to fit my unique
research agenda, but I follow Fairclough’s theoretical underpinnings of CDA.
44
Fairclough discusses previous attempts to synthesize a social theory of language in Ch. 1 of Discourse and Social
Change.
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additions and/or changes to this methodology as outlined in Language and Power (1989/2001).
Using this as a frame to conduct research, I then discuss how I will adapt this approach to the
study of race and citizenship to present a critical rhetorical approach informed by discourse
analysis.
In Discourse and Social Change, Fairclough provides a three dimensional approach to
CDA: “Discourse‐as‐text,” “Discourse‐as‐practice,” and “Discourse‐as‐social practice.”
Discourse‐as‐text (73‐78) consists of vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure
(concrete linguistic objects of study) (75). At the level of grammar, the clause is the unit of
analysis where cohesion refers to “how clauses and then sentences are linked together” (75).
The text structure involves the “architecture of the texts” to include “specifically higher‐level
design features” which constitute a genre such as a crime report in a newspaper or a job
interview (77‐78). Discourse‐as‐discursive practice (78‐86) involves processes of text
production, distribution, and consumption according to the different types of discourse. Texts
are produced in specific ways in specific social contexts. The text producer can be understood
by a set of different subject positions such as “animator,” “author,” “principal” (78). Text
consumption can be individual or collective and has to do with the type of text and the
discourse being produced. In particular, Fairclough notes that “some texts (political speeches,
textbooks) are transformed into others” and that “institutions have specific routines for
‘processing’ texts” (79). The distribution of the text deals with who is involved with the text.
Fairclough provides the example of a casual conversation versus a text produced by political
leaders. The first text is limited in distribution and pertains to the immediate context of the
situation whereas the second is distributed across a range of different institutional domains
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(79‐80). Here, Fairclough is quick to also explain that text production and interpretation also
depend upon “members’ resources”45 and defines this as the “things” that members have
internalized and bring with them to the text process and interpretation (80). It is at this level
that Fairclough links the texts (concrete linguistic objects of study) to context through three
other analytical concepts: force, coherence, and intertextuality. Force refers to “the actional
component” of a speech act (82). In my opinion, it is a matter of the choices available for a
subject to express his or herself. Fairclough determines that force “potential” is usually
distinguished between indirect and direct force. Consider these three utterances by a flight
attendant: If you’d like, you can move your seat to 35A; Please move to 35A; Move to 35A. The
difference in these utterances is a matter of force and is highly context dependent.
Coherence is, according to Fairclough “a property of interpretations” (83). A coherent
text is one “whose constituent parts (episodes, sentences) are meaningfully related so that the
text as a whole ‘makes sense’, even though the text itself may have few “formal markers” to
indicate the relationship between the parts of the text (83). Texts set up subject positions
where the subject is capable of interpreting the text through making connections or inferring
them. These connections are ideological and will be discussed further in chapter four. The final
dimension of discourse‐as‐discursive practice is intertextuality (Bahktin 1981, 1986; Kristeva
1986). Intertextuality stresses the historicity of texts and the understanding that texts are
constituted by preexisting “chains of speech communication” (Bakhtin Speech Genres 94).
Texts transform the past into the present. We can, however, discuss intertextuality across all
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I liken the members’ resources to Emig’s governing gaze: “We see what we elect to see. We have, as this
metaphor puts it, a gaze that is governed—by our expectations which is in turn governed by our experiences and
by what we have cognitively decided to make of them…” (65).
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three levels of text production, distribution, and consumption. According to Fairclough,
discourse‐as‐discursive practice should encompass a combination of both micro and macro
levels. For Fairclough, the micro deals with how participants understand and interpret texts and
the macro deals with the orders of discourse and other member’s resources that are being
drawn upon in order to do this.
The third dimension of analysis is discourse‐as‐social practice, and its aim is to
understand discourse in relation to power and ideology drawing upon the theories of Althusser
and Gramsci (86‐96). In chapter two, I discussed at length Althusser’s theorization of ideology.
Raul Sánchez argues that Althusser’s theory presents two distinct forms: ideology and
ideologies. Althusser’s theory of ideologies, states Sánchez, is one that is conducive to
composition studies and supports the investigation of concrete linguistic objects since
ideologies can be located in texts. This has largely been a source of contention from
composition scholars who have rejected critical linguistics’ textual view of the location of
ideology. Fairclough also agrees that ideology resides in texts, but he maintains “that ideology
invests language in various ways at various levels” and that it is not necessary to account for
ideology at only one level (88). The issue at hand is whether ideology is located in structure or
in speech acts, and Fairclough argues that doing so is problematic since neither is completely
adequate to understanding discourse‐as‐social practice. Fairclough prefers the view that
ideology is located in both the structures (orders of discourse) as well as the discursive event
(89). Tied to the issue of ideology is if individuals are aware of the ideological processes built
into conventions such as racial categories on government forms. Fairclough links this issue to
Althusser’s interpellation of subjects. Fairclough rejects Althusser’s overstatement of the
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ideological constitution of subjects since he understands that all discourse is ideological but is
not “all ideologically invested to the same degree” (91). This is where Fairclough introduces the
concept of hegemony (Gramsci) as a means to understanding how certain discourses are more
ideologically invested than others. It also provides a means to explain how discourses change
and how subjects can be agents of that change. Fairclough defines hegemony as “the power
over society as a whole of one of the fundamental economically‐defined classes in alliance with
other social forces, but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily” (92).
Hegemonic struggle, states Fairclough, takes place over different levels and domains of society
but that discursive practice “is a facet of hegemonic struggle which contributes in varying
degrees to the reproduction or transformation” of the existing order of discourse and social and
power relations (93). The loci of this discursive struggle are the particular institutions such as
“the family, schools, courts of law, etc.” (94). The dominant exercise power not through
coercion but also by integrating subordinate groups through discourse. Thus, I focus on racial
categorization as presented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but this
investigation will highlight how this order of discourse shares a degree of integration with other
governmental institutions. The concept of hegemony is useful to analyzing discourse in its social
context and within a web of power relations.
CDA methodology has been furthered by Norman Fairclough in subsequent publications.
Most notably (and recently) in Language and Power 2nd ed. (2001). It is important, however, to
highlight some important points from this publication.46 In this book, Fairclough still
conceptualizes discourse analysis as a three‐dimensional approach that involves the text,
46

The 1989/2001 versions of Language and Power have remained virtually the same besides some minor changes
nd
and an updated bibliography (Language and Power 2 ed. iix).
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interaction of the text (discursive practice) and explanation (discourse‐as‐social practice).
Language and Power 2nd edition is also written for an audience other than linguists and can
serve as an introductory resource for researchers that are not familiar with CDA. Given this
change, Fairclough provides guiding questions to conduct Critical Discourse Analysis so that this
framework can be easily applied. The guiding questions for each dimension are based upon
experiential, relational, and expressive values. Each of these values represents the traces or
cues that are found in a text. Experiential value has to do with traces of “contents and
knowledge and beliefs” from the author’s experience of the world (93). Relational values refer
to “a cue to the social relationships enacted via the text in the discourse” and the expressive
value is a cue to “the producer’s evaluation…of the reality it relates to” (93).
The second and third dimensions of analysis as explained in Language and Power 2nd ed.
have remained essentially the same, except that Fairclough renames the second dimension,
interaction, and the third, explanation. I’ve already presented Fairclough’s main points as
summarized from Discourse and Social Change, but it is important to emphasize that the
second level of analysis is where text and social structures interact. This interaction is
dependent upon all the discourse that a text is a part of as well as the common‐sense
assumptions, which give the text its values. In short, it is how the participant interprets the text.
The final level—explanation is where discourses are mediated by the social context of the
discourse. The discourses only become real or “socially operative, as parts of institutional and
societal processes of struggle” (117). The object of the explanation phase is to “portray a
discourse as part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is determined by social
structures, and what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures,
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sustaining them or changing them” (135). Explanation has two dimensions; this depends upon
the focus of the explanation—process or social structure (135‐136). We can see discourses as
part of social struggle and contextualize them and their effects on structures or we can show
what power relationships determine discourses. The former puts emphasis on the social effects
of discourse, the latter; the social determination of discourse. Both of these, however, should
be investigated at three levels of social organization: the societal, institutional, and situational
(136).
Finally, one key change to Language and Power (2nd ed.) is Fairclough’s addition of
chapter ten, which highlights issues of language and power in a global context. In this chapter,
Fairclough explains that research into the local or national issues of language and power are
automatically set within the international frame as well (203). This chapter is ultimately
concerned with the globalization of discourse in the age of the Internet and global news
channels. Of import to this study is Fairclough’s discussion of how each society has its own
orders of discourse and that globalization is a domain of struggle, not just a domain of
homogenization. Legal residents applying for citizenship do not come to the Form N‐400 as a
blank slate; they come to the Form with traces of the orders of discourse regarding race from
their “home” society.
The review of the literature regarding Fairclough’s CDA approach yields a representation
of this model as understood below in Figure 3.1. The center circle represents the levels of
society, which is comprised of the macro (society), meso (institutions), and the micro (the
everyday). The macro also incorporates issues of globalization. The three dimensions used to
conduct Critical Discourse Analysis are: Discourse‐as‐text, discourse‐as‐practice, and discourse‐
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as‐social practice. All three of these dimensions are used in varying degrees at all three levels of
society and is context driven. The boxes are the concepts that Fairclough uses in his systematic
analysis of discursive events. The approach outlined below will serve as the base point for
conducting a critical rhetorical analysis of race and the new citizen.
vocabulary
grammar
textual structure

Discourse‐
as‐Text

Macro

Discourse ‐
as‐Pracqce

Meso
Micro

Discourse‐
as‐Social
Pracqce

production
consumption
distribution
force
cohesion
intertextuality

power
ideologies
subjectivity
hegemony

Figure 3.1 The three levels of social organization (macro, meso, micro) and the three
dimensions of CDA (text; practice, social practice)
Fairclough’s model for CDA is useful for this investigation because of two factors: he conducts
analysis at the three levels of society, and he provides the tools and vocabulary to conduct
textual analysis in composition research.
3.4 Where is the Rhetorical in CDA?
I mentioned previously in this chapter that I was working towards a critical rhetorical
approach informed by CDA. So where exactly is the critical rhetoric in CDA? This requires the
examination of the term that unites these two approaches—critical. According to Raymie
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McKerrow, “a critical rhetoric serves a demystifying function…by demonstrating the silent and
often non‐deliberate ways in which rhetoric conceals as much as it reveals through its
relationship with power/knowledge” (92). CDA, with its goals of understanding the function of
discourse in the construction of our social lives through the systemic analysis of language forms
and functions while attending to issues of power (Rogers 3‐4), exemplifies the type of critical
rhetoric that McKerrow argues for: one that “examines the dimensions of domination and
freedom as these are exercised in a relativized world” (91). Therefore, the treatment of critical
by these two approaches (discourse/rhetoric) is essentially the same.
If doing critical work is, as Ralph Cintrón states, simultaneously an inquiry into the object
of knowledge as well as “an inquiry into how, why, and when the knowledge became
knowledge and who made it so” (13), then the issue at hand dividing critical rhetoric and critical
discourse analysis is a question of how. Discourse analysis inevitably, because of its grounding
in linguistics, focuses on the linguistic patterns of a text (sounds, words, meaning, register,
style, and intertextuality) and analyzes the functions of these patterns by context and in
constructing social practices. Since all rhetorical acts contribute to the production and
reproduction of society (See K. Burke) then rhetorical analysis foregrounds the function of
language in constructing and creating identities and reality whereas discourse analysis
foregrounds the function of linguistic patterns (See Stillar).47 The issue here really is one of
focusing on the system (grammar) rather than the practice since the theoretical assumptions of
both CDA and critical rhetoric are identical: language is doubly constitutive—it constructs but is
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Stillar dedicates his book “Analyzing Everyday Texts” to understanding and integrating text analysis from the
three perspectives: discourse, rhetorical, and social theory. Although his analysis of rhetoric is framed by Kenneth
Burke, he does offer insights into understanding the difference and similarities of the three perspectives.
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also socially determined. Both approaches also share the same theoretical framework as they
both invoke theorists such as Bakhtin, Kristeva, Althusser, Gramsci, and Foucault.
If many of the theoretical underpinnings of critical rhetoric and critical discourse
analyses are similar, then where do the two diverge? In general, rhetorical analyses incorporate
higher‐level constructs, whole text, the sentence level, and word choice in examining a text but
do not employ linguistic vocabulary in doing so because the textual evidence is handled
differently and are rarely quantified (Fahenstock and Secor 195). Our discipline has our own
vocabulary for such analyses, but notes Huckin, we tend to lack such vocabulary when
discussing the fine‐grained details of a text and thus turn to CDA to supply this (158). Rhetorical
analyses for the most part invoke terminology from classical rhetoric such as topoi, telos,
kairos, logos, ethos, and pathos, and from contemporary theorists concepts like the rhetorical
situation, identification and the pentad (K. Burke). Since the terminology is diverse, scholars
must selectively decide how to approach a text and decide which concepts are best suited to
analyze a text (Huckin 163). However, at a minimum, Fahenstock and Secor stipulate four basic
characteristics of rhetorical analysis:
It must attend to the rhetorical situation.
It should use an identifiable vocabulary drawn from rhetorical theory.
It should analyze language choices in terms of the effects on its audience.
It should uncover the argument of the text. (183‐184)
Despite differences in approaches, Fahenstock and Secor note that both discourse and
rhetorical analyses are “equally illuminating” and that the “different lenses always produce
different visions and the more lenses and visions, the better” (195). This is where I have tried to
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lead this dissertation research by using diverse yet complementary forms of analysis where the
incorporation of the different lenses and visions result in a better “illumination” of the social
problem at hand. Hence, my critical rhetorical approach48 informed by CDA will incorporate
Fairclough’s levels and dimensions of analysis, but will use rhetorical vocabulary and theory to
explain this analysis while attending to the rhetorical situation, and the effects of the discourse.
3.5 Critical Rhetoric, Racial Formation, and the New Citizen
This research attempts to understand how the process for applying for naturalization
and becoming a new citizen contributes to racial formation in the context of the U.S. Although
this is a daunting task, Fairclough’s three‐dimensional approach to CDA that incorporates
discourse‐as‐text, discourse‐as‐practice, and discourse‐as‐social practice provides a starting
point for the design of this investigation. This three dimensional approach, according to
Fairclough, should be investigated at three levels of society: social, institutional, and situational.
This framework works effectively with social theories of race formation that incorporate three
levels of social formation: micro‐, meso‐, and macro‐ (Omi and Winant; Winant; and Fenton) as
discussed in chapter two; therefore I will be using this terminology (micro‐, meso‐, macro‐) in
the dissertation. In order to investigate race and the new citizen at the three levels of social
formation, I have designed a three‐part approach to this study: Part I corresponds to the macro
level and consists of a historical analysis of racial formation through the racial categories
provided used for immigration and naturalization purposes in the last century. Part II
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At this juncture, it is important to note that the two most widely cited and utilized frameworks for critical
rhetorical analyses are put forth by Raymie McKerrow and Thomas Nakayama and Robert L. Krisek. However,
neither McKerrow nor Nakayama and Krisek outline a methodology per se for conducting critical rhetoric.

62

corresponds to the meso‐level and is an in‐depth analysis of the design of the current
application for naturalization, Form N‐400, and specifically the racial identification questions in
the Form. Part III corresponds to the micro‐level and incorporates ethnographic methods to
understand how the individual applying for citizenship negotiates the application and U.S.
notions of race and the effects of this negotiation. I have dedicated a chapter to each level of
social analysis, but the analysis of each level will draw upon all three dimensions of CDA,
discourse‐as‐social practice; discourse‐as‐practice; and discourse‐as‐text simultaneously. Each
part will be discussed at length in the following sections.
A. Major Questions
The overarching question of inquiry for this investigation is:
How does the application for naturalization (N‐400) construct the citizen and how does
this community disrupt or reify this construct?
And specifically:
1. What are the historically situated racial projects that inform the current racial
discourse of the N‐400? (Chapter 4)
2. How does the visual rhetoric of the form (N‐400) construct and persuade it users?
(Chapter 5)
3. How do applicants negotiate race as presented in the application for naturalization?
(Chapter 6)
B. Chapter 4. Going the Macro: Racialization and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service
The macro processes that contribute to racialization in the U.S. context are discussed in
chapter four of this dissertation. The guiding question of inquiry for this chapter is:
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What are the historically situated racial projects that inform the current racial discourse
of the N‐400?
The objective of this chapter is to understand the orders of discourse regarding race as
presented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and this necessitates an
understanding, although brief, of relevant historical events regarding race‐making in the U.S.
such as laws regarding citizenship, and the U.S. Census Bureau’s treatment of race. The U.S.
Census Bureau has figured prominently in the articulation of race in the U.S. and shares a
parallel history with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the treatment of race on
the application for naturalization. I visited the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service Historical
Library in Washington D.C. to conduct primary research into the genesis of racial categories by
immigration officials and the changes to these categories for naturalization purposes in the
past century. The changes are discussed and presented in this chapter. I draw upon the
theories of Althusser, Gramsci, and Foucault to explain the discourse in relation to power and
ideology. This chapter explores how race is conceived and controlled by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service through what is included and thereby excluded in the categories
available for racial identification. It also looks at the historical changes to the document and
how a particular discourse at a particular moment of time draws upon other discourse types. In
essence, I look at the power “in” discourse and the power “behind” discourse (See Fairclough
Language and Power 2nd ed.). The historical changes to the questions of racial identification are
indicative of the changing relationships of power at the institutional and societal levels.
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C. Chapter 5. Interacting with the Institution: The “Blank” N‐400 and the Rhetoric of
the Visual.
Chapter five of this dissertation deals with the meso‐level of society (the institution)
through an analysis of the content and document design of the N‐400. It is at this level that
scholars (See Fenton) argue that cultural battles are enacted; this is where the new citizen
encounters the dominant discourse about race in the U.S. The question of inquiry for this
chapter is: How does the visual rhetoric of the form (N‐400) construct and persuade it users?
The first level of analysis consists of the “fine‐grained details” of the text. I examine the
structure of the questions on the application and the verbal forms used to determine their
relational value (how these constructions present social relationships). It is in this chapter,
however, that I depart from Fairclough’s CDA approach. This is due in part because Fairclough,
as well as other scholars who use CDA, focus inevitably on “verbal” or “written” elements.
Although Fairclough assumes “broad and non‐restrictive notions of discourse and text” to
include visuals, he does not offer a comprehensive framework for the analysis of visuals
(Language and Power 2nd ed. 23). Furthermore, it is important to note that although Fairclough
provides for a broad notion of discourse, he does not theorize the relationship between the
visual/verbal. Ultimately, CDA views the text—spoken or written (not broadly conceived) as
primal. Visual rhetoric transcends these boundaries by positing that the text and structure are
not independent but work simultaneously on the “reader” to make meaning (See Kress and van
Leeuwen; Mitchell; Blair; Goggins; to name a few).
I stated that visual rhetoric is used to analyze the “blank” N‐400. By visual rhetoric, I am
referring to “a frame for analysis for looking and interpreting” (Helmers 65). But that frame
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includes diverse disciplines, foci, genres, and methodologies, and there is no consensus on what
constitutes visual rhetoric. Therefore, the first part of chapter five is a brief literature review
with an emphasis on scholars that theorize the visual/verbal relation such as Wysocki, Hocks,
Hagan, and Salinas. From these theorists, I develop a method of “looking and interpreting” the
N‐400 based on Salinas’ concept of the configuration and his assertion that technical
rhetoricians should infuse graphic design theory to “read” and “write” images. This analysis
makes transparent the discourses within the Form from a multimodal lens. Multimodality
entails the mixing/blending of multiple technologies and media to include words, sounds,
images, graphics, and video and inevitable leads to hybrid constructions.
The analysis of the Form begins first with global issues and then concentrates in on “Part
5,” which asks applicants to racially self‐identify. The visual presence of information, spacing,
black‐boxing, font style and size along with the content of the N‐400 are laden with cultural
significance. For example, the “NOTE” at the top of part 5 projects a certain ethos. First, the
word is written in all capital letters, and second, it states that the FBI requires this information.
This note sets the tone for this section as official and also legitimizes the information being
requested.

Figure 3.2 Part 5. “NOTE”
Although forms are designed to be easily read and recognized so that anyone can
understand them, they convey a message that arises from the reading of the image of the page
and the word. These image/word(s) are far from neutral or objective, and the analysis
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presented in this chapter demonstrates that an unfilled‐out form is just as lethal as the filled‐
out form.
D. Chapter 6. Attending to the Micro: The New Citizen
The third part of this study is concerned with how applicants act and interact with texts
the course of social events. Texts, however, can be shaped by the writer and also by social
agents, the applicants. In chapters four and five, I focused on the relationship between the text
(N‐400), social practices, and social structures (the U.S. government). In this chapter, I use
postmodern ethnographic‐oriented methods to explore how legal residents who are in the
process of applying for citizenship negotiate the discourses and ideology provided to them by
the state. Postmodern ethnography may use methods of observation, but rejects the positivist
assumptions behind this method. It incorporates the perspectives of the population under
study. Focusing on the micro‐level allows the researcher to see the effects of the Form in use,
and how the dominant racial ideology puts constrains applicants’ choices. Ethnographic
methods are the most appropriate at this level especially since this study looks at a text (the
applications for naturalization) in relation to society. The question of inquiry for this chapter is:
How do applicants negotiate race as presented in the application for naturalization?
The purpose of this micro‐level research was to collect information about attitudes, thoughts,
and behaviors regarding race from the sample population. The scope of the ethnography was
limited to non‐participant observation, a questionnaire, and follow‐up interviews. Since
ethnography is directed at explaining cultural patterns by incorporating the social actors, the
social actors are described below.
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Sample Population
The sample population for this research was legal residents from the El Paso area that
were in the various stages of applying for naturalization. One of the most difficult tasks in
designing this dissertation was finding access to this sample population since it was not feasible
to have access to immigration records in order to administer a questionnaire to new citizens.
The other means of identifying applicants was to work through the two non‐profit organizations
in the El Paso area that provide assistance to legal residents who are applying for naturalization.
The two non‐profit organizations are the Diocesan Migrant and Refugee Services (DMRS) and
Las Americas Immigration Advocacy Center. Although the Las Americas Immigration Advocacy
Center has hosted citizenship “drives,” they do not have a dedicated citizenship section; for
that reason, I chose to work with DMRS to identify the sample population of which seventy‐five
would participate in a written questionnaire. There is no clear cut rationale for this number (75)
except that I wanted the sample to be large enough to be able to make some overarching
generalizations about the data obtained as well as be an attainable goal.
Instruments
The questionnaire was two‐pages in length and written in both Spanish and English. It
was composed of open‐ended and closed‐ended questions. The questionnaire was designed so
that the participant could answer the questions on racial identity from the U.S. Census Form,
the application for naturalization, and of their own accord by “filling in the blank.” The open‐
ended questions asked participants to reflect on the choices available to them and indicate how
they would prefer to self‐identify now and in future instances. The follow‐up interview was oral
and in Spanish or English. The interviewee determined the language choice. The interview was
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also composed of open‐ended and close‐ended questions. In general, I asked participants to
explain their answers on the questionnaire. Of interest particularly was how the participant
perceived race before living in the U.S. and how this influenced their answers on the
questionnaire. (See Appendix B for the consent form, questionnaire, and interview questions.)
Administering the Questionnaire
The best method to gather data from a large sample size is a group‐administered
questionnaire. The group‐administered questionnaire allowed me to get my initial
questionnaire results in one space of time and also ensured a very high response rate since it
was administered face‐to‐face rather than mailed. The challenges, however, to a group‐
administered questionnaire were twofold: getting everyone together and getting permission.
After speaking to the executive director of DMRS, I decided that the best route for this type of
research was to visit the free citizenship classes that were held on a weekly basis in the El Paso
area. DMRS trains the volunteer instructors and provides them with the course materials for
the citizenship classes. At the time of this research, there were thirty different citizenship
classes conducted at eighteen different locations in the El Paso area. These locations varied and
included churches, libraries, and community centers (See Appendix C for a listing of the
citizenship classes). Students who attended the class were in various stages of the application
process, preparing for the test and interview phase of the application process. In total, I visited
twelve different citizenship classes located throughout the city. The classes were chosen
randomly with the only criteria that I visit classes from different areas of the city and from
different types of locations, i.e. churches, schools, libraries, community centers.
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Before visiting the first citizenship class, I conducted a pretest of the questionnaire as
Jeanne Converse and Stanley Presser assert that researchers should pretest the questionnaire.
Ideally it is best to conduct both a participatory pretest and an undeclared pretest. For the
purpose of this study, I conducted both types of pretests. The participatory pretest was
conducted on a group of graduate students that are not U.S. citizens. These students were told
that this was a practice‐run of the questionnaire and provided immediate feedback on the
questionnaire design and content. An undeclared pretest was conducted at the first citizenship
class site in the study. Subjects were not told that it was a pretest. The two pretests helped me
to gauge whether the questionnaire was effective. I found that many participants had difficulty
answering the self‐reflexive questions and left them blank. I then redesigned the questionnaire
by converting the open‐ended questions to close ended or short responses.
Video Interviews
Of the sample population (75), I proposed as a goal of fifteen percent of this population
to conduct a follow‐up interview. I asked participants to indicate on the questionnaire whether
they were willing to conduct an interview in regards to the responses on the questionnaire and
if so, to provide contact information. I contacted the interested participants and arranged to
meet at their convenience. The interview was scheduled around kitchen tables, as well as at the
location of their citizenship class since this was a neutral and public place that both the
participant and researcher were comfortable with. Participants first signed an additional
consent for the videotaped interview (See Appendix B). The interviews were approximately
twenty to thirty minutes in length and began with a review of their questionnaire as a starting
point to begin the discussion.
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Non‐Participant Observation
Observation was used in a very limited scope and was implemented in the administering
of the questionnaire. It was in this context that I observed how the participants approached the
questionnaire. The notes consisted of a short analysis of the rhetorical situation: who, when,
where, how many participants and the comment or question that was posed by the participant.
I was, in a sense, a rhetorical eavesdropper.49 The observation yielded some very interesting
comments to add to the qualitative research because inevitably an open conversation about
racial identity ensued at every citizenship class I visited.
Analysis of the Data
I outlined previously the approach I used to analyze the data. This research is for the
most part qualitative and utilizes this critical rhetorical approach. Some of the data from the
questionnaire and the primary research on the racial categories used in the last century was
quantitative. The quantitative data regarding racial identification was submitted to simple
statistical analysis using Microsoft Excel. The results were presented in the pertinent chapters
in written and table form. Some of the data analyzed included gender, age, and length of
residency as it correlated to racial identification.
The data from the questionnaire is then used to complement the citizenship class
observations and video interviews with permanent legal residents. It is in this chapter that I
draw upon the previous levels (macro, meso) and address the overarching question of inquiry.
In addition, I use this chapter to discuss limitations with this critical rhetorical approach and my
role as researcher. I end the chapter with final conclusions about the study.

49

See Krista Ratcliffe
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Chapter 4
GOING THE MACRO: RACIALIZATION AND THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Race is determined by language in such phrases as “the races of Europe,” but by physical
qualities such as color, hair, and shape of head, when we speak of “the five great races” or
divisions of mankind. (Folkmar 54)
The racial categories included in the following text generally reflect a social definition of race
recognized in this country, and not an attempt to define race biologically, anthropologically, or
genetically. In addition, it is recognized that the categories of the race items include racial and
national origin or socio‐cultural groups. (U.S. Census Bureau 2010 Census Questionnaire
Reference Book 27)
In this chapter, I trace the evolution of the federal racial classification system and
explore the role of this system in the construction of U.S. citizens and ultimately in the
racialization of U.S. society. I examine the historical context of the classification system from
1898 until the present with a narrow focus on immigrants from Mexico and discuss how
changes to this scheme and definitions thereof were used to control access to citizenship. The
body of this work will focus on changes to the racial classification system as it pertains to
naturalization and the official forms for naturalization. Where relevant, the discussion will
incorporate laws and policies pertaining to race and immigration in the U.S.
The historical context is crucial to understanding our present‐day treatment of race in
the U.S. In chapter two, I surveyed the literature regarding current theories of racial formation
in the society. These influential theories understand race as the outcome of the
interaction/intersection of different levels of “things” in society to include politics, economics,
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history, and ideology (See Hall’s Articulation). This dissertation furthers the theoretical work of
these sociologists by using as a framework Omi and Winant’s racial projects while incorporating
Fenton’s contribution of the meso structure (institutions) in the process of racial formation.
Racial formations, according to Omi and Winant, are “created, inhabited, transformed, and
destroyed” by “historically situated projects” where human bodies and social structures are
represented, organized and ruled (“Racial Formation” 124). These historical projects often
mediate between the discursive and the institutional forms in which it is routinized and
standardized (Omi and Winant “Racial Formation” 127). Race is “routinized and standardized”
through public institutions; all have descriptions of race within their regulatory schemata and
these definitions impact policy implementation and the internal practices of the institutions. At
the micro level, individuals consume these definitions of race and reproduce the definitions in
establishing social identities. There is no place where this is more evident than the production
of race by the U.S. government and the consumption of this “product” through various
institutional practices such as the U.S. Census and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
The production, distribution, and exchange of “race” position different social groups in
relation to one another through the lens of the dominant ideology. Yet, “race” as a concept is
not unified or stable. It changes over time, and in different contexts, and it can present itself in
diverse and conflicting ways.50 However, this instability is needed to mask the dominant
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The diverse ideologies construct the subject as a “strangely composite” character (Gramsci 324) where the
“common sense” is achieved by the conflicting, and overlapping intersection of past and ongoing ideological
struggles. Gramsci termed this an “ideological complex’ (195).
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discourse.51 The historical development of the racial classification schema in the U.S. presents
itself as unstable, but a closer examination of the historical racial projects (laws, policies,
manuals, treatises, and naturalization and immigration documents) reveals the persistent
stability of a core set of ideas about race that circulate in society.
4.1 Legalizing “White”
The point of departure for this discussion begins with the Naturalization Act of 1790 that
limited citizenship to any “free,” “white” person that had resided in the U.S. and its jurisdiction
for a period of at least two years. Applicants had to prove to “any common law court of record”
that they were of “good moral character” and that they had resided for at least one year “in
any one of the states” (1 Stat. 103). From 1790 to 1802, three other acts to establish the
uniform rule of naturalization were passed52, but each upheld the 1790 conditions that
applicants be “free white persons.” According to Marian Smith, “U.S. nationality law generally
transformed northern and western European immigrants into U.S. citizens” (92). This pivotal
law, excluding all non‐Whites from active participation in U.S. society, remained in effect until
1952 (Haney López 43). In the century after the Act of 1790 passed, there appears to be little
controversy or litigation over its enforcement (Smith 92). But where the majority of immigrants
were from northern and western Europe, by the late 1800s the demographics shifted and there
were increasing numbers of people from other parts of Europe and Asia. This shift challenged
the existing legislature regarding race and naturalization.
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“In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a
certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance
events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality. (Foucault “The Order of Discourse” 52)
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1795 Naturalization Act, 1798 Naturalization Act, and 1802 Naturalization Act
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As the country’s demographics were transforming, two major changes to citizenship
law occurred in the latter part of the 1800s. First, the Act of April 1866, and the fourteenth
amendment conferred citizenship to all persons born in the United States, and who were “not
subject to any foreign power” except for “Indians not taxed” (qtd in Smith 93). Then, in 1870,
the Act of 1866 was revised to include “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African
descent” (sec. 2169 U.S. Revised Statutes). This Act and the subsequent revision separated
citizenship by birth and citizenship via naturalization since the racial requirements for
citizenship only applied to those naturalized. This was also confirmed by the Supreme Court in
1898, which ruled that U.S. born children of Chinese and others were eligible to be citizens. This
was in direct opposition to the Naturalization Act of 1882 that prohibited the naturalization of
Chinese. Despite the racial qualifications set forth in sec. 2169, Marian Smith, U.S. Customs and
Immigration Service Historian, notes that “Congress, at times, ignored §2169 and used its
original authority over naturalization to extend U.S. citizenship to groups of racially ineligible
aliens” to include “Native Americans” and the “Chinese‐born citizens of Hawaii at the time of
annexation” (93). This also seemed to be the case when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in
1848 conferred citizenship to Mexican‐born residents of the Southwest. Article VIII of the treaty
stated that “Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico…shall be
free to continue where they now reside” and that those who remain have one year from the
treaty to declare citizenship. Those that fail to declare will “be considered to have elected to
become citizens of the United States.” Article IX provides further instruction that once said
territories were incorporated into the Union, Mexicans will enjoy “all the rights of citizens of
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the United States.” These two articles of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo granted full access to
U.S. society to Mexicans residing in the territories in 1848.
Mexicans not residing in said territories would have to petition the courts to become
citizens. This did not mean that all Mexicans were racially eligible to naturalize; only those that
were “White” and this was determined by “any court of record.” The “any court of record” that
determined eligibility for naturalization had a diversity of rulings regarding the eligibility of
Mexicans in the fifty years following the treaty. The lower courts passed on the decision
regarding racially eligibility to the Supreme Court and in 1897 (the United States v. Rodríguez),
the court determined that Rodríguez was eligible for naturalization. The judge ruled that the
defendant Rodríguez “would probably not be classed as white” from the standpoint of the
athropologist, but he was legally considered “white” by the law (re Rodríguez qtd. in Haney
López 61). This historically important decision by the judge was, perhaps, the context needed to
separate Mexicans (and all Spanish‐speaking citizens and immigrants) from Whites.53
4.2 Forming the Races
By the end of the 19th century, growing concern over the shift in the source of new
immigrants, the conferring of citizenship by Congress to racially ineligible aliens such as
Mexicans (as well as Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, and Native Hawaiians) led to the
formation of the racial classification system. According to Perlmann, the formative decades of
the classification system were 1890‐1913, but that the system was “created, refined, and
initially contested” from 1898 to 1903 (2). Although it is not completely clear when the scheme
was implemented, race became an important category after 1898. In the 1898 Annual Report of
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Laura E. Gomez writes extensively about the implications of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the
naturalization of Mexicans in Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race.
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the Commissioner General of Immigration, there is a move to use race to classify immigrants
rather than nationality since nationality “gives no clue to their characteristics and their
resultant influence upon the community of which they are to become members” (qtd. in
Perlmann 3). This was important because country of origin did not report much about the new
immigrant—immigrants who were coming from “multi‐national empires” such as “Russia,
Austro‐Hungary, Turkey and Germany” and thus a person who listed their country of birth as
Germany was not necessarily a German (Perlmann 354). Race was initially gathered as part of
the passenger lists of the ship manifests (See Perlmann; Smith; Weil). The first list included
forty‐six “races or peoples” and defined it as “blood” but that “mother tongue” could be used
to assist in determining race (Smith 9355). Yet the first list did not seem to be any different from
a list of nationalities with such entries as: “African (black),” “Bulgarian,” “Dalmation,” “Italian
(North),” “Italian (South),” “Mexican,” “Servian56,” and “Spanish American.” According to Smith,
this first list was created by Ellis Island immigration officials and was considered “a practical
tool” devised by these officials to classify people (93).
In “Races at the Gate,” Patrick Weil researches the creation of the original list of “Races
and Peoples” and finds that it was the “essentially the work of three civil servants: Terence V.
Powderly, Edward F. McSweeney, and Moses Victor Safford. Powderly was the then
Commissioner‐General of Immigration and was aided by McSweeney, the Assistant
Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis Island, and Dr. Safford, who had served as Surgeon
General at the U.S. Marine Hospital on Ellis Island (Weil 629‐631). It was McSweeney and
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Perlmann’s “Race or People”does not have page numbers in the print or digital copy. I have numbered the pages
for citation purposes starting with one.
55
See the instructions in the Figure on 93.
56
Serbian in the original entry on the list of Races and Peoples is spelled Servian.
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Safford who worked on drafts of the infamous report submitted to the Immigrations Bureau in
1898 with the original list of “Races and Peoples (Weil 631). Weil believes that Safford was
especially influential in devising the list; in a letter to the then Secretary of Treasury dated Dec.
31, 1897, Safford writes of his ability to accurately identify different human “races” (631). Far
from a mere “tool” of immigration, Weil states that the list was created with the goal of
gathering statistical data about immigrant groups based on race.
The original list was legitimized with the Act of March 3, 1903, which mandated the
classification of all aliens entering the U.S. by race (Weil 632). Later that year, the new
Commissioner‐General of Immigration, Frank P. Sergent, decided to “gather some of the ‘races
and peoples’ of Europe into ‘four or five’ well‐recognized divisions, which conform more or less
to geographical location” (Weil 633). These divisions were the Teutonic (northern Europe),
Celtic (western Europe), Iberic (southern Europe), Slavic (western Europe) and the Mongolic
(Chinese, Japanese, Korean, East Indian, Pacific Islander, and Filipino) (Weil 633‐634). Although
the 1898 list remained in effect, there was a move from within the Bureau to distinguish among
immigrants from Europe thereby establishing a hierarchy of whiteness.
4.3 The Naturalization Service and the Dictionary
The “List” and the mandate to classify all aliens according to race did nothing to clarify
the issue of racial eligibility because the language of the laws was vague and to compound that,
there was a differential application of the laws by Congress and the courts. No one seemed to
share a “common” understanding of the racial distinctions, to include the courts. Marian Smith
reports that “any court of record” meant that at that at the turn of the twentieth century there
were “more than five thousand high and low courts exercising such jurisdiction,” and “judges in
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different jurisdictions had different ideas of what constituted ‘whiteness’” or good moral
character for that matter (92). The lack of uniformity and other problems regarding this
matter57 led to the establishment of the U.S. Naturalization Service in 1906. The Basic
Naturalization Act of 1906 gave the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization the responsibility
of “all matters concerning the naturalization of aliens” (34 Stat. 596).
In its first year, the Bureau printed additional instructions for “Filing Alien Manifests”
(qtd. in Perlmann 7). These instructions stated that special attention should be given when
distinguishing between race and nationality. For example “France appearing on the manifest
might not necessarily mean French, and similarly French may not mean France by nationality”
(Perlmann 7). These instructions were also accompanied by special distinctions. Perlmann notes
that the first three distinctions involved Cubans, West‐Indians, and Spanish Americans, and
these three “specifically exclude blacks” (Perlmann 7). The fourth distinction was African (Black)
and “refers to the African Negro, whether coming from Cuba, or other islands of the West
Indies, North or South American, Europe, or Africa. Any alien whose appearance indicates an
admixture of Negro blood should be classified under this heading” (Passenger List Forms qtd. in
Perlmann 11). Perlmann states that the first order of business, then, was to “distinguish the
European subgroups from the larger black‐white division” and “reassert the one‐drop rule”
(Perlmann 7). These special instructions made clear then that not all Mexicans were of the
White race. Any Mexican that had the appearance of an “admixture of Negro blood” should be
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Smith states that this lack of uniformity in decisions and procedures “bred fraud” and this “underlay Congress’s
establishment of the U.S. Naturalization Service” (93).
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classified as such. Hence a policy of immigration control was contingent in great part on a
“racialist58” approach.
This “racialist” approach was further legitimized by the creation of the Immigration
Commission (Act of Congress of February 20, 1907; see Folkmar, The Immigration Commission
n. pag.). The committee’s duties were “to make full inquiry, examination, and
investigation…into the subject of immigration.” The commission, led by Senator William P.
Dillingham retained the 1898 list of “Races and Peoples” and was authorized to “send for
persons or for papers” regarding matters of immigration. The commission contracted Dr. Daniel
Folkmar59 to write The Dictionary of Races or Peoples published in 1911. In the introduction to
the Dictionary, Dr. Folkmar explains that Eastern Europe had become an important source of
immigration and “it became apparent that the true racial status of many of them was
imperfectly understood even in communities where they were most numerous” (1). The
purpose of this dictionary was to “promote a better knowledge” of the sources of immigration
to the U.S. and treats more than six hundred subjects with a special focus on current and
potential immigration trends (1). Folkmar is also quick to point out that this work is written for
the student of immigration, not the ethnologist (2). This is a telling point because, although
Folkmar’s dictionary is a scholarly work, he had to work within the limits and goals of the
immigration commission. Folkmar presents the arguments regarding race and understands that
the number of races are in dispute and that some writers have proposed “15, 29, or 63 races,”
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“Racialist” refers to “selection based on national or ethnic origin” (Weil 626).
I list Folkmar as the author in the Works Cited. In a letter of transmittal (n.pag.) in the foreword of the
Dictionary, the chairman of the commission, Mr. Dillingham writes that he has the honor to present this dictionary
“on behalf of the Immigration Commission,” which was “prepared for the commission by Dr. Daniel Folkmar.”
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but he “deems it reasonable to follow the classification employed by Blumenbach60…, the
Caucasian, Ethiopian, Mongolian, Malay and American, or, as familiarly called, the white, black,
yellow, brown, and red races” (4). Folkmar justifies the use of this classification for two reasons:
“the generally prevailing custom in the United States” and because other ethnologists such as
Keane and Brinton have returned to this classification system (4). The “prevailing custom” in
the U.S. refers to the issue that Folkmar was, to some degree, restricted by the current
classification system in the U.S. The government had gathered race‐based statistics since 1903
and for continuity purposes could not just “do away” with the previous list, and it was part of
Folkmar’s duties to make this previous list “authoritative” (Perlmann 14). Specifically, Folkmar
was restricted by the 1898 “List,” but he also incorporates the 1898 proposed divisions
suggested by then Commissioner‐General of Immigration Sergent. Although there are some
differences in these divisions, it is striking to note that the proposed divisions are quite similar
to Folkmar’s work except that the 1911 division adds the categories “Malay” and “American”
which were in the 1898 list subsumed under “Mongolic” (refer to Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Comparison of the 1898 and 1911 Racial Divisions
1898 Proposed Divisions

1911 Dictionary or Races or Peoples

Teutonic, Celtic, Iberic, Slavic

Caucasian

African

Ethiopian

Mongolic
Mongolian
(Chinese, Japanese, Korean,
East Indian, Pacific Islander,
and Filipino)
Malay
American
60

Blumenbach, Keane, and Brinton were the leading ethnologists from the U.S. and Britain at the turn of the
century.
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According to Folkmar, race is defined as physical characteristics, but also includes linguistic
factors: “Race is determined by language in such phrases as ‘the races of Europe,’ but by
physical qualities such as color, hair, and shape of head, when we speak of ‘the five great races’
or divisions of mankind” (54). The reason Folkmar does this is laid out in the Introduction of the
Dictionary; Immigration officials need to have some way to identify and classify a person
racially, and they are not ethnologists nor have the proper “scientific” training to do so.
Language, then, is another means to ascertain race especially since nationality does little to
distinguish between native and naturalized citizens. Furthermore, the subdivision of people
along linguistic lines is because “this is also the classification that has the sanction of law in
immigration statistics and in the censuses of foreign countries” (4).
Folkmar’s designation of the five grand subdivisions of mankind are further classified by
stock, group, and people. Although race is defined by physical and linguistic factors, the terms
stock, group, and people lack clarity. In the dictionary, he defines stock as a “loose expression
for race” (55). But further elaborates that “a stock in ethnology generally includes several
races” (55). “People” is also defined in a circular fashion since the use of it in this dictionary is
the equivalent of “race” (55). Therefore, the “English People” is the same as saying the “English
race” (55). The comparative chart of races and peoples organizes the races according to the
previous immigration lists and creates a grand scheme to “naturalize” race (refer to Figure 4.1).
This grand scheme was not ideologically neutral since one only has to look at the dictionary
entries of the main divisions to understand that “White” was defined in relation to all other
races, creating a system of racial classification of White and Non‐White.
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CAUCASIAN, CAUCASIC, EUROPEAN, EURAFRICAN, or WHITE race. The name
given by Blumenbach in 1795 to the white race or grand division of mankind
from the Ethiopian, Mongolian, American, and Malay races (see these). The term
is now defined more suitably for our purposes in a broader sense by Brinton and
Keane, namely, to include all races, which, although dark in color or aberrant in
other directions, are, when considered from all points of view, felt to be more like
the white race than like any other of the four other races just mentioned (my
emphasis). (30)
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Figure 4.1 Comparative Classification of Immigrant Races or People from the Dictionary
This system also created a hierarchy of whiteness that placed Scandinavian first; English,
fourth; and Mexican, twenty‐ninth out of a possible thirty‐nine (See Figure 4.1). It is surprising,
given the purpose of the Dictionary, that “English” was not placed first since Folkmar writes
that “there is no necessity in this dictionary for discussion of a subject so well understood by all
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as the character, social institutions, and other qualities of the English as an immigrant people. It
may be assumed that all Americans understand the race which has given us our language and
laws and political institutions” (54). It is ironic, however, that it is in this entry “English or Anglo‐
Saxon; inaccurately British” that Folkmar finally defines the terms used in the dictionary (rather
than in the introduction) and he explains how peoples of “mixed‐origin” should be dealt with:
race is “to be determined by the preponderating element in the mixture” (55). This
“preponderating element” was exploited when confusion arose over the placement of a
“people.” In the entry for “Ethiopian,” for example, Folkmar discusses the issues surrounding
the inclusion of some “groups” under the grand division of Negro such as the Papuans of New
Guinea, and concludes that for immigration purposes they should all be classified as Negroes:
NEGRO, NEGROID, AFRICAN, BLACK, ETHIOPIAN, or AUSTAFRICAN. That grand
division of mankind distinguished by its black color and, generally speaking, by its
woolly hair. While the black, like the white and yellow races, is accepted by
practically all ethnologists as a primary division of mankind, there is the greatest
difference of opinion as to what should be included in it Some… would set apart
the ‘Oceanic Negroes’—that is, the Negritos of Malaysia and the Papuans of New
Guinea…for immigration purposes it is preferable to include all the above under
the term ‘Negroes.’ They are alike in inhabiting hot countries and in belonging to
the lowest division of mankind from an evolutionary standpoint. (100)
The preponderance of one element over another was the building block of this classification
scheme, and the classification endorsed the current ideology that race had something to do
with “intelligence.” Folkmar positions “Negroes” as the lowest division of mankind from an
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evolutionary standpoint. Above them, are the three other divisions: Mongolian, Malay, and
American as evidenced by “type of head.” Although Folkmar enters into scholarly discussion of
the disputes over racial categorization, the Bureau of Immigration applies the system in the
widest sense possible wherever there is disagreement, as in the case of where to place
“Eskimos” (see below).
MONGLIAN, MONGOL, MONGOLIC, MONGOLOID, ASIATIC, or YELLOW race. That
grand division of mankind that is typically, as to color, yellowish, and as to origin,
culture, and present habitat, Asiatic. An important subject in immigration. The
Mongolian and the Caucasian (see) are the two largest “races” or divisions of
mankind… The term “Asiatic” may be used in a geographical sense to include
India. (97)

The term “Mongolic grand division” is used by the Bureau of Immigration in the
widest sense of all, to include the Malays, as well as the Chinese, Japanese, and
Koreans. All of northern, central, and eastern Asia was originally occupied
exclusively by the Mongolian race, if we exclude from this grand division the
doubtful Eskimos…(98)

Finally, the short, or brachycephalic, type of head is more characteristic of the
Mongolian and Malay races than any other. The eastern Eskimos, however, like
most American Indians and Negroes, have long heads. (99)
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This taxonomy provided the basis to contradict previous court decisions by applying race in the
widest possible sense and utilizing a definition of “preponderance” to exclude immigrants of
dark complexion. It was noted previously that in 1897, the Supreme Court ruled that “by law”
the defendant Rodríguez was “white.” Although Mexicans are classified under the Caucasian
race in the Dictionary, the entry regarding “Mexican” states that the definition of Mexican is
restricted to those with “pure white blood” regardless of nativity:
MEXICAN. Any native of Mexico who is neither of Negro nor of Indian descent.
Defined thus for immigration purposes, because Negroes and American Indians
are listed separately regardless of nativity (cf. Cuban and Spanish American). (96)

This understanding of “Mexican” is again reinforced in the entry for “Negro” and “Spanish
American:
NEGRO. Immigration statistics count as Negro, or “African (black)” “aliens whose
appearance indicates an admixture of Negro blood,” “whether coming from
Cuba or other islands of the West Indies, North or South America, Europe, or
Africa.61” Only American‐born immigrants of pure European blood are counted
as Cuban, Spanish American, Mexican, and West Indian (see). (101)

SPANISH AMERICAN. Defined by the Bureau of Immigration, ‘the people of
Central and South America of Spanish Descent.’ Those of Negro or Indian

61

It is not clear what source Folkmar is quoting in this passage. It is assumed that he is referring to the guidelines
for immigration statistics.
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descent (see) are listed separately, as are also Mexicans, West Indians, and
Cubans (see). (137‐138)
Lest there be any confusion, the definition for Mexican further implies that the Mexican “race”
is not overwhelmingly White: “The Mexican population, unlike that of Cuba, is mainly of Indian
or mixed origin and is therefore largely excluded from this definition. While 70 per cent of the
inhabitants of Cuba are white, less than 20 per cent of the people of Mexico are of pure white
blood.” (96). The Dictionary’s definition of Mexican conflicted with the U.S. Census classification
that maintained that Mexicans were White.62
The census had added race to the data they collected in the Census Bill of 1910 and racial
statistics gathered in this census were used to limit immigration through the Act of 1917 that
barred immigration from a geographic area with longitudinal and latitudinal precision. One
small part of this Act was to bar immigration to contract workers. In Not Like Us: Immigrants
and Minorities in America, 1890‐1924, Roger Daniels explains how growers in the “American
Southwest” urged lawmakers to exempt Mexicans because they “feared a farm labor shortage”
(83). The Secretary of Labor issued orders soon after to honor the request. This exemption
would prove to have further ramifications for immigration, as the understanding of White
would come under attack by the courts. Two fundamental cases were argued before the
Supreme Court: The United States v. Ozawa (1922) and The United States v. Thind (1923). The
1922 case, re Ozawa, argued that the language regarding racial ineligibility set forth in sec. 2169
was based on color not race. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that “a person of Japanese
race, born in Japan” was ineligible to naturalize because he was not White, or as stated in the
62

Prior to the 1920s, Mexican was a separate entry on the U.S. Census, but the Mexican government pressured the
U.S. to not list Mexicans as separate since Mexicans were White. In 1920, the entry was removed. (See Perlmann)
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written decision those “popularly known as the Caucasian Race” (Smith 96). Of relevance to
Mexican immigrants is the courts conclusion in re Ozawa that “it is not likely that Congress
would be willing to accept as citizens a class of person whom it rejects as immigrants” (Smith
96). If Mexicans had not been exempt from the Immigration Act of 1917, they would likely not
been able to naturalize regardless of race.
The United States v. Thind (1923) brought to light again the obscurity in sec. 2169 regarding
whiteness. It was argued that Thind, “a high caste Hindu of full Indian blood” should be eligible
to naturalize because he was of the Caucasian race and Caucasian was synonymous with White
(Smith 96). The Supreme Court ruled that “white persons” in sec. 2169 was a racial term, not a
“color” test (Volker 4). This was, perhaps the first time that White was upheld by the courts to
mean race. It is not clear whether or not this ruling was influential in a change in the U.S.
Census, but in the next decennial census (1930), Mexicans were classified as a separate race.
This differential application of Caucasian, White, and Mexican allowed immigration
officials, administrators, and the judiciary the agency to exclude certain groups of immigrants
from naturalization. The lack of uniformity in matters regarding naturalization was addressed
by the newly formed Immigration and Naturalization Service63 in Lecture 8 published on March
26th, 1934. Lecture 8 clarified the requirements regarding race, education, residence, moral
character, and attachment to the constitution. In a review of the pertinent laws and court cases
regarding race, H. L. Volker, an Associate Examiner for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service states that the Supreme Court has ruled that “persons of the Armenian, Mexican,
Parsee, and Syrian races” have been allowed to naturalize, but that “no authoritative and final
63

The Bureau of Immigration and Bureau of Naturalization merged in 1933‐1934 to become the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (See USCIS History)
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decisions have been rendered determining the racial eligibility to naturalization” (5). Volker
notes that the Mexican, Parsee, and Syrian cases were decided prior to the Ozawa case; this
was important because it was “when the Supreme Court first considered section 2169” (5).
Volker’s conclusion regarding Mexican immigrants provides the ambiguity to continue to deny
some (“non‐White”) Mexicans the right to naturalize or even to immigrate since the
Immigration Act of 1924 provided that immigrants who were not eligible to naturalize could not
immigrate to the U.S.
4.4 Revising the List of Races and Peoples
The formation of the new agency also raised the question again about racial categories.
Smith states that the two Bureaus used different racial classification systems and the merging
of the two “initiated some reconsideration and revision,” internally at least, on the question of
race (98). The original 1898 List of “Races and Peoples” was still the definitive source for racial
classification, and Smith discovered that as recently as 1930 in a memorandum for then
Secretary of Labor, the Department of Labor had concluded that the race categories could not
be changed because the data was “required ‘by law’” (98).
But where naturalization was solely a function of the courts prior to 1929, the
establishment of the Immigration and Naturalization Service marked a transition where the INS
had the administrative discretion to determine eligibility; it was the responsibility of INS to
carry out the will of the courts and the legislative mandates. The “administrative discretion” of
the INS was used to permit alterations to the traditional list of “Races and Peoples” (Smith 98).
The changes to the List are represented in Table 4.2. By 1936, four races were added and two
amended, and in 1937, Manx was added to the list (Smith 98‐99). Sometime in the late 1930s
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another USCIS circular was issued, this time reaffirming the whiteness of Mexicans (Smith 99).
This was in response to political pressure from Mexican Americans aided by the Mexican
Government, and “Mexican was dropped from the list of races and peoples” (Perlmann 44).
This change was first initiated through dispute over the census’64 categorization of Mexicans
and then was extended to immigration, (Perlmann 44). More importantly, it demonstrates how
an administrative act changed Mexican to White.
Regardless of administrative changes to the original list of races, immigration officials
maintained that the there was difficulty in recording an immigrant’s race and the Bureau
decided to significantly change the racial classification schema. Rather than stating their race,
applicants could choose from a list of eligible races; hence the change to White, African or
African descent or Filipino (Smith 99). The forms were revised again, however, with the
passageof the Nationality Act of 1940.65 The Nationality Act of 1940 extended eligibility for
citizenship to “descendents of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere” (sec. 303). Like
much of the previous laws regarding immigration and naturalization, the term “races
indigenous to the Western Hemisphere” lacked clarity and begged the question of whether or
not this was a geographic term. In 1945, the Immigration and Nationality Manual spelled out
who was not eligible: “native Samoans or Polynesian inhabitants of American Samoa, and
Maoris (members of the Polynesian family) born in New Zealand” (sec. 722.1).
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The next census (1940), Mexicans were classified as White.
It is important to note that the List did not go away. It was still used by the “immigration” side of the INS. Further
changes to the list occurred after 1940: Spanish American was changed to Latin American in 1942 and Hebrew was
deleted in 1943 (See Weil and Smith).
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Table 4.2 Comparison of Changes to the List of “Races and Peoples”
1898 List
African (black)
Armenian
Bohemian
Bosnian
Bulgarian
Chinese
Croatian
Cuban
Dalmation
Dutch
East Indian
English
Finnish
Flemish
French
German
Greek
Hebrew
Irish
Italian (North)
Italian (South)
Japanese
Korean
Lithuanian
Magyar
Mexican
Montenegrin
Moravian
Pacific Islander
Polish
Portuguese
Roumanian
Russian
Ruthenian (Russiak).
Scandinavian
Scotch
Servian
Slovak
Slovenian
Spanish
Spanish American
Syrian
Turkish
Welsh
West Indian (other
than Cuban)

1936
African (black)
changed to Negro
Italian (North) and
Italian (South)
becomes one entry
under Italian

1937
Added to the List:
Manx

Added to the List:
Albanian
Estonian
Latvian
Filipino
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1940
List is changed to only
these categories:
White
African or African
Descent
Filipino

after Act of 1940
List changed to only
these categories:
White
Negro
Japanese
Chinese
Other

After passage of this act, naturalization forms were revised and included five choices: White,
Negro, Japanese, Chinese, and Other. According to Smith, the change to these categories are
inexplicable and “do not correspond to the List of Races or Peoples” or the “races then eligible
for naturalization” (101).
The 1940s marked a period of great change in Immigration and Naturalization law. From
1942‐1943 eleven different bills were introduced to eliminate racial barriers to naturalization
(Smith 101). This was, in part, due to INS administrators dissatisfaction with the agency’s racial
classification system as well as the realization by INS officials that race was a matter of
administrative practice not law (Smith 101). Race was finally abolished as a determinant for
eligibility to citizenship through the Act of 1952; This Act officially repealed the Congressional
Act of 1947, which required immigration officials to record race (as well as other information)
of all immigrants.
It is at this point, that the INS revises the Form N‐400 and the race category is purged.66
However, the descriptor—complexion is left (or added) to the forms. In a review of the
historical forms on file at the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service Historical Library, the
question of complexion is present until the 1970s on the forms for “Declaration of Intention” to
Petition for Naturalization (N‐300; N‐315; N‐321; N‐325); and until 1975 on the N‐400;
Application to File Petition for Naturalization (See Figure 4.2). The purpose of the question on
complexion is not clear, and neither are the possible answers. Instructions to the forms do not
designate acceptable categories. A survey of filled out forms shows that the most common
answers are fair, medium, dark, light and ruddy. Below is a copy of a filed N‐400 for Zbigniew
66

It is not clear when race is deleted from the form, the USCIS Historical Library only has historical forms dating
back to 1959.
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Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor from 1977 to 1981, who was
born in Warsaw and entered the United States from Canada on March 7, 1954. This example
was taken from the National Archives Digital Vaults and although the form is not clear,
Brzezinski enters “fair” for his response to complexion.

Figure 4.2 Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Petition for Naturalization
4.5 Race and the N‐400 after 1952
While conducting primary research at the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service
Historical Library in Washington D.C., the historians related to me that because of the Act of
1952, race was deleted from all naturalization forms since race no longer had any bearing on
eligibility. I discovered that after 1952 a specific question regarding race was not present on the
N‐400, but that race was still recorded for all immigrants as part of the criminal background
check. The form FD‐258 is used to check FBI records through the fingerprints of the applicant.
Although each “District” office has its own fingerprint cards, the Form FD‐258 is used for all
Permanent Resident and Petition for Naturalization Forms67 (See Figure 4.3).

67

The Form FD‐258 is also used when filing the I‐90, Alien Registration Receipt Card, I‐589, Request for Asylum in
the United States, I‐600A Kit, Application for Advance Processing of Orphan Petition; I‐643 or G‐14, Refugee
Adjustment of Status.
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Figure 4.3 Race and the Form FD‐258 Rev. 10 Dec. 2007
Earlier versions of the N‐400 do not specifically state that the applicant must use Form
FD‐258, the data on file at the USCIS states that this form was used with the N‐400. The
Permanent Resident Application Instructions (I‐485) specifically mention Form FD‐258.
Applicants are “furnished” a copy of the fingerprint chart and must go to “any police station,
sheriff’s office or office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for fingerprinting” (See
Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4 N‐400 Instructions for Fingerprintingd
This chart is not filled out by the applicant, but by an authorized agent. Thus, race is
ultimately determined by the official. Instructions for the FD‐258 are not provided to the

d

Figure 4.4 Instructions are taken from Form N‐400 revised 1973.
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immigrant since the only responsibility the immigrant has is to fill in their “Alien Number.” I did
not find any instructions with the FD‐258 in the USCIS Historical Library, but did find through
the State Department the following instructions regarding race (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Instructions for Race on the Form FD‐258
It is not clear when this classification system was implemented because of the lack of
information regarding the instructions to fill out the FD‐258. However, this Form has gone
through very few revisions; the USCIS Historical Library has on file only two revisions: edition 4‐
25‐72 and 12‐29‐82. The 1972, 1982 and 2007 revisions, to my knowledge, have very few
changes. It is significant to note that there is a move within the government to consolidate the
List of Races into five main divisions (refer to Figure 4.5); a move that Folkmar and the
Immigration Commission made in 1911! The choices given on the FD‐258 are listed in
alphabetical order and include: American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander;
Black; White; and Unknown.
Although collecting racial data may not be a direct function of USCIS, race nonetheless
remains a category that must be answered. New immigrants are codified and constructed by
these categories. The Form FD‐258 accompanied the N‐400 until 2002. In July of 2002, the N‐
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400 (Ed. 7‐23‐2002) is revised and “Part 5. Information for Criminal Records Search” is added.
This section asks applicants to describe themselves and states that the FBI requires this
information. Two questions on the form relate directly to race and ethnicity. Given the
country’s historical exclusion of immigrants based on racial ineligibility, the USCIS points out in
the instructions that the FBI will use these categories to conduct a criminal records search and
the results of the search “may affect your eligibility” but that “we do NOT make naturalization
decisions based on your gender, race, or physical description” (their emphasis). Although these
categories do not restrict naturalization, they do however reinscribe the idea that race exists;
humans can be categorized by race, and that race matters in U.S. society. The 2002 revision
allowed applicants to declare whether they were “Hispanic or Latino” and choose among five
race options: White, Asian, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, and
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (see Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6 Part 5. Information for Criminal Records Search
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The options available to self‐identify on the Form N‐400 were developed through changes in
the classification system used by the U.S. Census. The original “List of Races and Peoples” had
migrated over to the U.S. Census Bureau early on.68 Although it is not within the scope of this
dissertation to survey the historical changes to the census forms regarding race, it is crucial to
highlight how and when “Hispanic and Latino” became separate categories and trace how the
USCIS/FBI determined the options available on the Form N‐400.
4.6 The Emergence of the Current Racial Categories
The Hispanic/Latino identifier was the outcome of massive influxes of Puerto Ricans in
the 50’s and Cubans in the 60’s. This rapid shift in migration was accompanied by changes in
the U.S. Census forms, and in 1950 the census included information on people of Puerto Rican
birth; the same occurred in 1960 as a separate category for Cuban birth or parentage (Rumbaut
23). In response to civil rights activism and the need to collect statistical data concerning
minority groups’ disadvantages, according to Rumbaut, the “White House ordered the addition
of a Spanish‐origin self‐identifier on the 1970 census” (23). Following this, Public Law 94‐311
was passed that mandated the collection and analysis of data for “Americans of Spanish origin
and descent.” The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) whose job was to develop a
government‐wide program to collect this data initiated this mandate. The Statistical Policy
Division of OMB issued, in 1977, Directive 15, which “specified a minimal classification of four
‘races’ (‘American Indian or Alaskan Native,’ ‘Asian or Pacific Islander,’ ‘Black,’ and ‘White’) and
two ‘ethnic’ backgrounds (‘of Hispanic origin’ and ‘not of Hispanic origin’)” (Rumbaut 24).
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Perlmann details in Working Paper 648 the relationship between the U.S. Census and the Immigration
Commission c. 1910. Many of the researchers/staff that worked for the Immigration Commission, including Dr.
Folkmar also worked with the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Criticism of the categories issued in Directive 15 led to a revision of the standards, which
were adopted in 1997. The revised Directive 15 changed the racial categories to five: “American
Indian or Alaska Native,” Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” “Asian,” “Black or African
American,” and “White.69” It also allowed for the option to choose more than one racial
category; an option that did not exist prior to the 2000 census. According to Rumbaut, it also
changed the two ethnic identifiers to “Hispanic or Latino” and “not Hispanic or Latino” (25). The
historical background reveals that the choices for race and ethnicity on the form N‐400 are a
direct result of the revised Directive 15 of 1997. The Office of Management and Budget does
not explain the justification for these five categories, but it becomes apparent in a comparison
of the 1911 Dictionary and Directive 15 that statistical continuity was involved. I compared the
current racial divisions from Directive 15 (1997) with the 1911 Dictionary and found that the
Directive matches the Dictionary’s five grand‐divisions of humans and within this structure are
five color groups: white, black, brown, yellow, and red; this is evidenced by reviewing the
entries in the Dictionary for the 1911 “grand‐divisions” and the races as per Directive 15. The
first three categories are listed in the Dictionary as such and demonstrate that the current racial
categories (White, Black, Asian) are listed as synonyms for Folkmar’s “grand‐divisions:”
CAUCASIAN, CAUCASIC, EUROPEAN, EURAFRICAN, or WHITE race. (30)
NEGRO, NEGROID, AFRICAN, BLACK, ETHIOPIAN, or AUSTAFRICAN. (100)
MONGLIAN, MONGOL, MONGOLIC, MONGOLOID, ASIATIC, or YELLOW race. (97)
Although there is not an entry in the dictionary for Alaskan Native, Folkmar debates the
classification of “Eskimo” and “Aleut” and determines that the Eskimo is more like the Indian
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Of note is that the “races” are listed in alphabetical order in Directive 15, but not in the Form N‐400.
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tribes also known as Americans and that the Eskimo is “long‐headed” like some of the Indians
from the southernmost tribes (78). Folkmar also reasserts this in the entry under “Mongolian”
(99) even though the Immigration Bureau applies the term Mongolian in the widest sense to
also include the “Eskimo” (98).
In regard to Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Folkmar understands Hawaiian to be
part of a larger classification of Pacific Islander (see entries below).
HAWAIIAN or SANDWICH ISLANDER. An individual member of the northernmost
Polynesian people subject to the United States. (See Pacific Islander.) Not
counted among immigrants on arriving in the United States. (73)

PACIFIC ISLANDER. A native of those Pacific Islands which lie between the
Phillippines, the Celebes, and Australia on the west and America on the east. The
Hawaiian Islands on the north are included. A loose geographical rather than
ethnographical term… The term then corresponds to Oceania as generally
defined. But this latter term also is made to include Malaysia. …It is more
convenient, however, for the present purpose to include in the term all islanders
toward the west, with the exception of the Malaysians, who are called East
Indians (see). All Pacific Islanders are put by the Bureau of Immigration into the
“Mongolic grand division. (102)
Although there is an attempt by the Bureau of Immigration to exclude Malaysia from the
category “Pacific Islander,” Folkmar remarks that this term is geographical not ethnographical
and geographically speaking includes Malaysia. Under the 1911 classification scheme, the
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Bureau would racially identify Native Hawaiians or Other Pacific Islanders as Mongolian. This
significant difference, however, only changes who is considered “brown” but ultimately
retained Blumenbach’s classification (See Table 4.3): “the Caucasian, Ethiopian, Mongolian,
Malay, and American, or, as familiarly called, the white, black, yellow, brown, and red races”
(Folkmar 3).
Table 4.3 Comparison of Five Racial Divisions
1911 Dictionary or Races or Peoples

1997 Revised Directive 15

Caucasian

White

Ethiopian

Black or African American

Mongolian

Asian

Malay

Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific
Islander
American Indian or Alaskan Native

American

After 1952, race is no longer a category for eligibility for naturalization, but it is apparent
that the racialist ideology concretized in the “List of Races and Peoples,” and the five “grand‐
divisions of mankind” continues to circulate in society. The current construction of race repeats
the prevailing notions of race as espoused a century ago in The Dictionary of Races and Peoples
commissioned by the Bureau of Immigration. The racial classification set forth by Folkmar and
the Immigration Commission in 1911 reemerges with the publication of Directive 15. The
reemergence of the racial discourse of 1911 is central to hegemony (Gramsci). According to
Omi and Winant, the “ruling groups” exercise control through maintaining “a popular system of
ideas and practices‐through education, the media, religion, folk wisdom, etc.” (Omi and Winant
“Racial Formation” 131). Although these “ideas” are circulated at all levels of society, they are
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legitimized through the government. This ideology is then reproduced by different branches
(the Department of Labor, Customs and Immigration, courts, the Executive Branch, the U.S.
Census), and these pre‐existing discursive practices that describe race are consumed by citizens
and non‐citizens alike through “historically situated projects” where human bodies and social
structures are represented, organized and ruled (“Racial Formation” 124).
The historically situated racial projects presented in this chapter demonstrate how the
U.S. definition of citizenship (to “free white persons”) excluded immigrants from Mexico until
congress signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This treaty defined Mexicans as White since
racially ineligible immigrants could not become citizens (sec. 2169). This definition was upheld
by the Supreme Court in their ruling of The United States vs. Rodríguez (1897). In this
monumental court decision, the judge noted that Rodríguez would be classified as White by the
law but not by the ethnologist. Rumbaut claims that this historically important decision by the
judge was, perhaps, the context needed to separate Mexicans (and all Spanish‐speaking citizens
and immigrants) from Whites (22). This court decision and the differential application of
whiteness and naturalization law by “any court of record” left Mexican immigrants at the mercy
of the judiciary until the Act of 1952 which removed race as a requirement for eligibility for
naturalization. This change, however, did not stop the recording of racial data on all immigrants
since race was required as part of the FBI background check.
The racial categories were transformed until the 1997 revised Directive 15, which
standardized the races to five, with two ethnic identifiers. Race emerges as a question on the N‐
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400 in 200270 with the revised Directive 15 standards. Although the N‐400 has undergone
various updates, the current N‐400 (revised 1/11) and its questions on race and ethnicity
remain unchanged. Even more striking is the question that precedes race on the Form that asks
the applicant to declare if he or she is Hispanic or Latino. This question accomplishes what
Rumbaut maintains the 1897 Supreme Court decision did: provides the context to separate
Mexicans (and all Spanish‐speaking immigrants) from Whites.
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Although I did not find any information as to the addition of these questions in 2002, in my opinion, the
questions were added as a direct result of the Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002.

103

Chapter 5
INTERACTING WITH THE INSTITUTION: THE “BLANK” N‐400 AND
THE RHETORIC OF THE VISUAL
[T]he whole revolution of information technology seems to encourage the idea that ideology
becomes increasingly reduced‐miniaturized—in step with the development of ever smaller and
more powerful computing devices. Therefore, we need to keep awake, applying our critical
intelligences outside, as well as inside the black box: questioning and resisting. (Kinross 29‐30)
In recent years, Anne Wysocki (2001), Carlos Salinas (2002), Mary Hocks (2003), and
Susan Hagan (2007), among others, have argued for a theory of rhetoric that does not privilege
one form (visual/verbal) over another. Wysocki sees the visual and verbal as no longer
separate and opts for “word/image;” Hocks calls this “hybridity,” and Hagan, “visual/verbal
collaboration.” Wysocki, however, is conflicted over using the terms “word,” and “image” since
they are very “slippery” terms (160). She likens word to content and image to form and also
uses “form/content” in her article because she “cannot make any clean cut between content
and form” (159). But, another way to avoid these slippery terms is to consider the fusion of the
visual and verbal as “configurations.” Carlos Salinas argues that our field needs “an
understanding of visual rhetoric that sees images as configurations that are designed and
critically read…” and outlines the role of the technical rhetorician in the “reading” and
“designing” of configured images (170). In this chapter, I approach the “blank” Form N‐400 as a
configured image and use visual rhetoric as a frame for analysis. In the following sections, I
provide a brief literature review regarding the theorization of the image/text and outline the
methodology for analyzing the N‐400.
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5.1 A Rhetoric of the Visual71
Since the 1960s scholars from various fields began arguing for the importance of the
visual in making meaning. How scholars conceived of the visual depended upon their
theoretical and disciplinary framework. Some referred to only artistic images, or two‐
dimensional images; others focused on digital composing, but this new mode of inquiry
encompassed pretty much anything considered visual. One limitation to this new field of study
was the rigid separation between the image and the word. In the introduction to a seminal
collection of essays edited by W. J. T. Mitchell titled The Language of Images, Mitchell
comments how our world is “inundated with composite pictorial‐verbal forms (film, television,
illustrated books)” and “the technology for the rapid, cheap production of words and images
(cameras, Xerox machines, tape recorders)” (1). He further notes that in general when scholars
refer to a language of images, they are referring to “three sorts of things”: “language about
images,” “images regarded as language,” and “verbal language as a system informed by images”
(3). The central conflict, notes Mitchell, is that scholars “insist on separating the study of texts
and images from one another” rather than investigating the interaction of the two
(“Diagrammatology” 627). Since Mitchell’s essay, scholarship into the impact of the “language
of the visual” has proliferated and given rise to a new field of study: visual rhetoric. Helmers
defines visual rhetoric as “a frame for analysis for looking and interpreting” (65). This frame for
looking and interpreting includes diverse foci and methodologies, but most of the previous

71

Although visual rhetoric is the term most commonly used, scholars have argued that visual as an adjective
before rhetoric diminishes the fact that the visual is rhetoric much like some scholars argue that ethnic labels
before American (Asian American, for example) and especially when hyphenated “can highlight the boundary
between minority Americans and White Americans”(Chen 9).

105

scholarship theorized visual rhetoric as a neutral medium that represents reality; this relegated
visual rhetoric to issues of design and layout.
In the last twenty years, visual rhetoric has undergone significant changes as our
understanding of the image/text has evolved. Some scholars (Kress and van Leeuwen, Mitchell,
Blair, and Goggins) have focused on visual language and argued that images contribute to
logical arguments and that images can present visual arguments. With the development of new
“writing” technologies and the expansion of the World Wide Web, other scholars such as
Wysocki, Salinas, Hocks, and Hagan have theorized the visual/verbal relationship in creating
meaning and call for new definitions of what we consider writing. In “Impossibly Distinct,” Anne
Wysocki argues that “images” and “words” are no longer distinguishable on the screen and
theorizes the “word/image” (159‐160). Hocks opts for the use of the term “hybridity” and
posits that “the relationships among word and image, verbal texts and visual texts, ‘visual
culture’ and ‘print culture’ are all dialogic relationships rather than binary opposites” (Hocks
631). Hocks defines hybridity as “the interplay between the visual and the verbal in one
constructed, heterogeneous semiotic space” (637). For Hocks, “any rhetorical theory works as a
dynamic system of strategies employed for creating, reacting to, and receiving meaning,” thus,
digital rhetoric should account for the dialectical relationship between “writers, audiences, and
institutional contexts” and also attend to the multiple modalities available for making meaning
(632). Multimodality entails the mixing/blending of multiple technologies and media to include
words, sounds, images, graphics, and video and inevitably leads to hybrid constructions.
Although the concept of hybridity sounds appealing, it becomes clear through Hocks’ analysis of
two websites (Wysocki’s “Monitoring Order” and Christine Boese's “The Ballad of the Internet
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Nutball”) that Hocks’ hybridity is akin to collaboration. In her analysis, Hocks claims that
Wysocki’s site “combine[s] pictures and text in thoughtful and unconventional ways,” and uses
the “juxtaposition of pictures, words, and unconventional margins to transform our
understanding of the visual through the reading experience” (637). In “Visual/Verbal
Collaboration in Print: Complementary Differences, Necessary Ties, and an Untapped Rhetorical
Opportunity,” Susan Hagan provides further framework for analyzing the visual/verbal. In this
essay, Hagan argues that when we operate “under the assumption that visual and verbal
modalities operate in similar ways,” we overlook important distinctions between the two (49).
Hagan offers a model of analysis based on perception (Arnheim) and cohesion (Halliday). This
analysis is rooted in difference, which, she states, “leads to the argument that visual/verbal
messages develop when cohesive and perceptual relationships form between image and text,
resulting in four types of loose to tight visual/verbal collaboration” (49). Her analysis leads to a
new type of image/text collaboration, one that includes actual with “imagined” images and
text.
Although Wysocki, Hocks, and Hagan theorize the visual/verbal relationship, their
theories are problematic even in their terminology: word/image; form/content (Wysocki);
hybridity (Hocks); visual/verbal collaboration (Hagan). These theories posit the “word” as
separate from the visual even though Wysocki admits these are slippery terms. But by opting
for content/form, Wysocki does not elude this issue. In addition, with the rise of digital
technologies, the word on the page has become an image, one that Goggins says is “in both a
literal and figurative way, a rhetoric of the written word is visual, distinguishable from other
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forms of symbolic representation by the sense of sight” (88). Therefore, written rhetoric
(verbal, content, word) is visual rhetoric (Goggins 88).
The problematic terminology of Wysocki, Hocks, and Hagan is avoided by invoking
Salinas’ concept of the image as “configuration.” In “Technical Rhetoricians and the Art of
Configuring Images,” Salinas contends that “images are integral to all forms of writing (broadly
conceived), and primary to how we read and communicate, especially via web writing” (166).
Salina’s approach differs in that he invokes Lupton and Miller’s critical design theory and
conceptualizes writing as visual. Lupton and Miller assert that language encompasses “words,
images, objects, and customs” and that these do not work separately in the meaning making
process, but “participate in the culturally and historically determined meaning that
characterizes verbal language” (65). Salinas likens this to design/writing which views images
and verbal language as both written and designed (169). By design of images, he refers to “the
strategic composition of visual representations that have cultural significance” (168). Thus,
rhetoricians must consider the cultural impact of images, and see images as constructed and
ideological. Salinas argues that despite research in this area no theory speaks directly to how to
culturally read and write images. Salinas, therefore, proposes a rhetorical theory that theorizes
“images as configurations that simultaneously operate as artifacts, figures, representations, and
projections” (166).
The concept of configuration is taken from Sosnoski who theorizes it as an “analogical
and graphical intuition” (11) that is also a “mode of argumentation” (16) articulated as an
“arrangement” (159) that rel[ies] principally on visualized resemblances” (12). This
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understanding of configuration views images72 as participatory in the building of culture and
therefore the “reading” of them is always negotiated and/or contested (Sosnoski 160). Because
of this, its “domain is rhetoric” (Sosnoski 159), and configuring is “always a heuristic” (Sosnoski
166). Salinas argues, then, that technical rhetoricians must “incorporate a savvy awareness of
the consequences images have into how they design images” (171). One way to do this is to
“infuse graphic design views into our understanding of visual rhetoric” since graphic design
“ha[s] a longer, more critical history of theorizing and producing images” (171). Salinas
“tweaks” Sosnoski’s concept of configuration to include not only the critical reading of images
but also the design of images and outlines a methodology using Lupton and Miller’s design
theory for graphic artists. Salinas argues that
Technical rhetoricians need to know how specific material elements constitute
particular images (how content is artificially designed); how images are written
and spaced into particular contexts(how they are figured); how images are
inscribed with identifiable values (what ideologies and cultural values they
represent); and how images convey the particular interests of their makers (what
identity or ethos they project. (166)
Salinas’ model provides clear questions that researchers can use to analyze images: How is
content artificially designed? How are they figured? What ideologies do the present/represent?
What identity or ethos do they project? (166). I use these questions to guide the analysis of a
“blank” Form N‐400.

72

Although it is difficult to avoid the terms image/text or image/word, it is important to keep in mind that when
Salinas invokes “image,” he is including in this “writing broadly conceived.”
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5.2 The “Blank” Form
Many scholars may question the validity of analyzing a “blank” form. This may beg the
question whether a blank form is rhetorical and if it is ideological. In 1985, Robin Kinross
challenged the assumption that texts used to inform are void of ideology in his essay titled “The
Rhetoric of Neutrality.” Kinross refutes this assumption drawing upon the work of Gui Bonsiepe
who asserts that documents used to inform are “interlarded” with rhetoric:
Informative assertions are interlarded [durchsetzt] with rhetoric to a greater or
lesser degree. Informating without rhetoric is a pipe‐dream which ends up in the
break‐down of communication and total silence. ‘Pure’ information exists for the
designer only in arid abstraction. As soon as he begins to give it concrete shape
to bring it within the range of experience, the process of rhetorical infiltration
begins. (qtd. In Kinross 18)
Kinross applies Bonsiepe’s assertion of the “interlarding” of rhetoric to analyze the British
Railway timetable. He examines the 1928 timetable and two subsequent redesigns. The
timetables, according to Kinross, “organize and articulate and give visual presence to
information” and thereby use rhetorical means (19).
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Figure 5.1 London North‐Eastern Timetable 1928e
Kinross uses the dictionary definition of rhetoric: “the art of using language so as to persuade
or influence others; the body of rules to be observed by a speaker or writer in order that he
may express himself with eloquence” to posit that timetables draw upon the second notion of
rhetoric: “the body of rules for eloquence” (19‐20) and declares that the “system of tabular
arrangement” used in the timetables are like “a figure of rhetoric: a framework for eloquent
articulation” (20). Kinross’ main point is that there seems to be a distinction between design for
information and design for persuasion, but that distinction breaks down when scrutinizing the
railway timetables (21).
He demonstrates, through one aspect of the timetables, typeface, that a collection of
beliefs and attitudes are associated with the choice of typeface. It is through this examination
that Kinross argues that there is no such thing as rhetoric of neutrality. Kinross adds that the
e

As reproduced in Monotype Recorder 32, Winter 1933, in Kinross 20
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“whole revolution of information technology seems to encourage the idea that ideology
becomes increasingly reduced‐miniaturized—in step with the development of ever smaller and
more powerful computing devices. Therefore, we need to keep awake, applying our critical
intelligences outside, as well as inside the black box: questioning and resisting” (29‐30). Kinross
demonstrates that the distinction between design for information and design for persuasion is
fallacy.
Kinross highlights a very important point: the presence of ideology is reduced through
the proliferation of information technologies. In fact, information technologies used for digital
composing, printers, and copy machines have allowed for the “form” to become commonplace.
Although Bonsiepe and Kinross are concerned with visual design for information, I turn my
attention to the “blank” form. It seems that we fill out forms wherever we go from the beauty
salon to the dentist’s office. These forms are usually aimed at soliciting information from the
user whether through a simple sign‐in sheet or a more detailed form such as medical history.
The explosion of the form has lead to its “routinization.” Routinization, according to Anthony
Giddens, is “the habitual taken‐for‐granted character of the vast bulk of activities of day‐to‐day
social life” (376). Yet, the danger of a routine is that it becomes second nature and is no longer
questioned or resisted. Consider the dangers inherent in the amount of confidential
information (personal, medical, financial) collected on these routine forms. These concerns beg
the questions: Who will use it? How will it be used or shared? How will it be protected? The
dangers inherent in these forms are obvious, but the ideological assumptions in a “blank” form
are overlooked and thereby reinforced through our use. For example, we come to expect the
designation of race on certain forms and, thus, no longer question its validity. Although it may
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be “blank,” the unfilled‐out form is far from empty of rhetoric; it is “interlarded” with it. Forms
are designed to be easily read and recognized so that anyone can understand them; this also
disguises that they convey a message that arises from the reading of the image of the page and
the word. These configurations are far from neutral or objective, and the unfilled‐out form is as
lethal as the filled‐out form. The visual presence of information, spacing, black‐boxing, font
style and size along with the text in the N‐400 are laden with cultural significance. Because of
the visual presence of information, the Form itself becomes an image.
According to Ding, “a visual representation of the structure of a page fits all the above
definitions of images: it lacks articulation of language, it uses forms in space, and it more
naturally represents the structure of a page than verbal descriptions” (34). That the word and
the page are can be defined as images further supports Salinas’ concept of configuration. The
verbal/visual, word/image, form/content cannot be neatly separated out. For this reason, I
argue that the Form N‐400 operates as an ideologically laden configuration that persuades
applicants to accept one version of reality over another. Therefore the guiding question of
inquiry for this chapter is: How does the visual rhetoric of the form (N‐400) construct and
persuade it users? To answer this question, I use critical (visual) rhetoric (infused with design
theory) as a frame.
5.3 Forming a Persuasive Argument and the N‐400
I stated earlier that I use Salina’s concept of configuration and his strategic questions to
guide the analysis of the N‐400. Salina stated that technical rhetoricians should infuse graphic
design theory in visual rhetoric. I apply Robin William’s design and typographic principles as a
frame for “looking” at the N‐400. This analysis incorporates global issues of the design of the
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form and then elaborates on “Part 5 (Information for Criminal Records Search).” The analysis
begins with a discussion of the Form in general terms.
The N‐400 is divided into 14 parts and the titles to each “part” as they appear in the are
reproduced below.
1. Your Name
2. Information About Your Eligibility
3. Information About You
4. Information About Contacting You
5. Information for Criminal Records Search
6. Information About Your Residence and Employment.
7. Time Outside the United States (including trips to Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean)
8. Information About Your Marital History
9. Information About Your Children
10. Additional Questions
11. Your Signature
12. Signature of Person Who Prepared the Form for You
13. Signature at Interview
14. Oath of Allegiance
Applicants fill out parts 1‐11 and also 12 if someone else prepares the form for them. The N‐400
is designed to be used throughout the citizenship application process and is forwarded to the
immigration official who will conduct the interview and test the applicant on his/her knowledge
of English, U.S. history, and government (Part 13). Once the applicant passes these, he/she then
is scheduled to attend an oath of allegiance ceremony and becomes a U.S. citizen once the oath
is taken (Part 14). The application process takes approximately one year from the date the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service receives the application.
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Applicants can choose to fill out the forms without any help, but seeking help is ideal
since fees associated with the application are high ($595.00 in 2011), and the application will be
returned if it is filled out incorrectly, thus delaying the applicant’s path to citizenship. In
addition, this analysis will show how having help, whether through a non‐profit like the
Diocesan for Migrant or Refugee Services or by someone else knowledgeable about the
application process, can make applicants aware of the “danger zones” in the form. For
example, “Part 2” pertains to information about the applicant’s eligibility for application for
naturalization. Yet, the applicant is essentially arguing for his/her eligibility in every “part” of
the form. The applicant may overlook that the answers provided in this application form the
overall argument that he/she is eligible for citizenship. Therefore, the potential citizen is
obliged to answer all questions, and this is stated unequivocally in the instructions that the
applicant must “answer all questions fully and accurately.” If an item does not apply, the
applicant must answer with not applicable “N/A” or, if the answer is none, “write none” (See
instructions to N‐400 in Appendix A).
In this section, I examine each part of the Form, and explore the hidden “danger zones.”
In “Part 1,” applicants declare information about their name. Far from a simple question,
applicants must provide their legal name, given name, the name on the permanent resident
card, and any other names used previously. Although not explicitly stated, this information will
be used for the criminal records search. “Part 2” requires applicants to check the box that most
applies to them and is based on the residency requirements for their specific circumstances. For
example, permanent residents must have resided legally in the U.S. for a period of five years
before being eligible for citizenship. If the applicant is married to a U.S. citizen, that
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requirement is shorter, a period of three years. “Part 3” is information about the applicant such
as social security number, date of birth, date he/she became a permanent resident, country of
birth, country of nationality, citizenship of parents, marital status, and any disability waivers or
accommodations. Although the applicant declares in “Part 2” that he/she is eligible for
citizenship, in this section the applicant is asked his or her date of permanent residency. This is
the date that counts. It does not matter if the applicant has lived for thirty years in the U.S.; if
the permanent residency date does not reflect at least five years of residency, the applicant is
ineligible. In addition, many applicants are not knowledgeable about the immigration system in
the U.S. The quotas by country are no longer the standard to admittance to this country, but in
its place is a tiered system of preference, and the answers on this form determine where
applicants stand in that system. The higher the tier, the faster an application will be processed.
In general the highest “preference” category is immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, followed by
other family‐related categories, then employment‐based categories (Congressional Budget
Office 6). In “Part 4,” the applicant provides information about his/her address and phone
number so that the USCIS can contact the applicant, but this information is also important to
the application process—and is not stated as such in the application instructions. The applicant
must reside at the current address for at least three months prior to applying for citizenship
regardless of how many years of permanent residency. This information is given again in “Part
6” where the applicant must provide a residency and work history for the last five years.
Tucked in between these questions is “Part 5 (Information for Criminal Records Check)” where
applicants provide information such as sex, race, hair color, and eye color to be used to
determine whether or not the applicant has a criminal history. This, combined with “Part 6”
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residency and work history, is important to conducting a background check of the individual to
determine an applicant’s desirability as a U.S. citizen. In “Part 7,” applicants must list all of the
times they have left the U.S. Applicants must count every trip that has lasted more than
twenty‐four hours. Again, this is a “dangerous” question if an applicant does not know the
rules—more than 180 days outside of the country in a calendar year means that permanent
resident status was interrupted and that year did not count. It also means the applicant did not
comply with the requirements of continuous residency. Applicants must have resided in the
U.S. for at least 30 out of the 60 months in the last five years.73
“Parts 8” and “9” are questions regarding marital status and children. The number one
priority for immigration policy is to reunite families. Here, the applicant provides information
regarding the citizenship of immediate family members. Applicants who are married to U.S.
citizens or have children that are U.S. citizens are in a more favorable position to earn
citizenship since they already have lasting ties to the U.S.
“Part 10 Additional Questions” seems like an innocent section but is, perhaps, the most
controversial since the questions indirectly provide a definition of what a “good” U.S. citizen is.
Based on the questions, a “good” citizen is law‐abiding, tax‐paying, honest, and loyal to the U.S.
Of particular interest are the questions regarding obeying the law; specifically, an applicant is
asked whether he/she is a drunkard, drug addict, polygamist, terrorist, or prostitute and, if the
applicant is male, whether or not he complied with the law to register with the Selective
Service. Finally, the last section asks applicants if they understand and agree to the parts of the

73

In this discussion, I refer to the requirements for a legal permanent resident who does not qualify for any special
exemptions or special categories. Under this schema, the LPR must have 5 years as a legal resident to apply for
citizenship (See USCIS Publication M‐476‐ Guide to Naturalization).
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“Oath of Allegiance.” The Oath requires applicants to swear loyalty to the U.S. and agree to
military or civilian service to the country if required by law.
As this short explanation of the Form N‐400 demonstrates, each “part” constitutes a
persuasive argument as to the applicant’s eligibility to become a citizen. This argument is
integral to the determination of whether the applicant has “established eligibility for the
requested benefit” (See Instructions). If an applicant does not establish a basis for eligibility,
“USCIS will deny your Form N‐400.” Becoming a citizen is part complying with the minimum
requirements and part persuasive argument as constructed through the applicant’s answers on
the Form N‐400. Although applicants must construct a persuasive argument for eligibility, the
Form also constructs its readers, and this is examined in the following section using design
principles.
5.4 The N‐400 and C.A.R.P
I frame the analysis of the Form N‐400 using the design principles of Robin Williams as
taken from The Non‐Designers Design Book. She is perhaps one of the most well known graphic
designers; she is a prolific writer/designer and has published over sixty books, many of which
deal with graphic design, typography, and web design, and her books have won many awards.
In this book, William’s states that there are four basic principles of design and that “every well‐
designed piece of work” uses these principles (13):
Contrast
The idea behind contrast is to avoid elements on the page that are merely
similar. If the elements (type, color, size, line‐thickness, shape, space, etc.) are
not the same then make them very different. Contrast is often the most
important visual attraction on a page…
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Repetition
Repeat visual elements of the design throughout the piece. … This develops the
organization and strengthens the unity.
Alignment
Nothing should be placed on the page arbitrarily. Every element should have
some visual connection with another element on the page. This creates a clean,
sophisticated, fresh look.
Proximity
Items relating to each other should be grouped together. When several items are
in close proximity to each other, they become one visual unit rather than several
separate units. This helps organize information, reduces clutter, and gives the
reader a clearer structure. (13)
These four principles will be used to “look” at the N‐400. Williams notes that these four
principles are interconnected (13); for the purpose of this dissertation, I center the analysis on
three of these four principles: contrast, repetition, and proximity. By using the lens of visual
rhetoric infused with Williams’ basic design theory and principles, it becomes clear how the
design of the Form N‐400 influences its readers as potential new citizens.
Under the principle of contrast, items that are different should be noticeably different.
In the N‐400, this is established through the use of boxing, shading, bold and italics. Each “part”
is written in bold and contained within a gray‐filled box. Bold is used to contrast these titles and
subsequent question identifiers (alphabetical and numerical) are also in bold to cue the reader
to the hierarchy embedded in the Form (see Figure 5.3, for example).
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Figure 5.2 Contrast in the Form N‐400
According to Williams, bold is the most effective way to organize information and this allows
the reader to instantly recognize the structure and relationship of the information (150).
Part 1. The form uses a standard format. (number, letter, number)
A. It also uses a standard hierarchy to organize the information.
1. The reader understands the relationship between
parts.
2. The reader understands the relationship of the
question/answer.
B. It is not original.
1. It is effective.
2. It also creates a formal feel to the document.
Figure 5.3 Structure of the Form
Italics are used to clarify points throughout the document. For example, next to “Your Name” is
person applying for naturalization and next to “Given Name” is First Name (see Figure 5.2). The
form also has strong alignment, and the whole document is left justified giving the document a
professional and sophisticated feel. Indenting along with bold letters and numbers provides the
contrast needed to understand what questions/answers belong to each section. This creates a
formal look that is reinforced also through the repetition of the type or font. The fonts used in
this document are Arial, Helvetica, Courier New, and Times New Roman. Arial, Helvetica, and
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Courier New are used in the title of the document, as well as the author of the document, and
the instructions at the top of the page.

Figure 5.4 Contrast with Type
Most of the elements on the page are written in Times New Roman or have the same quality as
that typeface (i.e., written in bold or italics). Thus, this document can be said to have a
concordant design (Williams 124). Times New Roman is a noteworthy font since it is classified
as “humanist” or “old style” (See Williams or Lupton). This typeface was based on “human”
writing: the type is angled and made with thick/thin transitions to mimic the “pen” (Williams
132). It was designed to imitate the writing of scribes and was meant to invoke humanity, but
now has become, through the proliferation of digital technologies, the default font on many
programs thereby erasing the “humanity” behind the pen. This font along with the genre of
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writing (the blank form) appears to neutralize the ideology present in the Form N‐400 and
creates the idea that there is no author/designer behind it.
One other element that sustains the formality and weight of this Form is the focal point
created on each page through the prominence of the USCIS A‐Number in the top right hand
corner. This is the one element of the document that is dominant and constant, i.e., “dominant
in the same way” (Williams 96) on every page. The request for applicants to write the USCIS A‐
Number (Alien Number) on every page serves as a constant indication of the official nature of
this form and also, indirectly, reinforces the position of the applicants as non‐citizens.

Figure 5.5 Creating a Focal Point
Another important element of repetition is the formulation of the questions on the
form. The grammatical structures create relationships between participants, the USCIS and the
legal resident, and this is accomplished through four different constructions: declarative
sentence, grammatical question, nominalization, and imperative. These processes are
important because they can position the applicant differently. Declarative sentences are
constructed using, at a minimum, a subject and verb and can also have a direct or indirect
object (S V O). The use of “I” as the subject positions the applicant as the “giver” of information.
See Figure 5.6. In this sentence “I am at least 18 years old…,” the applicant has choices
(although limited) as to the formation of the sentence.
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Figure 5.6 Declarative sentence
The applicant affirms first that he/she meets the age requirement and is eligible to apply based
on the additional information provided. Grammatical questions, also known as “wh‐questions”
can also position the applicant as the provider of information as in Figure 5.7 below.

Figure 5.7 Grammatical Questions
For example, question “H” incorporates the subject “you:” Are you requesting a waiver…?
However, grammatical questions like “G” incorporate a wh‐question, but do not position the
applicant equally since there is an avoidance of a subject position. Note how the question
“What is your marital status?” does not use the “I” or “you” construction. This question could
have easily been phrased as “Are you married?” but instead the agent is absent.
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The third type of construction used in the form is nominalization. This construction
takes a “process” and converts it into a noun (Fairclough Language and Power 2nd ed. 103). In
essence, the meaning is missing. There is no verb, no tense, no modality, and no agent. This
construction is prevalent as the answer format in the Form (see Figure 5.7 question G for
example). The answers to the question about marital status are converted into nominalizations.
Although the subject and verb is omitted, it is understood from the question that the applicant
is answering: “I am..” single, married, divorced, etc.” Notice, however, in figure 5.8 the
question is a nominalization, and there is no agent in either the question or answers; the
applicant becomes a compliant actor. This construction takes on the force of an imperative that
the applicant must answer.

Figure 5.8 Nominalizations
A final process used in the form is the imperative, and it is formed using the
construction “If…, imperative…” (See Figure 5.9). In this example the applicant is asked “If you
are married, give the following information.” Like nominalizations, this construction omits the
subject and takes on a more urgent tone that the information must be acted upon, and the
applicant is relegated again to a compliant actor in the citizenship process.
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Figure 5.9 Imperative
Related to the grammatical processes in this document are the verbal modes used to
solicit information. Overwhelmingly, the document is written in the simple present tense: I am,
you are, I have, and the present perfect: I have been. According to Norman Fairclough, the
prevalence of these forms (which can be called non‐modals) signals “a view of the world as
transparent” (Language and Power 2nd ed. 107). It also sets up a categorical commitment of the
producer to the truth of the enunciation (see Fairclough Language and Power 2nd ed. 107). In
other words, the document presents information as “categorical truths—facts” (Fairclough
Language and Power 2nd ed. 107). Although it can be argued that the simple present tense
predominates on the Form N‐400 because it was designed with second language learners in
mind, this assumption falls apart when we examine modality further. Modality is significant
because it has to do with authority and power. Consider how most questions begin with verbs
(in the present tense): Are you..? Do you? Have you? This construction allows the author of the
document to control the applicant through yes/no responses. There is no need for
interpretation or explanation. This point is even clearer when we consider the nominalizations
in the Form. For example, all biographical data is solicited through nominalizations such as
“Family Name,” “Address,” “Date of Birth,” and “Social Security Number” (See Parts 1, 3, and 5
in the N‐400). The nominalizations emphasize the view of the world as transparent and the
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language on this form as neutral. After all, these categories (name, social security number,
address) do not seem messy or ideologically laden. However, when “Part 5” is examined (see
Figure 5.10), the nominalizations present the information as matter of fact and disguise their
contested nature.
In my opinion, B. and C. (height and weight) are the only questions that are
straightforward in nature, and these questions are separated visually from the others through
the use of boxing. The other declarations of gender, ethnicity, race, hair and eye color are
subjective and open to various and conflicting interpretations.74

Figure 5.10 Part 5. Information for Criminal Records Search
Nominalizations hide the ideological assumptions behind them—it presents the world as
static, predictable, and knowable. This Form presents race and ethnicity as fixed and knowable
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Gender, hair and eye color are also categories that are contextual and constructed through language. For
example, English only has two gender categories even though we know that it is much more complicated than this.
Biologists such as Ann Fausto‐Sterling argue that sex is a continuum where she identifies at least five positions.
Likewise hair and eye color are subjective. For example, I would identify myself as having light brown hair, but the
participants in this study would say that I am “rubia” or blonde.
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categories. First, it presents Hispanic and Latino as “real75” and as categories that are separate
but related to race. It also presents race as a fixed reality that can neatly be divided into five
categories (or combinations of these five): White, Asian, Black or African American, American
Indian or Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.
Applicants must choose among these five subject positions or negotiate these subject
positions to choose a combination of them. Notice how the Form presents these categories on
the same line with equal “white” space to seemingly evade a hierarchical relationship (refer to
question 5.E. in Figure 5.10. Regardless of the linear formation, there is an embedded hierarchy
that positions “White” as first in relation to all of the other possibilities for racial identity on the
form. The most logical way to avoid this hierarchy would be to place these contested terms in
alphabetical order, but this renders “White” at the bottom as depicted on the right in the table.
At first glance, there does not seem to be any logical reason for the current order of
Table 5.1 Reordering the Racial Categories on the N‐400
Race on the N‐400

Race in Alphabetical Order76

White
Asian
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander

American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Black or African American
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
White

76

I recently answered a survey from the National Science Foundation and the race question had these five options
or combinations of them in alphabetical order. Also, Directive 15 (Rev. 1997), which establishes these five options
has them listed in alphabetical order.
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racial categories on the Form N‐400. One valid assumption would be that the formation of the
categories reflects the racial identity of the U.S. since the 2000 Census finds that the majority of
the persons living in the U.S. report their race as “White.” But this assumption does not hold up
to scrutiny because, according to that same report (U.S. Census 2000), the second highest racial
category is Black or African American, but this category is not the second option on the form.
Based on the previous chapter’s historical analysis of race and citizenship, the order of the
categories represent their ranking based on world population. However, it is interesting to note
that the names of the categories reflect a distinctly “American” lens regarding race with
“African American,” “American Indian,” “Native Alaskan” and “Native Hawaiian” as options,
especially since one would assume that anyone who chooses categories such as American
Indian, Native Alaskan, or Native Hawaiian are already U.S. citizens. This was also the
observation of Dr. Folkmar who noted in the entry for “Hawaiian or Sandwich Islander” that this
group was “not counted among immigrants on arriving in the United States” (73).
Even more can be gleaned from an analysis of questions D and E by understanding their
relationship to the other elements through the design principle of proximity. Under the design
principle of proximity, items relating to each other should be grouped together. Thus the
answers to question E (race) are grouped together on one line evenly spaced apart with a box
to check in front of each element. Therefore, the racial categories become one visual unit
rather than several separate units (see Figure 5.11).

Figure 5.11 Questions D. and E.
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Although the categories form one visual unit (possible answers to the question), the
categories are different, and this is depicted through spatial alignment. The reader knows that
“White” is different from “Black or African American” because one is separate from the other.
Conversely, the lack of separation between the options that are joined by the connector “or”
such as American Indian or Alaskan Native indicates a relationship and that these two elements
are somehow joined in meaning and can imply sameness. Because of these proximal
relationships, there are only five subject positions available even though there are eight racial
identifiers listed. The implications of the “or” applies to the question D: “Are you Hispanic or
Latino?” This question connects both Hispanic and Latino and only allows the applicant to
answer yes or no. If the applicant understands these terms to be two conceptually different
items, it does not matter because if the applicant can answer either one in the affirmative, the
answer is “yes.”
Note also the relationship of questions D and E. Their proximity indicates an intellectual
connection. Obviously, Hispanic and Latino have “something” to do with racial identity.
However, its relationship is not transparent; there is nothing in the question that indicates that
Hispanic or Latino are ethnic or racial categories. It is clear, however, that these categories are
separated spatially and silently denote that Hispanic and Latino are not races. The placement of
this question before (as opposed to after) the question on racial identity is common on many
official documents, such as the census and is used to minimize confusion over whether Hispanic
and Latino are racial categories.77 The 2010 census clearly states in the instructions to the
questions on identity that, for the purposes of the census, Hispanic and Latino are not races.

77

See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this.
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This, however, is not necessary on the Form N‐400 because there is not an option for applicants
to write in their own race. The separation of questions D and E signals that Hispanic and Latino
are not valid racial categories for the purpose of the N‐400.
In chapter two, I noted that critical race theorists express frustration that despite
consensus by scholars (and the U.S. government) that race is socially constructed; the biological
view of race persists in society. The principle of proximity states that items relating to each
other should be grouped together. If this lens of analysis is extended to the neighboring
questions, it illustrates that questions of ethno‐racial identity appear alongside biological data
such as sex, eye color, and hair color. The positioning of questions D and E (See Figure 5.10)
reinforces that race is biological. Even more striking, however, is that race precedes questions
related to color, namely hair and eye color. This foments the ideological assumption that race
has to do with skin color. This is supported by Clara Rodríguez who argues that questions of
racial identity for much of U.S. history has served to group people in the “overarching dual
racial structure (of white and nonwhite)” (39). Furthermore, the answers to question E position
White as the first option available, and the other racial identifiers are situated in response to
this category. The questions on the N‐400 reinforce an overarching dual racial structure of
White and non‐White (see Figure 5.11). It is clear from the analysis in chapter four that the
racial categories on the current N‐400 as established by the Office of Management and Budget
(Directive 15), are almost the equivalent of the five grand divisions of mankind as proposed by
Dr. Folkmar in The Dictionary of Races and Peoples (1911). These categories, according to
Folkmar correspond to the five color groups: white, yellow, black, red, brown.
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5.5 Agency, Resistance, and the Form N‐40078
In the discussion of grammatical structure and modality, I argued that the Form limits
applicants’ agency and, in “Part 5,” the questions are framed as nominalizations and take on
the weight of a command thereby further constraining the applicant’s opportunity to action.
However, question E (racial self‐identity) allows the applicants to pick more than one option
since they can choose “one or more” race. Yet, when this question is compared to other
documents with the same question, the Form N‐400 severely constrains the applicant’s
answers. For example, the 2010 census has fourteen different race options plus the option to
not choose any of them and write in one’s own race. As the data will demonstrate in chapter
six, not one of the participants in this study chose more than one racial category despite
expressing doubt as to claiming just one category. This fact has to do with two design features
in the application. First, although applicants can choose more than one race, this is the only
question (out of a possible 66) where they can choose more than one answer. Thus, the
repetitive construction of only one option is silently echoed in this question regardless of the
instructions to choose more than one. Second, the pairing of the racial identifiers such as Black
or African American confuses applicants because they understand the two to be very different.
In addition, of the five options, three seem more complicated—the response is longer and
includes the pairing of two racial or ethnic groups. So where they may have answered both
White and Black, for example, they opt not to because they are not African American and do
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In chapter four, I examined the historical context of racialization and the citizen and found that the current
categories on the N‐400 are the same as the categories used one hundred years ago from the Dictionary. See
chapter four for discussion of the “five”color system.
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not identify with that culture. This comes to light more in detail in the interviews with
applicants in chapter six.
Although the Form N‐400 does not provide for meaningful agentive action on the part of
the applicant, there is, however, the opportunity to resist racial classification. Question E. states
“choose one or more;” this allows the applicant to choose all five options, thereby resisting to
some extent the embedded racial ideology. A riskier option would be to leave the question
blank, but the instructions that accompany the N‐400 state unequivocally that all questions
must be answered fully (and accurately). Also, where an applicant may be tempted not to
answer questions D and E, they are reminded to do so by the “NOTE” at the top of part 5 (see
Figure 5.12). This “NOTE” projects a certain ethos. First, the word is written in all capital letters,
and second, it states that the FBI requires this information. This note sets the tone for this
section as official and also legitimizes the information and the content of the information
requested.

Figure 5.12 Ethos and Part 5
Failure to answer all questions begets consequences; the application and fees will be
returned, causing further delays in the processing of the petition to become a U.S. citizen.
Resistance is futile; if an applicant chooses all five boxes for race, the likelihood that the
application will be returned is also high. If it is not returned, the applicant must be ready to
explain his/her answers in the interview.
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5.6 Conclusion
The N‐400 at face value is a “simple,” “blank” form that is digitized and distributed to
legal residents to effectively and efficiently petition citizenship. However, the N‐400 as
“configuration” creates “big picture ideas” of our world. It provides a set of symbols that define
the citizen and designates what races are legitimate while rejecting others (Hispanic or Latino).
Using the design principles of contrast, repetition, and proximity, this analysis reveals the
ideologies inscribed in the Form. An overall analysis of the Form demonstrates that applicants
are constructing an eleven‐part persuasive argument that they are worthy to become U.S.
citizens. The complexity of the Form is disguised through its normative structure. It presents
itself as a straightforward and formal through the hierarchy embedded in it and the typeface
used throughout the document. As such, it appears void of ideology. Yet, through the repetition
of various elements, the Form constructs reality as well as constructs its user. Immigrants filling
out the Form are reminded of their position in the system through the rewriting of their Alien
Number at the top of every page. The grammatical structures limit the applicant’s agency to
that of a compliant actor. The verbal forms in the document, as well as the nominalizations,
present the world as transparent and the information as categorical facts. This is important
when examining the questions about race; as a configuration, the Form communicates that
races can be easily identified and separated. More importantly, the structuring of the question
conceals the embedded ideology about race that has plagued the U.S. for centuries. It
reinforces the overarching binary racial structure of White vs. non‐White as well as the notion
that race is biological and can be reduced to the color of a person’s skin. If applicants are not
satisfied with the options to self‐identify on the Form, they are discouraged from resisting.
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First, they cannot leave a question blank, or they risk rejection of their N‐400. In “Part 5” the
risks are even higher, as applicants are told that the FBI requires the racial information.
Invoking the FBI also legitimizes the options provided for the answers to “race” and is a
mechanism of hegemonic coercions. Finally, the Form influences the applicant to choose only
one race. This is accomplished through the repetition of only one valid response per question
and through the combination of the racial categories. In the following chapter, I investigate
how legal residents of Mexican descent answer the “race” questions. I ask participants to
consider how they would self‐identify and compare this to their answers on the N‐400. Through
questionnaires and video interviews, respondents discuss the options to racially self‐identify on
the N‐400 and explain whether or not the structure of the Form influenced their answers. They
also consider the lasting affects of this Form on their personal and group racial identities.
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Chapter 6
ATTENDING TO THE MICRO: THE NEW CITIZEN
A written text’s meaning or implications both as text and as act—are always larger than its
immediate purpose and situation. Written texts have, and create, their own worlds in which
their writers and readers may enlarge and interpret cultural contexts. (Miller 46)
The questions we face might be put this way: Who represents what to whom, for what reasons,
through what institutions, to what effect, to whose benefit, at what costs? (Jay 10)

This chapter continues with a critical rhetorical approach to understanding race and the
new citizen. Chapters four and five dealt with the ideologies embedded in the discourse of
citizenship and racial identity. However, discourse alone does not sustain the dominant
ideologies; they are reproduced through discourse. Social institutions often mediate the
dominant ideologies about race, and chapter four demonstrated that much of this discourse is
hidden in the document as configuration and contains traces of the historic racial projects that
have shaped the citizen. Applicants are often unaware of the hidden power of this discourse
and as such are not aware of the consequences of the writing act. Their responses can
legitimize or delegitimize the existing power relations and how they negotiate this Form has
social impact. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between discourse, power, and
representation and explain that the embedded ideologies become “socially operative” as sites
of struggle over representation. It is at the moment a box is chosen on the Form, that race
becomes “real” categories. Thus, this chapter explores what happens when the applicants, legal
residents of Mexican ancestry, are faced with the dominant discourse. The question of inquiry
for this chapter is: How do applicants negotiate racial identity in the Form N‐400?
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The discussion begins first with an overview of the subjects of this study and my position as
researcher to this project. Then, I outline the methodology and the process of collecting data. I
present the empirical data from the questionnaire and integrate these with observations and
video recorded interviews.
6.1 Finding the “Subjects”
The purpose of this micro‐level research was to collect information about the attitudes
and behaviors regarding race from the sample population. This required a method that studied
the relation between discourse and society in context: ethnography of communication.
According to Gumperz and Hymes, the aim of ethnography of communication is to study the
patterns of language use to uncover social systematization. Although Gumperz and Hymes’
model focuses on “speech” acts (rather than “writing”), they advocate the investigation of
language in its situational context in order to find patterns that have escaped separate studies.
In this chapter, I study writing and the writing subject to understand and explain patterns of
racial self‐identity. While the goal of ethnography is descriptive, it is an essential first step in
any investigation that attempts to understand acts of writing within a community. The scope of
the ethnography was limited to non‐participant observation, a questionnaire, and follow‐up
interviews. The sample population for this research was permanent legal residents of Mexican
origin living in the El Paso area who were in the various stages of applying for naturalization.
One of the most difficult tasks in designing this dissertation was gaining access to this
sample population since it was not feasible to have access to immigration records in order to
administer a questionnaire to potential new citizens. I explained in chapter three that I
approached a local non‐profit, the Diocesan for Migrant and Refugees Service (DMRS) because
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it has a dedicated citizenship section and a grant through SHINE79 to coordinate citizenship
classes in the El Paso area. DMRS is responsible for assigning instructors and providing course
materials, training, and assistance as needed. I obtained a current list of citizenship classes in
the area with the goal of meeting my objective of seventy‐five participants.
6.2 The Researcher
It is at this point that I deviate from the methodology to discuss my role in this research
project. This is essential since my positionality and subjectivity affect the research outcomes. I
grew up in New England, and my native language is
English. I am fluent in Spanish and graduated from
the University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras. I am not
Hispanic or Latina; I am White. In the past few
years, I have preferred to check the “Other” box
because everything else seems to erase who I am.80

Video 6.1 Crystal

This sentiment was also echoed by some of the participants. Crystal, age 24 and a legal resident
from the age of two, relates in Video 6.1 that she often feels like her identity is not located in
the choices on the forms. My background is relevant to this research because although
ethnographic methods are founded on positivistic assumptions, i.e., that the world can be
observed and that the researcher is detached and objective; this is no longer true for
postmodern ethnography. Therefore, I approach this study and the reporting of the data as
79

Project SHINE is a national program called Students Helping In the Naturalization of Elders.
I understand that the option of highlighting an ethnic identity such as French or Irish is a privilege of whiteness
since other groups, such as African Americans, may not have this option. Mary Jane Collier discusses the options to
conceal or enact identities in “Researching Cultural Identity.”
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“confessional.” John Van Maanen characterizes confessional ethnography as personalized that
focuses on the researcher’s learning as much as the subject of study (73‐74). Therefore, my
“voice” will be present in the research findings. Brenton Faber argues that the researcher’s
presence “should not take away from the adequacy or findings of the work,” but rather
enhances the reliability of the research (9). In this study, I have tried to foreground the voices
and views of the participants. I did this through supplementing the data from the
questionnaires with their comments and video interviews. Where relevant, these videos are
interwoven in the chapter. I have also chosen not to translate participants’ comments in the
body of the dissertation. The translation is provided in the keys ( ) that accompany the text. I
acknowledge that as a researcher I had to “make sense” of the story‐based responses from the
questionnaire and the videos. I have chosen comments that typify the responses from other
participants and have edited minimally the video.
6.3 Data Collection
At the time of collecting data, I was also eight‐months pregnant. Truth be told, I
thought I had two things in my favor: I spoke Spanish, and, well, I was noticeably pregnant! I
was quite surprised that after I visited the first ten citizenship class sites, I was not close to my
goal of seventy‐five participants. Many of the class sites had an average of eight to ten
students, and I was lucky if half agreed to volunteer to answer the questionnaire. One class site
had almost fifty students, and I thought my prayers had been answered. To my dismay, only ten
filled out the questionnaire. This was due to many factors, which I discuss in the course of
describing the administering of the questionnaire and the interviews, but in general, I realized
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that my outsider status made the students distrustful of me, and this was only worsened by the
current immigration climate in the U.S. At one site, a student asked me in a roundabout way if I
was an immigration official. This prompted me to redesign the questionnaire and assign
everyone a number rather than ask if they wanted their real name used in the study.
By the end of the fall semester of 2010, I had approximately forty‐five questionnaires.
Although I had ties to this community through my volunteer effort at the non‐profit, and I had
attended the instructor orientations, I really did not know the people in this study. As a result,
very few volunteered for the interview portion. As I began to call those who expressed interest
in the interview and schedule the recording, an unexpected thing happened: my son was born
almost a month early. By the time I recuperated, the semester was over. This was also true for
the students in the citizenship classes as the classes run on a semester schedule, and, for the
most part, the instructors and pupils change every semester. It suddenly became difficult to
contact students who had expressed interest in the interview. This change also led to a
modification in my role as ethnographer. I originally envisioned my role as a passive observer
gathering descriptive data by way of the questionnaire and then following up with interviews.
This was not working, and I realized that if I did not take a more active role in the community, I
might not have any prospects for the video interview. As a result, my research took on a more
hands‐on approach. I noticed that on the far Westside of El Paso citizenship classes were not
offered. I volunteered to teach a citizenship class once a week on Fridays at Rey de Reyes (King
of Kings), an Evangelical church. The class was open to the general public. Although this
involvement stops short of activism, I nonetheless take on a more active role in the
ethnography. Many researchers see ethnography as more observation than action, but others
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such as Ralph Cintrón and Brenton Faber take on a more direct role in the communities they
study: Cintrón as activist, and Faber as academic consultant. My new role as teacher gave me
weekly access to a group of legal residents seeking citizenship, and in turn, these students
volunteered without reservation to complete a video interview.
During the 2010‐2011 academic year, there were twenty‐three classes offered at
seventeen different locations (See Appendix C for the Master Schedule). Classes were offered in
different parts of town (east, west, central) and at different types of locations (libraries,
churches, community centers). I randomly chose the classes to attend but ensured a proper
distribution of the different parts of town and types of locations as per the master schedule
(refer to Appendix C for information regarding the distribution by type of site/location).81 The
sites I visited are listed below in Table 6.1 with information as to meeting times, location82 and
type.
Prior to visiting the classes, I made every attempt to communicate with the instructors
to ask permission to visit the class and administer the questionnaire. If I did not reach the
instructor, or the instructor did not return my calls or e‐mail, I would stop by on the day of the
scheduled class with questionnaires in hand to distribute. Since I had already attended the
instructor orientations at the beginning of the semesters, and the coordinating party (Diocesan
for Migrant and Refugee Services) had approved of my visits, I did not encounter any issues if I
showed up unannounced.

81

The majority of the classes I visited were located in central El Paso. This reflects the distribution of the classes
citywide. Fourteen of the twenty‐two classes were located in central El Paso.
82
I classified locations by central, west, and east. The master schedule reflects a different schema, I chose to
simplify this.
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Table 6.1 Citizenship Classes in Study
Meeting Place
Main Downtown
Library
La Fe Cultural &
Technology Center
Project Bravo
Doris Van Doren
Library
Burgess Branch Library
Diocesan Migrant &
Refugee Services83
Centro Mujeres de la
Esperanza
Esperanza Moreno
Library
Armijo Library
Sacred Heart
Rey de Reyes

Meeting Times
Mon. 4:00‐5:30 p.m.

Location
Central

Type
Library

Mon. 3:00‐5:00 p.m.

Central

Community Center

Tues. 3:00‐5:00 p.m.
Tues. 6:00‐8:00 p.m.

Central
West

Community Center
Library

Tues. 5:00‐7:00 p.m.
Weds. 3:00‐5:00 p.m.

East
Central

Weds. 6:00‐8:00 p.m.

Central

Thurs. 5:30‐7:30 p.m.

East

Library
Non‐profit/Community
Center
Faith‐based Community
Center
Library

Sat. 10:00 a.m.‐12:00
p.m.
Sat. 9:00‐11:30 a.m.
Fri. 6:00‐7:00p.m.

Central

Library

Central
West

Church
Church

The instructor allowed me to administer the questionnaire at the beginning of class. As an
outsider to this community, I usually began with a short introduction about the study and my
background. I preferred to explain that I was a graduate student and, as part of the
requirements for my degree, I needed to conduct a study, and that I had chosen the area of
race and citizenship because of my prior volunteer work with DMRS. At that point, I distributed
the consent form and questionnaire to the students and explained that the university required
the consent form. I would read the consent form aloud and answer any questions or doubts as I
read. I explained to the students that the study was voluntary and tried to minimize their fears
of completing a very “legal” sounding consent form. In fact, the consent form was five‐pages

83

I visited DMRS twice: once in the fall, and once in the spring.
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long and the questionnaire was two (refer to Appendix B). I also copied the questionnaire on
color paper so that participants (and I) could easily distinguish it from the consent form. For the
first three classes, I brought the forms in both English and Spanish because I had assumed that
because the citizenship test is in English,84 and legal residents also have to pass a basic
reading/writing test in English, that perhaps there would be residents who preferred the forms
in English. After the third class, I did not bring copies in English; most of the students were older
and would not have to take the tests in English, and those that would, only had a basic
knowledge of English.
The Questionnaire
In chapter three, methodology, I stated that a participatory and an undeclared pretest
of the questionnaire were conducted. The participatory pretest was conducted with a class of
international graduate student in a writing seminar dedicated to working in writing groups on
our respective projects. There were twelve participants in this pretest: nine from Mexico, one
from India, one from Iraq, and one from Iran. I asked my peers to review the questionnaire and
make comments on content and structure as well as answer the questions. From this pretest,
no significant changes to the questionnaire were made.
The first citizenship class I visited, I conducted an undeclared pretest. I did not announce
beforehand that it was a pretest; these participants were not included in the overall study.
From this pretest, I realized that I needed to redesign the questionnaire. My goal for the

84

Legal residents are required to take the citizenship test and pass a reading/writing test in English unless they
qualify for an exemption based on age and length of residency in the U.S.
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questionnaire was to solicit how participants prefer to self identify versus the choices for racial
self‐identification on the N‐400. Originally, the questionnaire was two‐pages in length with very
few close‐ended questions. This questionnaire consisted of a reproduction of the ethno‐racial
questions on the N‐400. The second part of the questionnaire asked respondents to be self‐
reflexive about their answers. Participants also had to recall how they had self‐identified
previously on official documents. Finally, participants were asked to fill in a “blank” regarding
race. In the pretest, the open‐ended questions were overwhelmingly left blank. Faced with the
task of redesigning the questionnaire, and seeking IRB approval again, I decided to use this
questionnaire at one more class before making a final decision. At the second class, again,
students did not answer the open‐ended questions. I had to find a new way to solicit
information on racial self‐identity. I decided to incorporate the questions from the 2010 census
regarding race and ethnicity since the census has more options to self‐identify and also has the
option to “write in your race.” One other important change occurred to the questionnaire: I had
placed the “fill in the blank” about race at the end of the original questionnaire, thereby leaving
participants influenced by the previous race questions when they wrote in their own race;
hence this came first on the questionnaire redesign. The final questionnaire consisted of four
parts:
Part I: Profile. Included basic information such as name, age, gender, time of residency
in the U.S., country of origin, and languages spoken.
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Part II: Racial Identity Questions. Included a “fill in the blank” question as well as a
reproduction (image) of the 2010 census questions on race, and a reproduction of the
N‐400 questions on race.
Part III. Self‐reflexive questions. Included open‐ended questions about how the
participants felt about the options on the N‐400, how likely they were to self‐identify as
they did on the N‐400 and the census.
Part IV. Interview. Included a question about participating in the video interview and
contact information to communicate with the participant at a later date.
(See Appendix B for the consent form, questionnaire, and interview questions.)
Overall, the consent form and questionnaire took participants thirty to forty minutes to
complete. This was about double the time I had originally estimated and was due to discussions
that took place while participants answered the questionnaire.
Non‐participant Observation
At every citizenship class site I visited, when applicants began to review the
questionnaire, a discussion would ensue. Someone would ask: “Am I Hispanic or Latino?” This
provoked a class discussion of the definitions of Hispanic or Latino or other racial terms. Since I
did not want to influence their answers, I did not help with the questions except to state that
the application for citizenship and the accompanying instructions do not define the terms or for
that matter instruct applicants on how to answer these questions. In Video 6.2, Maité also
struggles with these terms; she explains in the interview that she really doesn’t know what they
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are, but that Mexicans are Hispanic. As a researcher,
the discussions that took place while the participants
answered the questionnaire were the most telling.
Since I did not have permission to video record these
interactions, I made field notes of the discussion
Video 6.2 Maité

during the sessions. The notes consisted of a short

analysis of the rhetorical situation: who, when, where, how many participants and the
comment or question that was posed by the participant. I was, in a sense, a rhetorical
eavesdropper.85 The observation yielded some very interesting comments to add to the
qualitative research because inevitably an open conversation ensued at every citizenship class I
visited. For ease of note taking, I used a preset format based loosely on Gumperz and Hymes
framework for the communicative event. The format included six categories:
1. Date/Time
2. Location
3. Speaker or Speakers (This could be a rough description rather than a name)
4. Speech Act
5. Reference
6. Other Participants Present.
These notes reveal the limitations of the questionnaire and will be discussed after presenting
the data from the questionnaire.

85

See Krista Ratcliffe’s Rhetorical Listening
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Video Interviews
Of the sample population (55), I proposed as a goal of fifteen percent (or 8) of this
population to conduct a follow‐up interview. I asked participants to indicate on the
questionnaire whether they were willing to conduct an interview based on their responses to
the questionnaire and to provide their contact information. I contacted the interested
participants and arranged to meet at their convenience. The meeting place was the kitchen
table. Most participants generously invited me into their homes, a few chose the location of
their citizenship class as this was a neutral and public place that the participant and researcher
were comfortable with. Participants first signed an additional consent form for the video
interview (See Appendix B). The interviews were approximately twenty to thirty minutes in
length and began with a review of the questionnaire to encourage dialogue (see proposed
questions in Appendix B). The purpose of the interview was to capture how the participant
answered the questions, the processes that were involved in self‐identification, and how they
understood the racial terms in the forms. I used a personal digital recorder and downloaded the
video on a personal computer to edit the video for clips to be integrated into this dissertation.
The video files are formatted for the Adobe Acrobat Pro X and use the file extension MPEG‐4 or
.M4V. When necessary, I translated the video in this dissertation. There were eight legal
residents who participated in the video interview. These interviews are used throughout this
chapter to support the empirical data and expound upon specific points.
First, I turn to the participants in this study. It is important to note that the information
provided in the next section is largely descriptive. The intention of this study is to understand

146

how this group of people, legal residents of Mexican ancestry, negotiate the N‐400 rather than
understand the social differences in how this group of people self‐identify.
6.4 Participant Profiles
In the course of collecting data, I administered sixty‐five questionnaires; ten were
discarded, of which, nine were not answered completely and one was a legal resident from
Honduras. The total participants were fifty‐five. In Appendix D, there is a table that illustrates
the composition of the sample and is sorted according to the sixth column, or the applicant’s
answer to the first question in the questionnaire (Fill in the blank on race). The names have
been changed, but the categories reflect on gender, age, country of origin, and length of
residency in the U.S. Below, I provide a summary of the data. The corpus was 67% female and
33% male. All of the participants entered the U.S. from Mexico. The youngest participant was
24 and the oldest, 83 (three chose not to respond). Table 6.2 illustrates the ages of the
applicants divided into four generations. The majority of the participants (70%) were over the
age of fifty with a median age of fifty‐four.
Table 6.2 Age Distribution of Sample
Age Range
18‐35
36‐50
51‐75
76‐ and over
No Response
Total

Number
3
11
33
5
3
55

I asked participants to report their length of residency in the U.S. to the closest year.
The question does not ask for legal residency, just overall residency in the U.S. The shortest
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residency in the U.S. was five years; the longest, forty‐eight (six chose not to respond). Table
6.3 illustrates the distribution of length of residency. The majority of the legal permanent
residents have lived in the U.S. for an average of 11‐20 years with the median length of
residency 17 years.
Table 6.3 Length of Residency
Length of Residency
5‐10
11‐20
21‐30
31 –over
No Response
Total

Number
10
20
14
5
6
55

In Part II of the questionnaire, I ask participants to answer three separate racial identity
questions. In the first question, immigrants must fill in a response to the prompt “Race.” The
majority of the respondents (35%) wrote in Hispanic, followed by Mexican (32%), White (20%),
and Latino (7%). One person wrote in “Mexican/Hispanic.”
Table 6.4 Preferred Self Identification
Race
Hispanic
Latino
Mexican
White
Mexican/Hispano
Total
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Number
21
4
18
11
1
55

In the second set of questions for racial identity, participants were asked to respond to the
2010 U.S. Census questions (See Figure 6.1). The Census also provides a translated version of
these questions in Spanish. I used their official translation on the questionnaire (See Appendix
B).

Figure 6.1 2010 U.S. Census Questions regarding Race
Preceding the questions on race, the census instructs participants that “Hispanic origins” are
not races (See “NOTE”). Participants answered only questions eight and nine. Question “8”
concerns Hispanic, Latino, or other Spanish origin. Next, participants must racially identify in
question “9,” and have fourteen different options to choose or they can select “Some other
race” and write in a response. All of the participants answered yes to question “8” and chose
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the option of “Mexican, Mexican‐Am., or Chicano.” For question “9,” I counted a total of seven
different responses for racial identity and these are reported below in Table 6.5. The top three
answers to this question were White (49%), Mexican (18%), and Hispanic (12%). The chart
illustrates that eleven percent chose to write in some other response and ten percent chose not
to answer the question.
Table 6.5 Racial Identity per Census
Race
Hispanic
Latino
Mexican
Mestiza86
Mex./Hispanic
Mex./White
White
No Response
Total

Number
7
2
10
2
1
2
27
5
55

The results from the census compared to the “fill in the blank” are inverted; whereas the top
three answers to the first question were (in order) Hispanic, Mexican, and White, the top
answers to the census question are White, Mexican, Hispanic. It is my opinion that the design
of the questions on the census influences their readers, especially those of Hispanic origin. First,
the note at the top informs readers that Hispanic origin is not a race, so they are not as inclined
to write it in as a response below. Second, the “some other race” response is positioned last.
Most do not realize that that response is an option until after they have already marked a box.
Finally, respondents have already answered a question about Hispanic origin; writing that in on
the option for “some other race” appears redundant. This was confirmed in the interviews.
Crystal, who self identifies as Latina, discusses her response to the questions from the census
86

Literally “mixed” of two or more races.
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(refer to Video 6.3). Other participants also echoed
Crystal’s observations; they stated that since they
had already answered that they were of Hispanic
origin, they could not write that in the “some other
race” response.
Video 6.3 Crystal and “some other race”

In the third set of questions regarding race,
participants were asked to answer the questions as they appear on the Form N‐400. I published
an image of “Part 5 Information for Criminal Records Search” in the questionnaire and then
translated questions “D” and “E” (See Figure 6.2 below).

Figure 6.2 Part 5. Information for Criminal Records Check
Question “D” of Part 5 on the N‐400 asks respondents if they are Hispanic or Latino. In
comparison with the census questions, there is no explanation that Hispanic and Latino are not
races. This is not necessary since the Form does not allow applicants to choose “some other
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race” and write in their own response. Applicants are limited to five options: White, Asian,
Black or African American, Native American or Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific
Islander. Table 6.6 illustrates the results of question E. Despite the fact that there was the
option to choose more than one race, no one did. Ninety‐three percent of the participants
chose White as a racial identifier, and one person, Rosalia, chose American Indian.
Table 6.6 N‐400 Responses
Race
White
American Indian
No Response
Total

Number
51
1
3
55

Although I do not recall Rosalia, I do know that she was an elderly woman who had lived in the
U.S. for the past eleven years. In her answers to the first two questions, she chose to self‐
identify as “mexicana.” I visited Rosalia’s citizenship class early on in the data collection and as I
noted earlier, because of issues of confidentiality, I opted to assign a number to all of the
participants. I also did not ask them to provide any contact information unless they had
volunteered to participate in the video interview. When I changed the questionnaire, I became
aware, because of Rosalia’s response, that my translation of American Indian—indígena de
America87 (for the N‐400) was not the same as the “official” translation by the U.S. Census
Bureau: india americana. I realized that my translation would be more appropriate for Native
American, but this term is complex because it includes within it natives of all of the Americas.
Before this, I was not aware of the implications of word choice. It is my opinion that American

87

The application for naturalization, Form N‐400, is only printed in English. I translated the questions regarding
race. The census, on the contrary, has a Spanish translation.
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Indian is used because it corresponds only to indigenous peoples of North America and this
subtle difference discourages people who are from Central or South America who may identify
as indígena (indigenous) from choosing this as a racial identifier. Because of the census
translation, I decided to change the translation for the N‐400 to india americana.
Unfortunately, Rosalia did not participate in the video interviews, and I did not have further
contact with her regarding her response.
Lastly, there were three participants who did not answer the question for racial identity
on the Form N‐400 (Table 6.7). While administering the questionnaire, I stressed the
importance of answering the questions on the N‐400 since the US Customs and Immigration
Service instructions state that all questions must be answered “fully and accurately.”
Table 6.7 No Response/ N‐400
NAME
AGE
DAMASO
60
LUIS
64
ROSENDA
48

GENDER
M
M
F

COUNTRY RESIDENCE
MEX.
30
MEX.
41
MEX.
10

BLANK
MEX.
LATINO
HISPANO

CENSUS
HISPANO
MEX.
N/A

N‐400
N/A
N/A
N/A

Luis and Rosenda answered “yes” to question D: “Are you Hispanic or Latino?” And both
underlined the word “Hispano.” It is my understanding that the question was left blank because
the participants did not find an option that they felt reflected their racial self‐identity.
Consuelo, who originally left this question blank, confirms this. In her interview, Consuelo and I
discuss why she did not answer the question about race. Consuelo answers that the only option
available to her is White, but according to her, she is not “White” (See Video 6.4). This is also
the case with Victoria who writes on her questionnaire: “Para mi el inciso (E) no es claro ni
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conciso para definer realmente mi raza. No me
identifico en ninguna de las opciones.” On her
questionnaire, Victoria wrote in her race as
hispana and for the census she chose “some other
race” and wrote in mexicana but chose White for
Video 6.4. Consuelo negotiates race on
the N‐400

the Form N‐400. Eighty year‐old Betty, who
identifies herself as mexicana and india mexicana,

finds herself in the same predicament. Betty writes “No soy blanca pero pienso que es la única
opción.”
In chapter five, I analyzed the Form N‐400 and discovered that question 5.E. (race) was
the only question on the Form that allowed applicants to choose more than one option. I was
curious whether the Form influenced legal residents in their answers to this question, and if
legal residents, like Victoria or Consuelo, were aware that they could choose more than one
“race.” In response to this question, (whether they were aware they could “select one or more”
race), seventy‐five percent responded “yes” (See Table 6.8).
Table 6.8 Race (Select one or more)
Response
Yes
No
No response
Total

Number
41
8
6
55

Finally, I wanted to know what applicants thought of the options on the N‐400. This question
was open‐ended and participants could write in any response regarding questions D and E.
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Almost half of the participants wrote that the options for racial identification were “Good,”
“Correct,” or “Adequate,” while thirty‐three percent wrote in that the options were
“Confusing,” “Inadequate,” or “Not specific enough.” Twenty percent did not answer this
question (See Table 6.9).
Table 6.9 Opinions regarding the options on the Form N‐400
Response
Good/Correct/Adequate
Not Good/Confusing/Not Specific
No Response
Total

Number
26
18
11
55

For purposes of simplification, I classified each response according to the schema in Table 6.9.
In some cases, participants did not overtly express positive or negative opinions of the
responses per se, but wrote in, for example, “Son difíciles, pero necesarias” (Josefa); or “Son
faciles de contestar” (Raquel), and I had to determine whether to count the response as
positive, negative, or if it was too ambiguous, classify it as “no response.”
6.5 Data Analysis
In the previous section, I presented the data collected from the questionnaire. Based on
this data, I now return to the question of inquiry for discussion: How do applicants negotiate
race as presented in the application for naturalization? In the response to the first question on
the questionnaire, “Fill in the blank” regarding race, the majority of the participants wrote in
Hispanic or Latino; on the Census, White, and the N‐400, White (See Table 6.10). Therefore,
when given the option to fill in the blank, applicants identify as Hispanic or Latino. I had
assumed that “Mexican” would have a higher response rate than Hispanic or Latino. There was
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not a correlation between length of residency in the U.S. and the responses to these questions.
I had initially (and naively) worded this research question: If given full agency, how do legal
residents self‐identify? Is there ever such a thing as full agency? Social actors are continuously
exposed to categorization by society, and the Form N‐400 is not the first time Permanent Legal
Residents have come in contact with categories sanctioned by society to differentiate people by
race. This is particularly salient when we consider that 2010 was a census year, and there was a
campaign in force to “be counted.” More than half of the budgeted advertising was targeted to
media consumed by minority and ethnic audiences (U.S. Census). This message was reiterated
by Franco, who wrote on his questionnaire that it was important to identify as Hispanic or
Latino for political power and the majority of this sample population chose to identify as
Hispanic or Latino as a racial category. After years
of residing in the U.S., legal residents accept that
they are Hispanic or Latino and choose to identify
as such over their country of origin; even though
they are not sure what these terms mean, they
understand that they are the acceptable terms by
the government. I asked participants what Hispanic
Video 6.5 Antonio

and Latino meant. The answers varied from ethnic
origins (Spain) or Spanish‐speaking peoples, but forty‐six year‐old Antonio explains that
Hispanic is what Mexicans are in the U.S. and that they are Latinos everywhere else. In this
video (Video 6.5), he links Hispanic with language, as did other participants.
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In contrast to the responses to the prompt “fill in the blank” on race, participants chose
to identify as White on the Form N‐400. This, however, is not enough to determine whether the
Form influenced the applicants’ responses. First, one could assume because of the data (See
Appendix D) that Hispanic, Mexican, and Latino are White. Therefore, these affirmations are
not in conflict but given the choices available legal residents are asserting another subject
position. In postmodernity, individuals have multiple subjectivities to choose from and the
choice is often shaped by social context.
Table 6.10 Comparison of the Responses for Racial Identity
RACE
Mexican88
Hispanic/Latino
White
American Indian
Other
No Response

BLANK
18
25
11
0
1
0

CENSUS
10
9
27
0
4
5

N‐400
N/A
N/A
51
1
0
3

The structures of the three racial identity questions represent three different rhetorical
situations, and legal residents are bound by the interactional constraints of each question. I
noted previously that most applicants were aware that the question on the Form N‐400
allowed for them to choose more than one race, and almost half of the sample deemed the
options as adequate or better. Therefore, the questionnaire data alone indicates that legal
residents are not asserting conflicting racial identities, but given the rhetorical situation are
choosing among a node in their network of available subjectivities.89

88

Mexican, Hispanic, or Latino are not listed as races on the census, but the applicant can write in “Some other
race.”
89
See Foster Networked Process
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Although most participants classified the options as “good,” this seemed disparate with
observations made as a volunteer helping legal residents fill out the Form and when I
administered the questionnaire to this sample population. Walt Wolfram and Ralph Fasold have
noted that this is a typical limitation of questionnaires; there can be incongruence in the
answers in the questionnaire and actuality (69). To underscore this point, I turn to my “field”
notes (Table 6.11).
Table 6.11 Observational Notes
Format

Observational Notes

1. Date/Time

1. 6 Nov. 2011/9:00 a.m.

2. Location

2. Sagrado Corazón Church meeting room

3. Speaker or Speakers

3. Josué

4. Speech Act

4. What is race? Race… race… animals have

5. Reference

races. Humans don’t have race. I cross the

6. Other Participants Present. bridge and the immigration official asks did
you cross on foot; “en patas.” Animals have
“patas90.” I’m latino‐moreno, but I don’t know
what to put on this form.
5. Discussion of race before answering the
questionnaire
6. 48 classmates/ 1 instructor

In this exchange, I visited the citizenship class at the Sagrado Corazón Church located in
central El Paso. As participants began to answer the questionnaire, various questions were

90

The word “pata” refers to legs, but is not used for humans (only animals and inanimate objects such as “las
patas de la mesa,” the table’s leg).
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raised on the definitions of Hispanic and Latino. In particular, one gentleman, Josué,
commented to the class that “race was for animals not humans,” and he considered himself to
be “latino‐moreno”91 not any of the options available. But even after these comments and
further discussion, Josué identified as Hispano in the first two questions, and as White on the N‐
400. His response to the options on the N‐400 was “Están bien, pero un poco confusos.”
In another exchange at another citizenship class location, Maria exclaimed out loud,
“¿Quiero saber qué significan hispano y latino?” The class began to dissect the terms. One
gentleman offered definitions; others opined. Another woman (Isabela) in the same class asked
me, “¿Soy blanca?” Both Maria and Isabela did
not comment on the options on the N‐400
even though their questions indicate that they
were not sure of the categories. In the end,
Maria and Isabela chose White on the N‐400.
Although there is overt struggle over
Video 6.6 Elena

representation, this is not manifest in the

questionnaire. Given the observations, the interviews, and my previous experience
volunteering at the non‐profit, I argue that the legal residents who did not identify as White on
the previous questions of race, did so on the N‐400 because it was the only subject position
that was, according to the participants, available. This is evident in Consuelo’s video (6.4) and in
this exchange with Elena (Video 6.6). Their initial trepidation in understanding the categories
and where they may “fit” in this scheme demonstrates that these categories do not reflect their
91

Latino‐moreno roughly translates to dark‐skinned Latino. Moreno, however, can also be considered another
term for Black.
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descriptions and perceptions. My concern is not how these choices for racial identity contribute
to the identity formation of legal residents (this is a complex issue that cannot be solved here)
but to call attention to the implications of these choices at the individual and societal level.
6.6 Writing, Consequences
In this section, I return to my overarching question of inquiry for this dissertation: How
does the application for naturalization construct the citizen, and how does this community
disrupt or reify this construct?
In chapter four, I traced the historically situated racial projects (Omi and Winant) that
established race as the determinant for citizenship and naturalization. When the source of
immigration shifted in the late 1800s to other parts of Europe, the need to classify by race
became imperative and was mandated by Congress.This was the period that the “List of Races
and Peoples” was created and solidified with the objective to differentiate among the different
classes of White. The original “List” used by immigration officials at Ellis Island in 1898
contained 46 different “races and peoples.” Mexicans seeking naturalization during this period
were at the mercy of the local courts, which determined whether the applicant was White by
the court of law. Although Mexicans residing in the territories that were ceded to the U.S. as
part of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were granted citizenship, the issue of whiteness and
Mexican immigrants continued to be a source of conflict.
In 1897, the Supreme Court heard a case regarding the petition for naturalization by the
defendant Rodríguez, a Mexican immigrant. The judge ruled that Rodríguez was White by law
(perhaps alluding to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo) but not by the anthropologist. This case
allowed Rodríguez to naturalize, but was not a victory for all Mexicans. This is evident by the
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1911 Dictionary of Races and Peoples that defined Mexican, for immigration purposes, as only
those of pure European blood (Folkmar 96). Mexicans who were Negro or Indian were to be
listed as such, and according to Dr. Folkmar, author of the Dictionary, approximately seventy
percent of Mexicans would be classified as Negro or Indian (138). Folkmar divides mankind into
five “grand” races: Caucasian, Mongol, Malay, Negro, and American (referring to the American
Indians) and only Mexicans of “pure” European blood were classified as Caucasian.
In the period from 1898‐1937, the “List of Races and Peoples” was altered; some races
were added (Manx), some were deleted (African), or changed (Italian North and Italian South
became one category). In 1917, there was another move to limit immigration and citizenship of
Mexicans. The Act of 1917 had a provision to deny immigration to contract workers. After a
petition by U.S. farmers, Mexicans were excluded from this Act. After this and with pressure by
the Mexican government, there is a move to classify Mexicans as White in the 1920 census.92 By
the 1930 census, Mexicans are listed again as a separate race. In the 1930s, perhaps because of
confusion with the U.S. Census and racial eligibility requirements, Marian Smith, Historian for
the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service Historical Library in D.C. reports that the USCIS
released a circular reaffirming the whiteness of Mexicans. It is also at this time that the Bureau
of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization merge into one agency: the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The merging of the two brings about questions of the racial categories,
and by the 1940s, the races are changed on naturalization forms to only include the eligible
races: White, African or African Descent, and Filipino. The forms were revised again, however,

92

Before 1980, census takers recorded race.
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with the passage of the Nationality Act of 1940.93 The Nationality Act of 1940 extended
eligibility for citizenship to “descendents of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere”94
(section 303). After passage of this act, naturalization forms were revised and included five
choices: White, Negro, Japanese, Chinese, and Other. Although there is no apparent reason for
the five choices on the application for naturalization (Smith 101), this is the first time that the
N‐400 has five options.
With the passing of The Act of 1952, race is eliminated as a requirement for
naturalization, and race is removed from the petition for naturalization. However, racial data is
still collected through the criminal records check. Applicants must declare a race, and on the
Form FD‐258 (Fingerprints); there were five options: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian
or Pacific Islander, Black, White, or Unknown. The Form FD‐258 has changed little over time,
but it is not clear how these categories were altered. The FD‐258 does not list the options for
race since each answer is assigned a code and this is found in the instructions (see chapter five
for further discussion of this). The changes to racial categories after 1952 were strongly
influenced by the U.S. Census Bureau. For example, in the 1970s, after periods of major influxes
of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Mexicans, the government introduced the Spanish ethnic
identifier, which later became, in the Office of Management and Budget’s revised Directive 15
(1997), “Hispanic or Latino” and “Not Hispanic or Latino.” This revised directive also changed
the racial categories to five: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Black or African
93

It is important to note that the List did not go away. It was still used by the “immigration” side of the INS. Further
changes to the list occurred after 1940: Spanish American was changed to Latin American in 1942 and Hebrew was
deleted in 1943 (See Weil and Smith).
94
Like much of the previous laws regarding immigration and naturalization, the term “races indigenous to the
Western Hemisphere” lacked clarity. The Immigration and Nationality Manual of 1945 made clear who was not
eligible: “native Samoans or Polynesian inhabitants of American Samoa, and Maoris (members of the Polynesian
family) born in New Zealand” (Sec. 722.1).
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American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander and White. Race is added to the Form N‐
400 in 2002, and the responses to this question are the categories as listed in the revised
directive. The analysis of a comparison of the entries in the 1911 Dictionary demonstrate that
Folkmar’s five “grand” divisions of mankind are embedded in the new directive, and the revised
Directive 15 is still in effect in 2011.
This analysis uncovers the power “behind”95 the discourse of race as presented in the
current Form N‐400. Although there was a diversity of ideologies in conflict regarding the
definition of Mexican, this dominant ideology is sustained through repeated attempts to
reassert the non‐whiteness of Mexican immigrants through laws such as the Act of 1917
(barring immigration to contract workers) and the changing definitions with each decennial
census. This “unstable equilibrium96” reveals the hidden relations of power in the orders of
discourse of race in U.S. society. Although race is no longer a category of struggle over access to
U.S. society via citizenship, it still remains a struggle around assimilation as immigrants threaten
the grand narrative of a “White America.” In “Biracial Identity—Asset or Handicap,” Elaine
Prinderhughes explains how “the very clear racial boundaries…in the interest of White
domination are seriously threatened by the presence of a biracial person” (76). (See also Root;
Parker and Song). This is also the case with the majority of immigrants of “Spanish origin.” Clara
Rodríguez reports in a study of racial identity and the Puerto Rican community that Puerto
Ricans present an enigma in U.S. society because they are both an ethnic group and more than
one racial group: they were both Black and White, but as an ethnic group they were neither
95

Fairclough uses the terms power “behind” and power “in” discourse. See Language and Power 1989/2001
Hegemony is domination across different levels or domains of society but it is never complete domination; “it is
never achieved more than partially and temporarily.” Gramsci terms this an “unstable equilibrium” (Fairclough
Critical Discourse Analysis 76).

96
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Black nor White (Puerto Ricans: Born in the U.S.A 47). Angel Falcón argues that Rodríguez’
observations can be applied to the experiences of Latinos in general and cites a privately
funded social survey completed by the Latino National Political Survey in 1989 that examined
the attitudes and behaviors of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans in the U.S. One significant
part of the study was that participants had to place themselves in the U.S. system of racial
classification. Falcón notes that there was an inconsistency between how the interviewer
labeled the respondent by phenotype and how the respondent self‐identified (Falcón 199‐200).
Of note is that prior to the 1980s the enigma
of Latino racial identity was probably not an
issue; individuals did not answer the question
directly, census takers did, and for
naturalization, the authorized agent (FBI,
Police, USCIS official) recorded race on the

Video 6.7 Elena defines morena.

form FD‐258. Prior to the 1990s, only one race could be declared. For many Mexicans in this
study, they are (like Rodríguez’ conclusions) both Black and White, but neither Black nor White.
(Elena explains in Video 6.7 that she is neither Black nor White). Until 1990, they would have
had to choose between the two, thereby maintaining the binary of Black/White in the U.S.
This struggle for representation is a symbol of the process of becoming part of the racial
discourse as defined by U.S society. In chapter five, I explained how the dominant control the
social actors, legal residents, who are applying for naturalization. The analysis of the Form N‐
400 reveals how the grammatical structuring of the Form constrains applicants and the subject
positions one can occupy. The applicant is relegated to the giver of information or compliant
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actor while filling out the “blank” form. This is accomplished through four types of
constructions: declaratives, grammatical questions, nominalizations, and imperatives. In
particular, nominalizations take a process and convert it to a noun. Instead of “What race are
you?” the question is stated only as “Race.” This process removes the subject/agent, verb form,
and modality and presents the world as fixed and knowable. I noted that it was only on the
section for criminal records search that nominalizations were used to frame the questions.
Using the design principles of Robin Williams, I evaluated the Form N‐400 as configuration
(Salinas, Sosnoski). Under the principle of proximity, (like objects should be positioned
together), I uncover how this configuration maintains, to varying degrees, the power relations
of the dominant ideology. First, the racial categories are presented on the same line with White
listed first. This positions White in relation to all of the other races and sustains the ideology
that the U.S. racial system has at its foundation an overarching dual structure of White vs. non‐
White (See Rodríguez “Counting Latinos” also). In addition, the five racial categories and the
ethnic identifiers are presented as common sense. There is no need to define them and
definitions are not provided in the instructions for the N‐400. The meanings of the words
depend, then, on its relation (proximity) to others. In question E, the spatial alignment of the
race categories marks the boundaries between them. It is understood that White is different
from Asian and Asian from Black or African American because of the spatial divisions. Likewise,
the proximal relation of “Black or African American” denotes that these categories are similar.
This inevitably leads to the overwhelming majority of permanent legal residents of Mexican
origin in this study to reject this category and assert a White racial identity.
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Preceding the question on race is Spanish origin. Applicants understand that this
question has “something” to do with race because of its proximal relationship, but the question
does not state that Hispanic or Latino are ethnic or racial identifiers (nor do the instructions).
Regardless of the applicant’s perception of these categories (Hispanic and Latino) as racial or
ethnic, they are separated from the subsequent race question. Cobas, Duany and Feagin argue
that the Spanish origin identifier was established by the government in the 1970s to erase
differences among Spanish speakers and collapses diversity into two groups: Hispanic or Latino
(9). The question on the Form N‐400 goes one‐step further, its construction of “Are you
Hispanic or Latino?” erases any distinction between these two terms. If applicants understand
that they are distinct, it does not matter, if they can answer yes to one or the other, the answer
on the Form is “yes” (See Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 Part 5. D and E
In my opinion, the Spanish ethnic identifier eliminates any “confusion” over race. The broad
label of “Hispanic or Latino” does more than erase differences among Spanish speakers; it also
accomplishes what the 1911 classification did: separate all Spanish speakers or people of
Spanish/Latino origin from other Whites. This new ethnic identifier becomes a strategy to
maintain these racial boundaries. Chen argues in “(De)hyphenated Identity,” that the “hyphen
is a metaphor which highlights the boundary between Americans and white Americans” (9). The
separate question functions as a hyphenated designation Hispanic‐White or Hispanic‐American.
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Permanent legal residents,97 however, are unaware of the power “in” the discursive
elements in the application. The Form N‐400 “reads” as void of ideology and this is due to many
factors. First, as a written document, the participants are separated spatially. There is a feeling
of one‐sidedness to the communication, and this makes it unclear as to the nature of the power
relations manifest in the Form. Since this Form is also created with a broad audience in mind, it
is written with an ideal audience in mind. Applicants negotiate this “ideal” citizen. Although, I
understand that a single piece of discourse (one interaction) is not enough to render claims
about the effects of this discourse or its impact on identity formation at the individual or
national level, nonetheless potential new citizens do negotiate their relationship to the ideal
subject/citizen. This ideal citizen is the product of the articulation of politics, economics,
ideology, and history that sanctioned whiteness. According to the question on the N‐400,
racially, this ideal citizen subject can only be a combination of the five categories as designated
by the Office of Management and Budget’s revised Directive 15 (1997): American Indian or
Alaskan Native, Asian, Black, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. These categories
represent the pre‐existing categories of race as understood from the U.S. perspective. The
difficulty that permanent legal residents encountered with the racial identity question on the
Form N‐400 point to a rupture in the way they perceive themselves and the way the Form N‐
400 constructs the potential new citizen. This Form, which is used by immigrants from other
countries, must assimilate to these sanctioned categories of self‐definition. The racial terms
used in this question makes evident that permanent legal residents are reproducing social

97

Since I am referring to filling out the N‐400, I limit the discussion to this group of people, but I would stress that
in general terms, most people are not self‐reflexive when filling out “blank” forms.
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structures when responding to this question since the categories do not welcome diversity, but
asks immigrants to choose among U.S. defined subject positions.
Applicants who are self‐reflexive could strategically and creatively negotiate race on the
N‐400 since the instructions to question E are “choose one or more.” The data shows, however,
that no one chose more than one race. This was due to many factors, but I argue that the
design of the form was instrumental. Applicants were only allowed to choose one response on
all of the other questions structured like question E. I speculate that the repetition of “one”
answer (65 times) subconsciously confines immigrants to choose only one. So although the
questions regarding race on the census and the application for naturalization allowed for
respondents to choose more than one category after 1990, on the naturalization form, the
traces of “one” race only are present.
Finally, the position of White as the first answer to question E also sustains the
dominant ideology that Americans are White. Sherrow Pinder argues in The Politics of Race and
Ethnicity in the U.S. that “even though nonwhites have been in America since the very
beginning of America’s founding, nonwhites are always viewed as foreigners, alien to America’s
cultural oneness/homogeneity” (1). In a study of African Americans, Asian Americans and
whiteness, Thierry Devos and Mahzarin R. Banaji
found that there is a predisposition to view Whites
as Americans. This is also true for some of the
participants in this study such as Maité and
Consuelo who state that Americans are White
(refer to Video 6.8). The construction of these
Video 6.8 Consuelo, Maité and
“Americaness”
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questions (D and E) certainly reinforces this ideology. The power masked in this Form is not
surprising since Pinder argues that “in the United States, all major institutions are intended to
support those who have habitually been in power, or the groups that are perceived to be
dominant”—white, heterosexual male (3). This begs the question as to what effect, if any, this
group of immigrants has in disrupting or reifying the dominant ideology.
The second part of the question of inquiry addresses the role or roles that this
community has in maintaining or disrupting the existing power relations. I noted in the previous
sections that 51 out of 52 legal residents chose White as their race when responding to the
questions from the Form N‐400 in comparison to only twenty‐percent who chose White as their
answer to the “fill in the blank” on race. The observations and videos illustrate that the majority
of the sample population did not previously consider themselves White but when faced with
the options on the Form N‐400, chose White. Based on the studies by Falcón, Rodríguez, and De
Fina, I believe that the findings in this study can also be applied to Hispanics and Latinos in
general. Consider the ramifications of this population: Mexicans comprise the largest source of
immigrants to the U.S. in the last ten years (U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics) and Hispanics
and Latinos in general are the largest source of immigrants to the U.S. (Customs and
Immigration Service). Given this, their answers to race on this important Form for citizenship
takes on new meaning—White is no longer required by law to become a citizen, but
nonetheless the idea of the American citizen as White is.
The consequences of this one act of writing is not assessable, but I argue that because
applicants must “write in” a response, the force of subjection is more extensive in contrast to
other discourses that are consumed such as the newspaper, magazines, or television. The
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applicant takes on two roles; he/she alternates between the interpreters and producers of a
text. Fairclough identifies this as a feature of face‐to‐face interactions (Language and Power 2nd
ed. 41) but filling out a form also requires applicants to “read” the images and then “write” in
their answers. Although they may be limited in their production, as chapter five demonstrates,
there is not a sharp divide between interpreter and producer once the applicant begins to
answer the questions. Thus there is some action on the part of the applicant in constructing
their identity as well as the identity of American citizens. At the moment the “pen” hits the
paper, the macro, meso, and macro levels of racial formation are enacted as applicants are
presented a version of reality that sustains the power relations of the dominant class. This
ideology hails us (Althusser) and unfairly devalues minorities of Spanish origin. The sample
population, after years of residency in the U.S., has accepted the labels Hispanic or Latino. This
socialization occurred a priori to the naturalization process. These labels erase diversity, and
the applicant becomes complicit in this subject reformation in the act of writing. This
reformation continues with “racial” identity. As immigrants navigate this Form (and other
governmental forms), they must think of themselves in racial terms, even if they did not
before.98 These racial terms do not reproduce race as understood from the immigrant
perspective, the “writer” of the Form. Many Hispanic or Latinos would prefer an intermediate
category of “brown” (moreno/a), and this was expressed by half of the participants in the video
interview. Faced with the options on the Form N‐400, they identify as White. This is also the
observation of De Genova and Ramos‐Zayas who note that because of the options on the U.S.
Census, Latinos “readily identify as ‘white’ (even if many may never do so on virtually any other
98

This is not to say that race is not a category of importance in other countries, but a national identity may take
precedence over race.
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occasion)” and an equal number of Latinos “opt instead for the nondescript ‘none of the above’
category of ‘Some other race’” (16‐17). The N‐400, however, presents a totalizing ideology; the
applicant does not have the option to choose “none of the above,” “some other race,” or to
write in a category.
Foucault recognizes that where there is power there can also be resistance, but
applicants must answer the ethno‐racial questions if they want to become U.S. citizens. Refusal
to answer will result in the return of the application for failure to answer all of the questions as
stated in the instructions. If the applicant does not answer the questions regarding race and
ethnicity, there are real consequences. The application will be returned and the applicant will
be asked to complete all answers and resubmit, thus causing a delay in processing. This adds
another layer to racial subjection; resistance is not an option. Agency, however, sometimes, is
born out of creativity. If an applicant wanted to, he or she could check all of the boxes on the
Form. In the interview, Crystal, a permanent legal resident since the age of 3, explains her
desire to check all of the boxes for race, but given the seriousness of the application, fears that
the risk is too high to do so. This act of resistance, an act of deroutinization (Giddens Modernity
13), cannot be realized.
These papers that grant citizenship determine “how and where immigrants exist and
loom large in their lives” (Maira 122). It determines full access to U.S. society and the possibility
of petitioning residency on behalf of other family members. Given this, the applicant must
racially identify and consume the orders of discourse of race according to the dominant
ideology. The legal resident from Mexico struggles with discourse about race that positions the
applicant in a binary structure of White and Non‐White in the U.S., but this struggle is also over
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assimilation—the dominant discourse does not take into account the culturally diverse
understandings of race but strives to standardize race to some extent in U.S. society. This is
central to the workings of hegemony. The dominant ideology attempts to erase the cultural
context and replace it with discourse that benefits the dominant group. In a study of “everyday
racism” in the U.S. and the Netherlands, Philomena Essed explains that the strategies used to
achieve hegemony are aimed at “cultural control” and that the “tendency to control the
influence of other cultures is not just a policy issue; it pervades the everyday practices by which
the dominant group secures the status quo of race and ethnic relations” (6). The application for
naturalization is a manifestation of the macro level projects of society where groups of people
are allowed (or denied) access to full rights as a citizen. They are also denied (or limited) to the
way they can define themselves. Thus, racial categories are defined in the relationship of
struggle over language and are rhetorical: “They are about how groups of people feel, talk, and
think about other groups of people; about the assumptions and judgments groups make about
other groups; about how these assumptions and judgments ‘compose’ society—how they
influence philosophy, determine policy, and incite action” (West Signs of Struggle 1).
The writers (permanent legal residents) become co‐constructors of the American citizen
through their struggle over representation. The naturalization application, however, presents a
sort of hegemonic coercion: applicants must accept (even if temporarily) ethnic and racial
categorizations. Although identity is context driven and variable as the different responses to
the three sets of race questions exemplify, in the context of citizenship, White reigns. Although
this is only one writing act, Susan Miller recognizes that “a written text’s meaning or
implications both as text and as act—are always larger than its immediate purpose and
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situation” (46). This “text” speaks to immigrants and does ideological work; it determines what
is correct. Applicants check a box (or more) and this act determines their place and space in a
given hierarchy. White then “crowds out99” the “other.” Although there is no singular identity,
acts of writing are dialogic and members of society are constantly engaging in the “process of
becoming100” a “good” citizen subject. This process creates, through repetition, a society where
people come “to know” that they are White, Asian, Hispanic or Latino etc.:
Through repetition, we come to “recognize” ourselves as the persons hailed and
so act as if we were “really” those persons. Because ideology has taught us that
we are unified subjects with free will, we do not imagine our identities to have
been created this way. Our actions and our choices seem to be the result of
some fixed character or unfettered choice rather than the product of ideology.
(Jamieson 157‐158)
According to Utz McKnight, the major sources of racialization in U.S. society are the product of
“social encounters when very young, and the idea of racial difference as phenotype is initially
explained or justified as a social value of importance” (46). So, who supplies the major sources
for racial subjection for the new citizen? This happens, in part, by their interaction with the
meso‐level institutions of U.S. society and particularly the U.S. Customs and Immigration
Service. Yet subjection does not happen alone; writing has a role in this. At least momentarily,
in the process of becoming U.S. citizens, the permanent legal residents in this study have

99

In her discussion of literacy, Patricia Bizzell wonders whether academic literacy will “crowd out” other cultural
literacies that students bring to school (134)
100
In discussing the use of autobiographical essays in the classroom, Cindy Hesford argues that “the
autobiographical writing process can be construed, then, as intrinsically dialogic, and the autobiographical subject
can be read as always in the process of becoming” (61).
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reproduced and co‐authored the status quo: “the heterogeneous origin of the population”101
(Gimenez qtd. in De Fina 144). Whether or not these acts of writing continue to sustain the idea
of the American citizen as White remains to be seen. I can only speculate that what emerged as
a habit of whiteness (racial categorization) will continue to assert itself through a myriad of
different social practices. Its hegemony rests upon the racial subjection of Hispanics and Latinos
and the willingness of individuals, everyday, to reassert these ideologies through checking a
box.
6.7 Conclusion
This dissertation examined acts of writing in the construction of race in the United
States. The research question was born out of my initial curiosity of the ways permanent legal
residents of Mexican origin identified racially on the application for naturalization and the
implications of this racial schema. This research emphasized a critical rhetorical approach that
emphasized writing’s role in the construction of racial identity for this sample population. I
examined three levels of “writing” in the making of the U.S. citizen. The design of this three‐
level approach (macro, meso, micro) integrated different theories and methodologies, such as
discourse analysis, visual rhetoric, graphic design, and ethnography.
At the macro‐level, I investigated the laws, policies, lists, manuals, and Dictionary (the
historical racial projects) that created our present racial classification as used in the current
Form N‐400. The research in this chapter, focused also on the affects of these racial projects on
this target group: Mexicans. At the meso‐level, I examined how the Form N‐400 constructs its
101

Gimenez notes that “ethnic categorizations are central in the social and political landscape of the United States
since in this country the existence of social classes and class struggles are neither recognized, nor discussed, while
race and ethnicity are obsessively placed in the center of political life. Such emphasis is the result of the interaction
of many factors, among which one of the most important is the heterogeneous origin of the population” (qtd in De
Fina 143‐144).
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user at the “text” level and as a configuration. The text‐level analysis demonstrated how users
were constrained by the grammatical constructions of the questions. The Form as configuration
exposes, through the use of graphic design principles, the ideologies embedded in this pivotal
form for naturalization. Finally, at the micro‐level, I integrated the responses, observations, and
interviews of legal residents of Mexican origin to understand how they negotiate the Form, the
racial categories contained within, and the role this act of writing has in constituting the
subject.
It is apparent from the historical analysis that the racial categories in the Form N‐400
maintain the dual structure of White/Non‐White that is now a century old. It also presents race
from a U.S. perspective (with categories such as Native Hawaiian, American Indian), thereby
erasing the other—the foreign. If racism “involves the subordination of people of color by white
people” (Rothenberg “Defining Racism and Sexism” 6), this Form accomplishes just that: White
is positioned first, and the “other” is defined in relation to it. For this sample population, the
options available to self‐identify are Black or White or a combination of these two. However,
the overwhelming majority rejects a combination of Black and White even if, like Elena, (see
Video 6.7) they define themselves as morena (Fifty‐one out of fifty‐two respondents chose
White on the N‐400). The decision to not choose Black was due to various factors, but namely
the design of the question influenced their answers. Participants also related to me that they
may have African heritage or Indian heritage, but that this was in the distant past, so they did
not identify with the culture. Consuelo, José, Elena, and Maité explain in their videos that they
are not that color (Black) or that race (African American) so the best option for them was to
choose only White. For most of these participants, this was their initiation into race in U.S.
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society, as they had not answered questions like this before (not even for the application for
permanent residency). The consequence, at least momentarily, is the reassertion of a White
America. Whiteness is no longer a requirement by law for naturalization, but if the majority of
immigrants who identify as Hispanic or Latino answer like this population, then White is
reaffirmed as the de facto racial identity in America. At the same time, however, this
community is further subjected to another level of categorization (“ethnic”) through the
question of Spanish origin. This question separates this community from all other Whites. This
was also the purpose of the 1911 Dictionary: to make distinctions among peoples of the
Caucasian race.
Population projections of the U.S. predict that by 2050, the Hispanic and Latino
population will “make up 29% of the U.S. population” and “whites will become a minority” (Pew
Hispanic Center). The Hispanic and Latino community, with the promise of more political clout,
look upon this prediction favorably. Others, like critical race scholar Ian Haney López, believe
that the declining percentage of Whites102 is cause for concern because it “imperils
domination” and “change often brings conflict” (“Race and the U.S. Census” 43). Contrary to
Haney López, I believe that racial categorization is a key example of how “whiteness persists in
the form of habitual action” (MacMullan 72). Although the forms may change from
governmental office, department, or agency, racial categorization persists because it reaffirms

102

Haney López clarifies that this depends upon how we count Latinos. If they are counted as White then the
census projections will change considerably (“Race on the 2010 Census” 43).
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whiteness. If the results of this study are any indicator, as this population, much like the Irish,103
for example, transitions to Mexican American, they will become White Americans.
This study did not aim to solve the complex issue of identity, but to problematize how
writing and specifically the naturalization process contribute to the construction of the new
citizen. More studies, ethnographic in nature that focus on ethnic populations are needed to
understand how people come to understand themselves in particular ways and the effects of
such from a local perspective. Although much of the current research focuses on the state’s
construction of immigrants, none have looked at the ways immigrants (or minority groups in
the U.S.) participate in their subject formation through acts of writing. These acts of writing can
reinforce racial subjection or disrupt the dominant ideology. This is an area that Ellen Cushman
says rhetoricians can bridge the gap between the university and the community as “agents of
change.” Researchers can “contribute resources” to help people “disrupt the status quo of their
lives with language and literacy” (Cushman 13). The disruption of the status quo is achieved, in
part, through the individual reflecting on his/her actions (See Giddens). I would like to think
that this project encouraged change because it required applicants to reflect on the version of
racial reality that is presented, but the analysis demonstrated that institutions could be self‐
reflexive as well; they can also adapt, resist, and restructure (Côté and Levine 43). This is where
I predict there will be conflict—the institutional level, as ethno‐racial categories will be
restructured to maintain the status quo. The status quo, however, depends upon the

103

“As immigrants made the transition from Irish to Irish American, they also became white Americans.”
(Roediger 333)
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“micropolitics of power”104: the repetitive assertion of race through a collection of writing
events that continuously form and reform notions of self and society everyday.

104

See Flores and Moon 183
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Appendix B
CONSENT FORMS AND INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH

University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) Institutional Review Board
Informed Consent Form for Research Involving Human Subjects

Protocol Title: Race and Citizenship
Principal Investigator: Theresa L. Donovan
UTEP English Department

In this consent form, “you” always means the study subject.

1. Introduction
You are being asked to take part voluntarily in the research project described below. Please take your
time making a decision and feel free to ask questions regarding the nature of this study. Before agreeing
to take part in this research study, it is important that you read the consent form that describes the
study. Please ask the study researcher to explain any words or information that you do not clearly
understand.

2. Why is this study being done?
You have been asked to take part in a research study that looks at how people self‐identify on the N‐
400, Application for Naturalization. Approximately 75 people will be participating in this study in
locations off the UTEP campus, typically at the Citizenship Class meeting place.

You are being asked to be in the study because you have applied for or are in the process of applying for
naturalization. If you decide to enroll in this study, your involvement will last about 2 weeks. The first
step is to complete a written survey, which will take about 10‐15 minutes to complete. The second step
will involve a follow‐up videotaped interview based on your responses from the survey; this will take
between 25‐40 minutes.
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3. What is involved in the study?
If you agree to take part in this study, the research team will ask you to do the following:
1. Fill out the necessary consent forms. 2. Fill out a survey. 3. If you are selected, to participate in a
videotaped interview that asks you follow up questions from the survey you fill out.

4. What are the risks and discomforts of the study?
There are no known risks associated with this research

5. What will happen if I am injured in this study?
The University of Texas at El Paso and its affiliates do not offer to pay for or cover the cost of medical
treatment for research related illness or injury. No funds have been set aside to pay or reimburse you in
the event of such injury or illness. You will not give up any of your legal rights by signing this consent
form. You should report any such injury to Theresa L. Donovan and to the UTEP Institutional Review
Board (IRB) at (915‐747‐8841) or irb.orsp@utep.edu.

6. Are there benefits to taking part in this study?
There will be no direct benefits to you for taking part in this study. This research may help us to
understand the impact of the racial categories on the N‐400 in identity formation.

7. What other options are there?

You have the option not to take part in this study. There will be no penalties involved if you choose not
to take part in this study.

8. Who is paying for this study?
Internal Funding:
None
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External funding:
None

9. What are my costs?
There are no direct costs. You will be responsible for travel to and from the research site and any other
incidental expenses.

10. Will I be paid to participate in this study?
You will not be paid for taking part in this research study.

11. What if I want to withdraw, or am asked to withdraw from this study?
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to take part in this study. If
you do not take part in the study, there will be no penalty.

If you choose to take part, you have the right to stop at any time. Please let the researcher know the
reasons why you no longer want to be part of the study. If there are any new findings during the
study that may affect whether you want to continue to take part, you will be told about them.

The researcher may decide to stop your participation without your permission, if he or she thinks
that being in the study may cause you harm.

12. Who do I call if I have questions or problems?
You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may call Theresa L.
Donovan at 915‐877‐xxxx or e‐mail her at tldonovan@utep.edu.

If you have questions or concerns about your participation as a research subject, please contact the
UTEP Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (915‐747‐8841) or irb.orsp@utep.edu.

13. What about confidentiality?
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1. Your part in the survey is confidential. None of the information will identify you by name if you
indicate this preference. You also have the option to allow the researcher to use your real name.
If you agree to a follow up video interview, you will be identifiable in the video. You will have
the choice to have the researcher use your real name or a fake name.
2. All records‐‐surveys and videos—will be kept in the lead researcher’s locked office.
3. Your responses on the survey and in the video interview may be used for the researcher’s, and
possible co‐authors’, publications. This may be in the form of an academic publication, including
electronic publication, and for conference or workshop presentations.
4. Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records (survey and video tape
interview) for quality assurance and data analysis include, but are not necessarily limited to:
•

A sponsor or an agent for the sponsor

•

UTEP Institutional Review Board

14. Authorization Statements
On the following page, I ask that you sign to certify that you understood this consent form, and
you are willing to participate in the study. Also, by signing, you authorize the use of the
responses from this research study to be used for educational purposes. I may wish to present
some of the survey results and video interview tapes from this study at academic conferences,
as demonstrations in classrooms, or as hard copy or digital publications. Please sign below if you
are willing to allow us to do so with the survey responses.

Please note that if you participate in a videotaped interview, you will be asked at that time to
sign an additional consent form for use of the videotape for educational purposes. On both the
questionnaire and the consent form for the video, you will be asked whether you would like to
use your real name or a have a fake name provided for you.
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15. AUTHORIZATION FOR QUESTIONNAIRE

I have read each page of this paper about the study (or it was read to me). I know that being in
this study is voluntary and I choose to be in this study. I know I can stop being in this study
without penalty. I will get a copy of this consent form and can get information on results of the
study later if I wish. I also hereby give permission for the questionnaire responses made for this
research study to be used for educational purposes.
(Please note: You will be asked whether you want to use your real name or not on the actual
questionnaire)
Participant Name:

Date:

Participant Signature:

Time:

Explained by/Witnessed by___________________________________

Name________________________________________ Date________________

Signature_________________________________________
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16. AUTHORIZATION FOR VIDEO TAPED INTERVIEW

I have read each page of this paper about the study (or it was read to me). I know that being in
this study is voluntary and I choose to be in this study. I know I can stop being in this study
without penalty. I will get a copy of this consent form and can get information on results of the
study later if I wish. I also hereby give permission for the videotape responses made for this
research study to be used for educational purposes.

Participant Name:

Date:

I consent to letting the researcher use my real name in the video recording

Yes

No

Participant Signature:

Time:

Explained by/Witnessed by___________________________________

Name________________________________________ Date________________
Signature_________________________________________
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QUESTIONNAIRE
I.

General Information

Name: ________________________________________________________
I consent to letting the researcher use my real name from my responses to the
survey:
Yes

No

(Circle your choice above; if you circle “no” the researcher will invent a fake name for you)

Age:________________
Sex:
M
F
Address________________________________________________________________________
Phone: _______________________E‐mail:____________________________________________
Country of Origin______________________Length of time in U.S._________________________
Languages you
speak______________________________________________________________
II.
Questions pertaining to Racial Identity
1. Race______________________________ How would you identify yourself if you were
told to fill in the blank.
2. Below is a reproduction of the racial identity questions for the 2010 U.S. Census. Please
fill out the form:
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3. Below is a reproduction of the racial identity questions on the application for
naturalization. Please answer 5D and 5E.

4. What are your thoughts on the choices available to you in both documents?

5. Were you aware that you could choose more than one race in both documents?

6. On a scale of 1‐3, does your answer on an official government form influence how you
will answer this question in other official documents ? (Please circle one)
Are you
1. very likely
2.likely
3. not likely
to answer the
same on future forms?

224

Proposed Interview Questions
1. How did you answer questions 5D and 5E on the N‐400?
2. Take me through the things you thought about as you were answering the question?
3. Have you been required to supply race information on other forms?
4. What types of forms?
5. What types of contexts? Formal, informal?
6. What do you think about question 5D and 5E?
7. How would you identify yourself?
8. Given your answer on the form, how likely are you to answer that way again?
in what contexts?
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University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) Institutional Review Board
Informed Consent Form for Research Involving Human Subjects

Protocol Title: Race and Citizenship
Principal Investigator: Theresa L. Donovan
UTEP English Department
En este formulario, “Ud.” significa el sujeto de este estudio.

1. Introducción
Estoy pidiendo su participación voluntaria en un proyecto académico; más información sobre
este proyecto se encuentra abajo. Por favor toma su tiempo en tomar una decisión, en cualquier
momento puede hacer preguntas acerca de este estudio. Antes de participar en este estudio, es
importante que lea el formulario (consent form) que lo describe. Por favor, pregunta la
investigadora sobre cualquier palabra o información que Ud. no se entiende.

2. ¿Por qué se hace este tipo de estudio?
Se necesita su participación en este estudio porque este estudio investiga como individuos se
identifica en la solicitud para naturalización o ciudadanía. Aproximadamente 75 personas
participará en este estudio en varios locales en el área de El Paso, típicamente en las clases de
ciudadanía.

Le pido su participación porque Ud. solicitó ciudadanía o está en el proceso de solicitarla. Si Ud.
decide participar en este estudio, su participación consiste en un cuestionario que tomará 10‐15
minutos para contestar. Según sus respuestas en el cuestionario, la segunda etapa es una
entrevista grabada; este puede tomar 25 hasta 40 minutos. La duración máxima de su
participación en este estudio es dos semanas.

3. ¿Qué necesito hacer como participante en este estudio?
Si participas en este estudio, la investigadora le va a pedir que:
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1. Llene un formulario de consentimiento. 2. Llene un cuestionario. 3. Haga una entrevista
grabada que consiste de preguntas basadas en sus contestaciones en el cuestionario.

4. ¿Cuáles son los riesgos o incomodidades en el estudio?
No hay riesgos asociados con esta investigación.
5. ¿Qué pasará si sufro de una enfermedad o herida mientras participo en el estudio?
La universidad de Texas de El Paso y sus afiliados no toman responsabilidad para cualquier
tratamiento o gasto médico para cualquier enfermedad o herida relacionada con esta
investigación. No hay fondos para pagar sus gastos o reembolsarle para sus gastos. Al firmar
este formulario, Ud. no pierde sus derechos legales. Por favor, reporte cualquier herida a la
investigadora principal, Theresa Donovan, y a la Universidad de Texas de El Paso, Institutional
Review Board (IRB) al (915‐747‐8841) o por correo electrónico: irb.orsp@utep.edu.

6. ¿Hay beneficios de participar en este estudio?
Ud. no recibirá ningún beneficio directo por participar en este estudio. El objetivo de esta
investigación es entender el impacto de las preguntas de etnicidad y raza en la solicitud de
naturalización, N‐400 para la población de inmigrantes de países hispanohablantes.

7. ¿Hay otras opciones?

Ud. tiene la opción de no participar en este estudio. No hay ninguna penalidad si Ud. decide no
participar en la investigación.

8. ¿Quién paga por este estudio?
Los gastos de este estudio son la responsabilidad de la investigadora principal.
Fondos Internos:
Ninguno
Fondos externos:
Ninguno

227

9. ¿Puedo incurrir gastos por participar en este estudio?
No hay ningún costo directo por participar en el estudio. Sin embargo, Ud. puede ser
responsable para los gastos incurridos para viajar al sitio de la investigación si se consiente a una
entrevista grabada.

10. ¿Me pagará por participar en el estudio?
No recibirá ningún tipo de paga por ser participante en este estudio.

11. ¿Qué va a pasar si decido terminar mi participación o si termina mi participación en el
estudio?
Participando en el estudio es voluntario. Ud. tiene el derecho de terminar su participación en
cualquier momento. Si Ud. no participa, no hay penalidad.

Si Ud. decide participar, Ud. puede terminar su participación en cualquier momento. Por favor,
informe a la investigadora principal de sus razones por no seguir en el estudio. Cualquier
información nueva que se encuentre sobre este estudio que pueda afectar su participación, será
divulgada.
La investigadora tiene el derecho de terminar su participación sin su permiso si piensa que el
estudio le puede causar sufrimiento.
12. ¿A quién llamo si tengo alguna duda, pregunta, o problema?
Ud. puede hacer cualquier pregunta que tenga ahora o si tiene preguntas más tarde, puede
llamar a la investigador principal, Theresa L. Donovan , al 915‐877‐xxxx o enviar un correo
electrónico a tldonovan@utep.edu.
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Si Ud. tiene dudas o preguntas sobre su participación como “sujeto”en este estudio, por favor
comunique con UTEP Institutional Review Board (IRB) al (915‐747‐8841) o por correo
electrónico a irb.orsp@utep.edu.

13. ¿Es mi participación confidencial?
Su participación en el estudio es confidencial. Ud. tiene el derecho de indicar en este formulario
que no quiere que la investigadora utilice información que pueda identificarle como participante
en el estudio. Ud. también tiene la opción de utilizar su nombre real o un nombre falso. Si Ud.
participa en una entrevista grabada, Ud. puede ser identificada en el video.
Todos los cuestionarios y videos estarán en la oficina de la investigadora principal bajo llave.
Sus respuestas –en el cuestionario y en el video—podrán ser ultilizadas en publicaciones hechas
por la investigadora principal y/o co‐autores. Este puede ser en forma de publicación
académico o presentaciones académicos.
Las organizaciones que pueden inspeccionar y/o copiar los cuestionarios o las entrevistas para
asegurar cualidad (Quality Assurance), y análisis de data, incluye (pero no son limitadas) a:
un auspiciador o agente por un auspiciador de UTEP Institutional Review Board

14. Declaraciones de autorización
Me gustaría presentar los resultados de este estudio (con data de los cuestionarios y las
entrevistas grabadas) en conferencias académicas, demostraciones en clase, o para publicación.
Por favor, firme abajo si Ud. da permiso a la investigadora para utilizar el cuestionario y las
grabaciones para estes fines. Véase la siguiente sección para certificar que Ud. leyó el
documento (Consent Form) y autoriza su participación en el estudio.

Si Ud. desea participar en una entrevista grabada, Ud. firmará otra hoja de consentimiento
antes de la grabación.
En el cuestionario y también al consentir a una grabación, Ud. podrá elegir utilizar su nombre
real o un nombre falso para este estudio.
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15. CERTIFICACIÓN PARA EL CUESTIONARIO

Certifico que he leído cada página del formulario sobre el estudio (o fue leída a mí). Reconozco
que este estudio es voluntario y participo de mi propia voluntad. Puedo pedir una copia de este
documento en cualquier momento. Sé que en cualquier momento puedo terminar mi
participación sin penalidad. También tengo derecho de pedir información sobre los resultados
de esta investigación más tarde. Al firmar este documento, también entiendo que autorizo el
uso de los resultados del cuestionario para fines académicos (conferencias académicas,
demostraciones en clase, o para publicación).
(Ud. tendrá la opción de pedir que la investigadora no utilice su nombre verdadero en el
cuestionario)

Nombre de participante:

Fecha:

Firma de participante:

Hora:

Testigo_________________________________________
Firma___________________________________________

¡GRACIAS!
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Fecha__________

16. CERTIFICACIÓN PARA LA ENTREVISTA GRABADA

Certifico que he leído cada página del formulario sobre el estudio (o fue leída a mí). Reconozco
que este estudio es voluntario y participo de mi propia voluntad. Puedo pedir una copia de este
documento en cualquier momento. Sé que en cualquier momento puedo terminar mi
participación sin penalidad. También tengo derecho de pedir información sobre los resultados
de esta investigación más tarde. Al firmar este documento, también entiendo que autorizo el
uso de los resultados de la entrevista para fines académicos (conferencias académicas,
demostraciones en clase, o para publicación).

Nombre de participante:

Fecha:

Yo autorizo el uso de mi nombre real para la entrevista grabada:
Sí

No

Firma de participante:

Hora:

Leido por/Testigo______________________________________

Firma___________________________________________
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Fecha__________

CUESTIONARIO
I.

Información general

Nombre: ____________________________________________________________________
Yo autorizo el uso de mi nombre real para este cuestionario:
Sí

No

(Escoge uno. Si Ud. escoge “No” la investigadora inventara un nombre falso para Ud. )

Edad:___________________________ Género:
Hombre
Mujer
Dirección postal_________________________________________________________________
Teléfono: ____________________________Correo electrónico___________________________
País de origen_________________________Duración de residencia en los EEUU_____________
Idiomas habladas________________________________________________________________
II.
Preguntas acerca de identidad racial
1. Raza___________________ ¿Cómo te identificarías si encontraste esa pregunta con un
blanco?
2. Abajo se encuentra una copia de las preguntas sobre raza del censo de 2010. Por favor,
contestalas.
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3. Abajo se encuentra una copia de parte 5, del N‐400. Por favor, contesta preguntas D y E.

D. ¿Es Ud. Hispano/a o Latino/a? Sí o No
E. Raza. (Escoge una o más)
_____ Blanco _____Asiático _____Negro o Afro‐Americano
_____Indígena de Hawái o de otra isla pacifica

__ Indía americana o de Alaska

4. ¿Qué piensas de las opciones disponibles en los dos documentos?
5. En cada documento, había la opción de escoger una raza o más. ¿Te diste cuenta de
eso?

6. Pensando en tus respuestas en los dos documentos (el censo y en la solicitud de
naturalización), ¿Contestarías de igual manera en otro documento oficial del
gobierno?
Sí
Quizás
No
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Preguntas para la entrevista grabada
1. ¿Cómo Ud. contestó las preguntas 5D y 5E el el N‐400?
2. Por favor, guíeme por los pensamientos que Ud. tuvo mientras contestaba la pregunta.
3. ¿Ha tenido Ud. que contestar preguntas acerca de su identidad racial antes?
4. ¿En qué tipo de documentos?
5. ¿En qué contextos? ¿Formales, informales?
6. ¿Qué piensas acerca de estas preguntas?
7. ¿Cómo te identificas?
8. ¿Contestarías igual en otros documentos? Sí o No? ¿Por qué?
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Appendix C
CITIZENSHIP CLASS MASTER SCHEDULE

CITIZENSHIP CLASSES / CLASES DE CIUDADANIA
El Paso Area ~FALL 2010
MASTER SCHEDULE WITH INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION

MONDAY/LUNES
• St. Pius X Catholic Church 6:30‐8:30pm
1050 Clark, East Side
(915) 566‐5435
Contact person & Permanent Instructor: Elvia Snow, 566‐5435

• Main Downtown Library
4‐5:30pm
501 N. Oregon, Central
(915) 543‐5480
Contact person: Martha Toscano, toscanoma@elpasotexas.gov 543‐5480
Permanent instructor: Jorge Torres (no contact information currently available)
• La Fe Cultural & Technology Center
3‐5pm
Rear‐721 S. Ochoa, Central
(915) 545‐7090
Contact person: Victor Rodriguez, victor.rodriguez@lafe‐ep.org 545‐7220
Permanent instructors Josie Campos & Jose Alvarado (no contact info currently available)

TUESDAY/MARTES
• Project Bravo
3‐5pm
716 E. Paisano, Central/West Side
(915) 544‐0336
Contact person: Mary Fernandez 544‐0336 & (915) 562‐4100
Current SHINE instructors: Patricia Olvera 449‐4590 & Mercedes Guevara
• Yselta Library
5:30‐7:30pm
9321 Alameda,Far East/Lower Valley(915) 858‐0905
Contact person: manager Amy Camp, campaj@elpasotexas.gov 858‐0905
Permanent Instructor: Claudia Esparza
• Doris Van Doren Library
551 Redd Rd., Central/West Side

6‐8pm
(915) 875‐0700
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Contact person: Norma Martinez, martineznp@elpasotexas.gov (915) 875‐0700 ext. 8502
Current SHINE instructors: Jose Hernandez 613‐6980 & Janet Paull (747‐7644)
• Burgess Branch Library
5‐7pm
9600 Dyer
(915) 588‐2907
Permanent Instructor: Alberto Lopez alopez@dmrs‐ep.org (915) 532‐3975 ext. 226
• La Fe Cultural & Technology Center
3‐5pm
Rear‐721 S. Ochoa, Central
(915) 545‐7090
See above
• Irving Shwartz Library
5‐7pm
1865 Dean Martin, Far East
(915) 857‐0594
Contact person: Martha Herrera, herrarama@elpasotexas.gov (915) 857‐0594
Current SHINE instructors: Oswaldo Modesto 355‐7226 & Angel Saenez
WEDNESDAY/MIERCOLES
• Centro Mujeres de la Esperanza 6‐8pm
1101 Birch, Central
(915) 545‐1890
Permanent Instructor: Adriaan Follansbee, adriaan.follansbee@gmail.com (915) 545‐1890
• Main Downtown Library
501 N. Oregon, Central
See above

4‐5:30pm
(915) 543‐5480

• DMRS~Diocesan Migrant & Refugee Services
3‐5pm
2400 E Yandell, Central
(915) 532‐3975
Permanent Instructor: “Carolina” Colleen Kilbride (915) 532‐3975 ext. 222 ckilbride@dmrs‐
ep.org
• La Fe Cultural & Technology Center
3‐5pm
Rear‐721 S. Ochoa, Central
(915) 545‐7090
See above
• Rio Vista Community Center
6‐8pm
901 N. Rio Vista, Far East/Lower Valley (915) 860‐8615
Contact persons: Rosa Maria Holguin, Maria Chaparro, 860‐8615
Current SHINE instructors: Tania Manjarrez 780‐8322 & Mayra Ortega

THURSDAY/JUEVES
• Esperanza Moreno Library 5:30‐7:30pm
12480 Pebble Hills, East Side (915) 921‐7001
Contact person: Ellen Eyberg, eybergec@elpasotexas.gov 921‐7001
Current SHINE instructors: Mike Hamilton (342‐7157) & Iris Martinez
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• La Fe Cultural & Technology Center
3‐5pm
Rear‐721 S. Ochoa, Central
(915) 545‐7090
See above
• San Elizario Catholic Church
6‐8pm
1556 San Elizario, Far East/Lower Valley (915) 851‐2333
Contact person: Alicia or Fr. Ed Carpentar carpentred@aol.com (915) 851‐2333
Current SHINE instructor: Efren Quijas equijas2@miners.utep.edu (915) 637 5764

FRIDAY/VIERNES
• La Fe Cultural & Technology Center
3‐5pm
Rear‐721 S. Ochoa, Central
(915) 545‐7090
See above
SATURDAY/SABADOS
• Armjio Library
10am‐12pm
620 E 7th St., Central/West Side (915) 532‐7940
Contact persons: Diana Levya and Patricia Hernandez leyvadc@elpasotexas.gov 532‐7940
Current SHINE instructors: Priscilla Benavente 731‐1131 & Laura Estrada
• Sacred Heart/Sagrado Corazón 9‐11:30am
602 S. Oregon, Central
(915) 544‐4970
Permanent Instructor: Sergio Encerrado, sencerrado75@hotmail.com 544‐4970 (office), 820‐
5305 (cell)
• La Fe Cultural & Technology Center 9:30‐11am
Rear‐721 S. Ochoa, Central
(915) 545‐7090
See above
• Judge Marquez Library
10:30‐12:30pm
610 N. Yarbrough Dr., East Side (915) 591‐3391
Contact person: Fernando Racelis, racelisfx@elpasotexas.gov 591‐3391
Current SHINE instructor: Paula Perales 867‐4688
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Appendix D
QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
NAME106

AGE

GENDER

COUNTRY RESIDENCE

BLANK

CENSUS

N‐400

JOSE

55

M

MEX.

22

HISPANO

MEX.

WHITE

DAMASO

60

M

MEX.

30

MEX.

HISPANO

N/A

MARIA

56

F

MEX.

16

MEX.

MEX./WHITE

WHITE

SOCORRO

70

F

MEX.

8

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

CARLOS

57

F

MEX.

18

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

RAQUEL

76

F

MEX.

13

MEX.

MEX.

WHITE

MAITE

54

F

MEX.

30

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE

ZULEMA

64

F

MEX.

13

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

SERGIO

37

M

MEX.

9

HISPANO

MEX./HISPANO

WHITE

JOSEFA

56

F

MEX.

21

HISPANO

HISPANO/LATINO

WHITE

TOMASA

73

F

MEX.

5

LATINO

MEX.

WHITE

F

MEX.

5

HISPANO

HISPANO/LATINO

WHITE

TEOFILA
RAMON

48

M

MEX.

15

HISPANO

LATINO

WHITE

LUIS

64

M

MEX.

41

LATINO

MEX.

N/A

CARMEN

54

F

MEX.

HISPANO

HISPANO

WHITE

ELENA

53

M

MEX.

25

HISPANO

HISPANO

WHITE

CARMEN

61

F

MEX.

14

WHITE

N/A

WHITE

JOSE

55

M

MEX.
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HISPANO

HISPANO

WHITE

MARIA T

57

F

MEX.

16

MEX

MEX./WHITE

WHITE

GUADALUPE

65

M

MEX.

25

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE

MARGARITA

56

F

MEX.

18

HISPANO

WHITE

WHITE
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NAME
REBECA

AGE
39

GENDER
F

COUNTRY RESIDENCE
MEX.
13

BLANK
MEX./HISPANA

CENSUS
WHITE

N‐400
WHITE

LUCIA

35

F

MEX.

20

MEX

WHITE

WHITE

SYLVIA

37

F

MEX.

10

HISPANO

WHITE

WHITE

F

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

ISABELA
CONSUELO

57

F

MEX.

43

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

LYDIA

56

F

MEX.

18

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

JACOB

68

M

MEX.

14

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

ANTONIO

46

M

MEX.

21

HISPANO

WHITE

WHITE

JOSEFINA

46

F

MEX.

21

HISPANA

WHITE

WHITE

CRYSTAL

24

F

MEX.

21

LATINA

LATINA

WHITE

MARCO

38

M

MEX.

17

MEX

WHITE

WHITE

ROSENDA

48

F

MEX.

10

HISPANO

N/A

N/A

HILDA

65

F

MEX.

25

MEX

HISPANA

WHITE

HISPANO
AMERICANO

MESTIZA‐
INDIA/ESP

WHITE

LOURDES

47

F

MEX.

20

SOCORRO

72

F

MEX.

7

MEX.

MEX.

WHITE

VICTORIA

47

F

MEX.

5

HISPANA

MEXICANA

WHITE

ADRIANA

59

F

MEX.

9

HISPANO

N/A

WHITE

ALER

35

F

MEX.

HISPANA

WHITE

WHITE

ROBERTO

77

M

MEX.

HISPANO

WHITE

WHITE

FRANCO

56

M

MEX.

14

LATINO

WHITE

WHITE

BERTHA

38

F

MEX.

5

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE

JUAN

71

M

MEX.

20

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE

MARISOL

66

F

MEX.

26

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE

ISMAEL

76

M

MEX.

48

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE
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NAME
MARIA
ELENA

AGE

GENDER

COUNTRY RESIDENCE

BLANK

CENSUS

N‐400

74

F

MEX.

14

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

JORGE

83

M

MEX.

14

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

CRISTY

53

F

MEX.

32

HISPANA

BETTY

80

F

MEX.

MARIA J.

73

F

MEX.

ISMAEL

53

M

CONSUELO

66

ROSALIA

WHITE

MEX.

INDIA MEXICANA

WHITE

15

MEX

WHITE

WHITE

MEX.

25

HISPANO

WHITE

WHITE

F

MEX.

40

MEX.

MEX.

WHITE

F

MEX.

11

MEX.

MEX.

NATIVE
AMERICAN

HISPANO

MEXICANA

WHITE

WHITE

N/A

WHITE

CARMELA

62

F

MEX.

ERNESTO

51

M

MEX.

30
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Appendix E
VIDEO INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

NAME107

AGE

GENDER

COUNTRY

RESIDENCE

BLANK

CENSUS

N‐400

OPTIONS

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

NO

SOCORRO

70

F

MEX.

8

RAQUEL

76

F

MEX.

13

MEX.

MEX.

WHITE

NO

ZULEMA

64

F

MEX.

13

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

NO

LUIS

68

M

MEX.

14

WHITE

WHITE

WHITE

YES

CRYSTAL

24

F

MEX.

21

LATINA

LATINA

WHITE

YES

ANTONIO

46

M

MEX.

21

HISPANO

WHITE

WHITE

YES

MAITE

54

F

MEX.

30

MEX.

WHITE

WHITE

NO

CONSUELO

66

F

MEX.

40

MEX.

MEX.

WHITE
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